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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The political mobilization of Christian fundamentalists 1 in the 
late 1970's into the movement I will label "the New Christian Right" 
(NCR) has sparked much interest. There has been much written in our 
newspapers about its colorful personalities and sometimes bizarre 
actions. Political groups like the American Civil Liberties Union have 
taken the group to task for what is perceived as the movement's poten-
tial threat to our constitutional rights. Other religious traditions 
have criticized the New Christian Right for what seems like its total 
disregard for the American pluralist tradition. Even within its own 
tradition the NCR has come under attack for its supposed failure in 
grasping the actual message of Christ. With all this written material 
in existence one may ask, what can a sociologist add to what has already 
been said? The answer: a new understanding of the movement that goes 
beyond the inner life of its members and the biography· of its leaders 
1. The reader should be aware that I am differentiating between the 
terms fundamentalist, evangelical and the New Christian Right. They are 
not synonyms. In the next chapter I will explain these differences. It 
is only necessary here to say that evangelicalism is a multi-denomina-
tional religious tradition of which fundamentalism is a subgroup. In 
turn, the New Christian Right is mostly a subgrouping of fundamentalism. 
1 
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and attempts to place it within its social and historical context (cf. 
Mills, 1959:2-8). Such an understanding forces us to look past the 
facade of the movement's ideology and instead seek answers to its exis-
tence in the relationships between social groups and their relationships 
to society as a whole. Sociology offers methodologies which help us 
systematically to discover the underlying social causes of the movement 
instead of depending upon our or others' unsystematic speculations or 
polemically motivated explanations. The aim of this study is to examine 
the NCR from this perspective. The major aim of this dissertation will 
be to use the recent political activity of Christian fundamentalists as 
a "laboratory" in which to test and expand on some of the currently held 
sociological theories on social movements. I will also study the emer-
gence of the New Christian Right as a case study of the rise of right-
wing religious social movements. The study will analyze two main ques-
tions. 
(1) What is the source of the social psychological motivations leading 
these Christian fundamentalists to political action? 
(2) By what organizational structures have these individuals been able 
to collectively mobilize on the national level? 
The conceptual framework to be used will be taken basically from 
two compatible sociological perspectives on social movements: (1) the 
Politics of Lifestyle Concern and (2) Resource Mobilization Approach. 
The Politics of Lifestyle Concern approach sees right-wing social move-
ments arising out of a social group's feelings that their values, atti-
3 
tudes and lifestyle are being threatened by certain social forces. In 
order to protect their lifestyle, the social gr•)Up unites to form a 
social movement. The Resource Mobilization approach examines the vari-
ety of resources a social movement needs in order to explain how a move-
ment arises. It takes the social psychological motivations of individu-
als as given and instead focuses on the "linkages of social movements to 
other groups, the dependence of social movements upon external support 
for success, and the tactics used by authorities to control and incorpo-
rate movements." (McCarthy and Zald, 1977:1213) This joining together of 
two social theories is meant as a preliminary attempt to bring together 
the old and new in social movement theory. The Politics of Lifestyle 
Concern (see Lorentzen, 1980), a derivative of the Status Politics 
Approach, will be used to examine the social psychological motivations 
which have caused Christian fundamentalists to mobilize at this time. 
The Resource Mobilization approach (see McCarthy and Zald, 1977), the 
currently most dominant perspective in social movement theory, will be 
used to explain how these motivated fundamentalists were able to mobi-
lize in coordinated action through a preexistent social network. Both 
these theories together, if supported by the data, should offer a fuller 
understanding of the emergence of right-wing social movements than 
either would alone. 
A number of research methods, both quantitative and qualitative, 
will be used in this study. Quantitative content analysis of fundamen-
talist publications over a twenty-five year period will be used to test 
whether lifestyle concern is the source of the Christian New Right's 
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motivation. A more qualitative and historical approach will be taken to 
examine the social networks, if any, from which the NCR developed. 
A number of sociological works have been written about the NCR. 
These works have ranged from rather narrow empirical studies focusing on 
a specific aspect of the movement to broader studies concerned with more 
theoretical questions. One perspective is typified by such works as 
Hadden and Swann's (1981) Prime-time Preachers and Lipset and Raab' s 
(1981) article, "The Election and the Evangelicals" published in Commen-
tary. Both focused on limited aspects of the movement (the media and 
the 1980 election, respectively) and had as their partial aim the 
debunking of commonly held myths about the NCR. Hadden and Swann showed 
that religious programming attracts a relatively small audience despite 
the claims of the media and the televangelists themselves. Lipset and 
Raab have demonstrated that evangelicals had little importance in Reag-
an's 1980 presidential victory despite the claims of a number of politi-
cal analysts. However, while both these studies have played a valuable 
role in clarifying our image of the NCR, neither has really tried to 
make theoretical generalizations from their respective works. Their con-
cern has been solely with describing and explaining an aspect of the NCR 
in particular and not with theoretically generalizing about social move-
ments, religious fundamentalism or any related phenomenon. 
The other perspective contains articles more valuable to sociol-
ogy· These studies not only examine the movement as a whole in its 
broader societal context but have attempted to use this examination as a 
tool for the creation or modification of sociological theory. Included 
5 
within this group is Lorentzen's (1980) study in which she sees the 
movement as a response to lifestyle threats brought on by increased sec-
ularization. Gannon (1981) reaches a similar conclusion in his analysis 
of the movement. Langman (1982), developing a model based mostly on 
critical theory, sees the NCR as a political response to increased 
alienation. While these studies added to our theoretical knowledge of 
the movement, they make assumptions about the social characteristics of 
the NCR that still need to be empirically substantiated. (Some of these 
weakenesses will be discussed later in this dissertation.) 
I will examine the NCR in the same general way as these latter 
group of works. I will not only be concerned with the NCR but with what 
the movement can tell us about social movements in general. Let us now 
examine in more detail the theoretical approaches to be used in this 
study and hypotheses developed from these frameworks. 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
There has been a theoretical shift in social movement theory 
within the last decade-- a shift away from the more social psychological 
emphases of "classical" theories to the more organizational focus of 
resource mobilization. Most early theory in social movements and col-
lective behavior sought to explain the emergence of these phenomenon 
strictly by reference to the social psychological motivations or wills 
of the individuals involved. 2 If people become increasingly deprived and 
2. The exception is Heberle's (1951) work on social movements. His 
approach, although including a social psychological component, also con-
cerned itself with social movement organization as well. 
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also motivated or "inspired" to change an aspect of society, so these 
theorists say, a social movement is more likely to occur in this group 
of people. 
A few examples illustrate this approach. Both LeBon (1887) and 
Blumer (1969) stated that a social movement's initial impetus lies in a 
state of societal anomie. In times when the old norms and ideologies no 
longer hold and a new ideology has not yet been accepted, people are 
more likely to be motivated to participate in collective behavior in a 
search for meaning. Others explained social movements as being a 
response to frustrated goal attainment (Gurr, 1970; Davies, 1962). 
These theorists saw the impetus to this frustration in "relative depri-
vation". Smelser (1963), with his structural strain concept, was more 
general, stating that a necessary component to collective action was 
some type of "structural strain" which caused social psychological dis-
content in a segment of society. This strain was explained to the indi-
vidual by a generalized belief which identified the source of the strain 
and ways to alleviate it. 
These social psychological approaches have recently come under 
attack on both empirical (e.g., Portes, 1971) and theoretical (e.g., 
Oberschall, 1978) grounds. The most influential of these criticisms has 
been leveled by advocates of what has come to be called the resource 
mobilization approach to social movements. According to McCarthy and 
Zald (1977:1213) 
The resource mobilization approach emphasizes both societal support 
and constraint of social movement phenomena. It examines the vari-
ety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of social 
movements to other groups, the dependence of social movements upon 
7 
external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to 
control or incorporate movements. 
Since the approach's emphasis is on group resources and structure and 
not on the social psychology of its individual members, it is not sur-
prising that it finds theories of social movements which emphasize indi-
vidual motivations, grievances and/or frustrations inadequate. As 
McCarthy and Zald have pointed out, frustration, and grievances exist 
all throughout society, yet only certain groups choose to act collec-
tively. The resource mobilization approach claims that these groups are 
not necessarily made up of the most frustrated or discontented people 
but of those who have the necessary societal support, preexistent social 
networks and/or use the right tactics in order to mobilize successfully. 
There is always enough discontent in any society to supply the 
grassroots support for a movement if the movement is effectively 
organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some 
established elite. [Turner and Killian (1972) quoted in McCarthy and 
Zald (1977)] 
Resource mobilization does present an important aspect of social 
movement emergence which previous approaches neglected, i.e. social 
resources. However, in its zeal to address the problems and overem-
phases of the classical approach, it turns its back on and discounts 
some of the questions that these approaches were trying to answer. For 
example, what motivates individuals to want to use their resources to 
form a social movement in the first place?; to choose a certain issue 
around which to form social movement rather than another? Surely, as 
important as a group's resources are, they cannot fully answer these two 
questions. So the same type of criticism resource mobilization leveled 
against the "classical approach can also be leveled against it. There 
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are many groups in a society which have resources, societal support, 
access to a preexistent social network and know how to use the right 
tactics, yet not all these groups have mobilized collectively as a 
social movement. Some do not have members with any important grievances 
(cf. Gamson, 1968:95-7). 
Instead of rejecting one approach in preference to the other it 
may be more advantageous to perceive each approach as yielding a partial 
grasp of reality. Each highlights a certain aspect of social movement 
phenomena while neglecting another. By piecing the two approaches 
together a fuller understanding of social movements may be possible. It 
is this combined approach, I plan to take in this proposed dissertation. 
A fruitful place to start this process is in examining the difference 
between a social movement and a social movement organization. 
THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION 
McCarthy and Zald (1977) make a useful distinction between a 
social movement and a social movement organization (SMO). A social 
movement is defined as 
a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents pref-
erences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or 
reward distribution of society ... social movements (are viewed) as 
nothing more than preference structures directed toward social 
change. (pp 1217-8) 
One must notice that this definition of a social movement is very dif-
ferent from the sociological definitions of the past. The social move-
ment, in past cases, implied that collective action would itself neces-
sarily take place. In the case of resource mobilization this is not 
assumed to be so. A social movement is essentially just a group of pee-
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ple, not necessarily organized or in contact with each other, who have a 
similar set of political opinions, grievances, motivations, or prefer-
ences concerning the changing of society. 
Although the resource mobilization theorists espouse this defini-
tion of a social movement, they do not try to explain the social move-
ment's existence. This approach takes the social movement and its moti-
vations as given. As Turner and Killian note, there are enough 
preference structures existing in society to supply support for any num-
ber of collective responses so that an explanation of how these prefer-
ences arose is not important. 
On the other hand, however, it is just these motivations which the 
classical theorists studied. Their concern was examining the process by 
which certain grievances (preferences) developed in a population, which 
they assumed led directly to collective action. These theorists' major 
problem was seeking to explain the emergence of collective action 
strictly with reference to these motivations, opinions, and grievances. 
Therefore, the social psychological theorists, while not being able to 
explain collective action fully, may be able to help us understand how 
certain preference structures arise. It is in this way we shall view 
the social psychological theory. 
An SMO is defined as "a complex formal organization which identi-
fies its goals with the preference of a social movement or a counter-
movement and attempts to implement those goals." (McCarthy and Zald, 
1977:1218) It is the SMO which takes collective action in order to 
implement the preferences of the larger social movement. So for exam-
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ple, the social movement of the NCR is made up of various SMOs including 
the Moral Majority, the Christian Voice, and the Religious Roundtable. 
All these organizations translate the opinions and preferences of the 
NCR social movement into action. 
It is this translation process which is best explained by the 
resource mobilization approach for it is the resources that make this 
translation process possible. A group of people cannot depend solely on 
motivations for action to take place. In order for preferences to be 
translated into action, for example, some type of preexistent organiza-
tion or network is needed within the population holding the preferences. 
This organization or network brings this population of shared prefer-
ences together and integrates them, allowing for easier communication 
and faster, more extensive mobilization. The preexistent organization 
takes isolated individuals and ties them together in a relatively coor-
dinated organization. 
In summary, we see that both these approaches explain an aspect of 
social movement phenomenon. The social psychological approach seems 
potentially better suited to explaining the growth of the preference 
structure. The resource mobilization approach is more useful in 
explaining how this preference structure gets translated into collective 
action. 
In the rest of this section, we will use some of the above consid-
erations to build a framework for the study of the New Christian Right. 
The development of the preference structure will be studied with the 
Politics of Lifestyle Concern approach. The translation of this prefer-
11 
ence structure into collective action may be understood by using the 
Resource Mobilization approach to comprehend the development of the 
preexistent social network from which the NCR's organizations developed. 
LIFESTYLE CONCERN AND THE PREFERENCE STRUCTURE 
The Politics of Lifestyle Concern (PLC) approach, and its related 
approach (Status Politics), have been employed many times in the past to 
explain the rise of right-wing, extremist movements. It will be used 
here in order to develop and test a conceptual framework which explains 
the rise of the NCR movement. At the end of this section two hypotheses 
will be presented to be tested in the proposed dissertation. 
The PLC approach has its roots in Weber's concept of status. 
According to Weber (1978:305-7), a status group is a "plurality of per-
sons who, within a larger group successfully claim (a) special social 
esteem, and possibly also, (b) status monopolies." 
Societies and communities contain a status hierarchy. The 
arrangement of this hierarchy is based on the relative prestige accorded 
each group. This position, in turn, determines the group's relative 
amount of power. 
Some later writers have used Weber's concepts to explore the 
nature of right-wing movements. (e.g., Hofstader, 1955; Lipset and Raab, 
1970) In general, they all have seen the source of reactionary politics 
in shifts in the status hierarchy caused by social changes. Such shifts 
may threaten the prestige and power of certain groups within the hier-
archy. These groups may seek to maintain or gain status through politi-
cal movements. For example, Gusfield (1963) uses this approach to 
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explain the emergence of the American Temperance Movement. He states, 
in one instance, that late 19th-century immigration into the United 
States became a threat to the prestige of the dominant Protestant status 
group. The immigrants did not honor the prestige nor follow the lifes-
tyle of the dominant group. According to Gusfield, the Temperance move-
ment was a "symbolic" effort by the dominant status group to regain its 
lost honor by legislating an aspect of their lifestyle (temperance), 
thus demonstrating to the society the dominance and prestige of their 
status group. 
More recent authors have prefered to view such "symbolic crusades" 
not as status enhancements but as lifestyle protections. (Zurcher, et 
al., 1971; Page and Clelland, 1978; Lorentzen, 1980) These researchers 
have claimed that to focus on status before one focuses on lifestyle is 
"to place the cart before the horse" (Lorentzen, 1980: 147) ' I s1nce one s 
relative status and prestige are ultimately based on the community's 
evaluation of one's lifestyle. So, in Page and Clelland's (1978:266) 
view, "symbolic crusades" should not be examined as attempts "to defend 
against declining prestige but the attempt to defend a way of life." 
So, as Zurcher et al. (1971) has shown, the anti-pornography campaigns 
of some communities is an attempt to destroy a potential threat to the 
values, and attitudes (lifestyle) of the community. 
The PLC approach has been applied to the New Christian Right. 
Lorentzen, in her study of the 1978 Democratic nomination process for 
the U.S. Senate seat in Virginia, established that those evangelicals 
involved in the campaign expressed a concern for protecting their lifes-
13 
tyle against the onslaughts of political, social, and moral liberalism. 
However, Lorentzen study has two flaws (besides neglecting the whole 
question of organization and resources). First, although she concludes 
that lifestyle concern was the motivating factor behind these people's 
political activism, she can not clearly make this conclusion because 
longitudinal data were not used in her research. Establishing that 
these people expressed lifestyle concerns is not the same as establish-
ing that such concerns were an actual motivating factor. She does not 
offer longitiudinal evidence which would show that before this group was 
politically active their lifestyle concerns were less intense. It may 
be, after all, that all fundamentalists express concerns about their 
threatened lifestyle whether active in politics or not. If this be the 
case, then lifestyle concerns cannot be the factor causing the one 
group's activism. 
Secondly, Lorentzen fails to explain why these lifestyle concerns 
should arise in political 'action at this time. She fails to elaborate 
on her statement that this contemporary political action is a result of 
increased secularization. This is an unsatisfactory explanation. Secu-
larization has been an ongoing process throughout the 20th century, yet 
only at certain times has fundamentalism chosen to mobilize politi-
cally. 3 Some other process, covarying with fundamentalist activism, must 
3. I am differentiating between political organizations made up of 
fundamentalists and fundamentalist political organizations. Fundamen-
talists have always been involved in political organizations especially 
of right wing orientation. However, only at certain times have 'offi-
cial' fundamentalist political organizations existed. 
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be found. 
In order to test this PLC approach to the study of the New Chris-
tian Right, I will need to avoid these two flaws. The research design 
used in the present study (and discussed in chapter 3) will overcome the 
longitudinal data problem. The answer to the second problem-- why there 
is an increase in political discontent at this time-- calls for an exam-
ination of past lifestyle concern movements and their causes. 
Upon examination at least one process, immigration, has been found 
by some observers to cause status concerns within the native population 
at many points in American history. We already, for example, have men-
tioned how Gusfield (1963) found that one possible factor behind the 
Temperance Movement could be 19th-century immigration. The immigrant 
became a threat to the status prestige of the dominant status group. At 
first glance, it may appear that immigration would hardly be an impetus 
behind the NCR's status concerns. There has not been an influx of for-
eign immigrants to the extent this is apparent at other times in U.S. 
history.~ However, upon closer look, there has been 1 major migration 
pattern within the U.S. in the 1960's and 1970's --the migration to the 
Sunbelt from the Snowbelt-- which has already had a profound effect on 
the United States (Biggar,1979) and which may also be the source of the 
fundamentalism's already hypothesized increased lifestyle concern. 
4. This does not mean that foreign immigration has not occurred or 
played some part recently in the rise of right-wing extremism. The 
immigration of Vietnamese fishermen in Texas and the Ku Klux Klan's 
response is one example. 
15 
THE RISE OF THE SUNBELT 
According to Biggar, 
The Sunbelt-- the U.S. frontier of the 1970's-- is now the most rap-
idly growing segment of this nation. The emerging mix of people 
from the North and East- some of whom are returning South- with 
those already in the South and West reflects a radical change in 
historical regional distribution patterns of the U.S. popula-
tion. (1979: 3) 
Table 1 demonstrates this change. In the years from 1970 to 1975 net 
migration to the South South5 was 6 times more than in the preceeding 5 
year period. At the same time, the Northeast and North Central states 
experienced a loss of population to migration. The traditional migra-
tion pattern has been reversed as younger migrants move from the more 
urban North and Midwest to the rural or small town South and 
West.(Freymeyer, 1981:1) 
What is at the root of this demographic change? These changes due 
to two major factors. First, industry has found the Sunbelt increas-
ingly more attractive. According to Biggar, 
Manufacturing jobs grew particularly rapidly during the 1960's. 
Despite the general U.S. recession, such jobs still rose 432,000 
(7 .5 percent) in the Sunbelt in the first six years of the 1970's 
while declining by nearly 400,000 in the U.S. as a whole and by 
769,000 in the Northeast and 185,000 in the North Central states. 
5. Geographical areas will be defined according to Biggar's cri-
terion. The Northeast consists of Maine, New Hamphire, Vermont Massa-
chusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylva-
nia. The North Central states are Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, 
Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska and Kansas. 
The Southern states are Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, 
Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Okla-
homa, and Texas. Lastly, the Western States consists of Montana, Idaho, 
Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Washington, Ore-
gon, California, Alaska and Hawaii. 
TABLE 1 
Net Migration Into U.S. Regions (1950-1975) 
(in millions) 
PERIOD 
50-55 
55-60 
60-65 
65-70 
70-75 
source: 
NORTH-
EAST 
0.4 
0.0 
0.3 
0.1 
-0.7 
REGION 
NORTH 
CENTRAL 
0.4 
-0.7 
-0.8 
0.1 
-0.8 
SOUTH 
-1.6 
0.3 
0.3 
0.4 
2.6 
U.S Bureau of the Census, 
"Estimating of Populations of States 
with Components of Change: 
1970-1975." 
Current Population Reports, 
Series P-25, No. 640, 
November 1976, 
Table B. 
(1979:26) 
WEST 
1.9 
2.0 
1.7 
1.1 
1.4 
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This rise in jobs has not just been in the traditionally low wage 
industries as is sometimes assumed. While the South does account for 
from 60 to 70% of all low wage employment nationally, low wage indus-
tries accounted for only about 40% of the South' manufacturing employ-
ment. However, in either case the wages paid are still lower that in the 
North and Midwest. (Watkins and Perry, 1977:42) 
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Business perceives the Sunbelt as a place to accumulate maximum 
profit. Energy costs are lower in the Sunbelt because of both the Sun-
belt's warmer climate and its closer proximity to the sources of energy. 
Transportation has improved and expanded in this area. But most impor-
tantly, as alluded to above, labor is cheaper and more easily controlled 
in the Sunbelt. The rate of unionization in the Sunbelt is half that of 
the rest of the nation, meaning lower wages paid to workers. Most 
states have "Right to Work" laws in the Sunbelt which business believes 
creates less labor-management conflict. (cf. Ashton, 1978) Each of these 
factors is conducive to creating a favorable business environment (Big-
gar, 1979: 24-5). 
As business and industry leaves the Snowbelt for the Sunbelt, so 
do the jobs. As unemployment rose in the North and Midwest at the same 
time as job opportunities grew in the South and West, job seekers were 
inevitably drawn to the growth areas. However, jobs are not the only 
things that "seduce" the potential migrant. The South and West also 
have milder climates and lower taxes. Also, many migrants have percep-
tions that the South has lower crime rates and a rural - small town 
lifestyle which is captivating to the Northerner tired of urban life. 
I am hypothesizing that this demographic change could not help but 
have an effect on the political and social environment of the Sunbelt. 
The individual migrants come to the Sunbelt not only with the promise of 
a job but with needs and expectations developed from a lifetime of 
Northern socialization. Their lifetime in the North has caused them to 
see certain programs and facilities offered by North as necessities of 
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life (cf. Thurow, 1979). The young couple with children expects a 
quality education for their youngsters, meaning not only the introduc-
tion of new ideas into the Sunbelt curriculum but the necessity for 
increased taxes in order to handle the influx of new residents. The 
migrants' demand for housing changes the physical face of the community. 
The "newly arrived" do not leave their political and religious ideas in 
the North but seek to express them in their new homes. They also carry 
with them their likes and dislikes in entertainment and leisure activi-
ties, which may not readily be met in their new environment. As Watkins 
and Perry (1979:20-21) say, "the general flow of population from the 
rural to urban areas has meant that small-town values have been diffused 
by the more cosmopolitan outlook of metropolitan America." 
The fulfillment of such expectations, the enactment of such val-
ues, it is hypothesized, cannot help but bring them into conflict with 
the more conservative native "Sunbelter" (Thatcher, 1978). These 
changes represent both symbolic and real threats to the natives in gen-
eral and fundamentalists in particular. The native Sunbelter reasons 
that, since the newcomers seek to change our environment, the tradi-
tional Southerner lifestyle and all it represents are in peril of being 
destroyed. To protect their threatened lifestyle, the fundamentalists 
launch a symbolic crusade, that is, they attempt to legislate aspects of 
their lifestyle, thus protecting and legitimating it by giving it the 
state's "seal of approval". The NCR, it will be hypothesized here, rep-
resents this symbolic crusade. 
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HYPOTHESES ON THE PREFERENCE STRUCTURE 
Two hypotheses will be tested concerning the development of the New 
Christian Right social movement. 
(1) The NCR preference structure is the result of increased lifestyle 
concerns in Sunbelt fundamentalism. 
(2) These lifestyle threats are the result of Snowbelt migration into 
the Sunbelt. 
The analysis cannot be left at this point, for I have only 
accounted for the development of the motivations and beliefs of a group 
of individuals. I have not yet examined how these motivations are 
translated into political action. More specifically, unless a preexis-
tent social network exists within this group, the lifestyle-concerned 
individuals will remain isolated, unable to communicate and to mobilize. 
I will develop a rudimentary framework to study this aspect of this 
social movement in the next section. 
THE PREEXISTENT SOCIAL NETWORK 
Most "classical" theories of social movements held to the assump-
tion that movements were spontaneous, unstructured occurrences (Couch, 
1968:319). The typical scenario pictured the movement emerging suddenly 
out of a discontented group of individuals who, by some "miraculous" 
process (e.g., contagion and the group mind), simultaneously decided to 
take collective action. As some more recent writers have pointed out, 
however, this scenario lacks any empirical foundation (e.g., Couch, 
1968) . A social movement does not emerge overnight nor does member 
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recruitment take place like the spreading of disease through the air. 
Social movements develop and spread through preexisting social networks. 
A social network is defined as "a specific type of relation linking a 
defined set of persons objects, or events." (Knoke and Kuklinski, 
1982:12) 
The resource mobilization approach has emphasized the need for 
studying this aspect of the social movement, although many of its theo-
rists still focus mostly on external resources and a movement 1 s rela-
tionship with external organizations (Oberschall, 1973; McCarthy and 
Zald, 1973). Recently, however, a number of scholars have begun to 
examine the importance of internal organization and the extent to which 
an organizational foundation precedes social movement mobilization. 
Morris (1981) found that the black sit-in movement of the sixties devel-
oped out of a network of local churches, colleges, and personal friend-
ship ties. Tierney (1982) has examined the Battered Women Movement 1 s 
development from a network of feminist, nursing, and social welfare 
groups. Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson (1981) have shown how non-tra-
ditional religious movements use the personal friendship networks of 
their members to recruit new members. All these studies show that some 
type of preexistent social network is necessary for the dissemination of 
information, tactics, and strategies, the coordination of widely dis-
persed social units, the mobilization of resources for collective action 
and the recruitment of new members; what network analysts have called 
instrumental relations. (Granovetter, 1974; Boissevain, 1974) 
The preexistent social network, however, not only provides a means 
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of communication but also provides a set of resources to the social 
movement (Lin, 1982). Social networks come with social units and con-
tacts "owning" resources which may be valuable to the growth and success 
of a social movement. Such resources include media expertise, contacts 
to the institutional order, or links to financial resources. Each 
resource may either help or hinder the social movement's ability to per-
form and succeed at certain tactics and/or strategies, giving them the 
ability to enact its strategies and tactics. (Zald and McCarthy, 1979) 
The relationship between a social movement and its strategies does 
not end, however, with the enactment of strategy. To a great extent, 
the strategies and tactics of a social movement may react back on it and 
affect the structure and ideology of the movement. This is especially 
true today since most movements' tactics are geared to gaining media 
coverage. The media are the major source of a citizen's political 
knowledge, largely determining what people perceive as legitimate polit-
ical alternatives. The social movement that gains access to the news 
media is not immune from this socializing process. The image of the 
social movement which the media presents becomes accepted by the social 
movement, that is, the social movement begins to take its self-image 
from what the media write about it. Molotch (1979) sees three moments 
in the relationship between the media and a social movement. 
(1) GAINING ACCESS TO MEDIA- Since what the news media present as news 
is accepted by its readers as an issue of importance (Tuchman, 1978:2), 
the social movement, to be taken seriously, must attract the media's 
attention. To do this, a social movement must present itself as new-
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sworthy- "as being something readers want to or need to know." This may 
be a rather difficult challenge for a social movement to meet since 
social movements do not, in most cases, naturally fit the media's defi-
nition of being newsworthy. Therefore, in order to gain media atten-
tion, the movement must find some tactics for making itself look new-
sworthy. 
(2) TRANSFORMATION OF EVENT INTO NEWS PERSPECTIVE- The media do not just 
present newsworthy events, they also transform the events into what 
Altheide (1976) has called the news perspective. They distort the 
actual event by taking it out of its real context and recontextualizing 
it into the world of the media with its own interests and needs. 
(3) NEWS PERSPECTIVE TRANSFORMS f'lOVEMENT- The transformed view of the 
social movement created by the media reacts back upon the social move-
ment itself. 
The NCR offers the researcher an interesting situation for the 
study of social networks and social movements. Fundamentalism has 
always shunned centralized national organizations and denominations 
(e.g., Marsden, 1980:34) in favor of decentralized, locally autonomous 
churches and programs. Fundamentalist churches have been "connected" in 
a loosely federated network of congregations at a regional or local 
level. On the other hand, the NCR social movement and its SMO' s are 
nationally coordinated. If a social network is needed for collective 
action to take place, how was a previously decentralized religious sys-
tem able to spawn a national movement? (Or the question may be, is the 
NCR really a national movement?) 
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QUESTIONS ON PREEXISTENT NETWORK 
Unlike fn the last section on the politics of lifestyle concern, the 
portion of the present study related to the NCR's preexistent social 
network will be guided by general questions rather than specific hypoth-
eses in a similar manner to that of Glazer and Strauss' (1967) Grounded 
Theory. 
(1) What early 1970s networks was the fundamentalist preference struc-
ture able to use to mobilize collectively on the national level? 
(2) How did this social network develop? 
(3) Following from Morris (1981), how has this social network affected 
the nature and extent of the strategies and tactics the NCR has taken? 
(4) How have these strategies and tactics affected the NCR? 
OVERVIEW OF DISSERTATION 
This dissertation contains eight chapters including the present 
chapter. Chapter II presents a brief survey of the evangelical tradi-
tion. The aim of this chapter is to differentiate between many of the 
terms which sometimes enter into the discussion of the NCR, primarily 
distinguishing between the terms fundamentalism, evangelicalism and the 
NCR. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the NCR's ideology. 
In chapter III the PLC hypotheses are tested using quantitative 
content analysis of fundamentalist publications. What the analysis in 
this chapter will show is that the PLC hypotheses must be rejected. 
Lifestyle concern cannot account for the rise the NCR. 
Chapter IV is a methodological chapter in which I will try to 
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identify the subgroup structure and linkages of the NCR in 1980. These 
results will be used in chapter V and VI. 
Chapters V and VI attempt to explain how the 1980 network struc-
ture came into existence and how this helps us understand the rise of 
the NCR and its use of tactics. In these chapters, I identify two net-
works from which the NCR developed: (1) secular old right (most notably 
the group called the Young Americans for Freedom), (2) fundamentalist 
groups involved in the Church Growth and National Evangelism movements 
of the late 1960s and the early 1970s. 
In chapter VII, I will examine the last preexistent social network 
question. To do this I will focus on only one, though prominent, tac-
tic- tactics aimed at gaining media coverage. 
In the last chapter I will summarize the major findings, discuss 
their theoretical implications, and make some recommendations for future 
research. 
CHAPTER II 
EVANGELICALS, FUNDAMENTALISTS, AND THE NCR 
Before I can analyze the hypotheses and questions presented in 
chapter 1, it is first necessary to define some of the terms to be used 
in this study, especially those pertaining to the religious tradition of 
much of the NCR. Of all the aspects of the NCR the role religion plays 
in the movement has been of the most interest. Despite this interest it 
is also the area least understood and the most distorted. The root of 
this distortion and ignorance lies in falsely assuming that various 
terms-- evangelical, fundamentalist, religious right-- refer to the same 
thing. Host commentators on the movement hold on to that commonsense 
(yet false belief) that conservative religious beliefs nessarily imply 
conservative politics. Marty (1980) states: "The media's communicators 
do most evangelicals a disservice when they clump them with the NCR." 
Examples of this faulty analysis are numerous. Deborah Huntington 
and Ruth Kaplan (1982), for instance, attempt to catalogue all Christian 
Right groups by listing all groups with an "evangelical" affiliation. 
Unfortunately, many of those evangelical groups and individuals listed 
are either neutral toward the New Right (e.g., Billy Graham) or totally 
opposed to it (e.g., John Alexander of Inter-Varsity Fellowship). Lang-
man (1982) uses demographic information on fundamentalists as if the 
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information also the characterized NCRists. The usual demographic pro-
file characterizes "fundamentalists" as predominantly female, middle 
aged, working class and Southern in residence (cf. Hunter, 1983). Actu-
ally, however, if Lorentzen 1 s (1980) findings are reflective of the 
whole NCR movement, those involved in the movement are demographically 
quite different from "general fundamentalism". She describes a movement 
dominated by college-educated males in their late 30 1 s. In both the 
above cases, as well as in many others, we see the analysts unknowingly 
assuming that the labels for certain groups are synomous terms for the 
same phenomena when actually upon closer view they are not. In order to 
avoid these same problems we need to define what is meant by the terms 
evangelical, fundamentalist, and New Christian Right. 
EVANGELICALISM AND ITS DIVERSITY 
Unlike what is commonly assumed, evangelicalism is not a homogeneous 
movement. As Moberg (1975:149) states 
evangelicals come from a broad range of theological, denominational, 
historical, educational, cultural, ethnic, and other backgrounds, it 
is no wonder that they do not comprise a homogeneous segment of the 
population on anything other than the central tenets of faith which 
give them a distinctive identity in our pluralistic society. Even 
the faith position may be variously interpreted on the levels of 
implications for action, internalized subtleties of meaning and 
depths of conviction. 
A September 15, 1980 Gallup poll published in Newsweek illustrates this 
diversity in the realm of politics. Except for the issues of prayer in 
school and abortion there is little difference between evangeli"cals and 
the rest of the U.S. population on political questions. To make the 
simplistic assumption, then, that all evangelicals are right-wing extre-
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mists is to distort the facts and to present the group as less diverse 
than it really is. 
Having said this, then, what are "evangelicals" and what does this 
diverse group hold in common? Evangelicals represent a multi-denomina-
tional religious tradition whose members adhere to the following conser-
vative Protestant religious beliefs (Quebedeaux, 1978). They believe 
in: 
(1) (T)he full authority of Scriptures in matters of faith and prac-
tice. 
(2) (T)he necessity of personal faith in Jesus Christ as Savior and 
Lord (conversion) ... 1 
(3) (T)he urgency of seeking conversion of sinful men and women to 
Christ (evangelism). 
Beyond these common beliefs there is a diversity of overlapping groups 
within evangelicalism, dividing themselves on both "minor" theological 
doctrines and political, social and lifestyle issues. One such subgroup 
of evangelicalism is "fundamentalism". 
FUNDAMENTALISTS 
There are many characteristics which distinguish "fundamentalists" 
from "evangelicals" as a whole (Ammerman, 1982; Hill and Owens, 1982). 
Only four will be dealt with here-- (1) literalism, (2) anti-tradition-
alism, and (3) extreme separatism. 
1. Many evangelicals do not believe this process of conversion 
must be an instantaneous occurrence although many will say some type 
of turning point in one's life must occur which will lead to a grad-
ual conversion. Others within the ranks believe the conversion is 
instantaneous. 
28 
LITERALISM 
First, fundamentalists have a different view on how to interpret 
the Bible, holding to an extreme literalism (Ammerman, 1982). They 
believe the words and sentences of the Bible must be taken as literal 
truth with no regard to symbolic literary devices nor with any reference 
to what the words and sentences may have meant within the historical 
context in which they were written. This is a very different view from 
that held by many evangelicals. While both fundamentalists and evangel-
icals, for the most part, believe the Bible to be the infallible word of 
God with full authority over Christians, the evangelical may well 
believe that this "Word" may be expressed through symbolic means. To 
this person it is the message that is inerrant, not the literal incident 
being described in the passage. Also this same evangelical may realize 
that to truly understand a passage she or he must read it in its histor-
ical context. To illustrate this difference, it is only necessary to 
compare the way each might view the Creation story in the Bible. The 
fundamentalist would take the story as a literal account of how the 
world was formed and life created. Many evangelicals would be more con-
cerned with the Gospel implications which God is relating through this 
story to those who are reading it (cf. Christianity Today, 1983). 
SPIRITUALIZING 
This is not to say that fundamentalists always interpret_passages 
literally. When such interpretations conflict with their own cultural, 
social, and political views, more symbolic meanings may be used. The 
fundamentalists use a number of techniques for explaining away the lit-
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eral meaning of a passage without giving up their literalist view of 
the Bible. First, they avoid translating a passage literally by spirit-
ualizing it, that is, by taking a passage and viewing it as if it were 
presenting some spiritual symbolism. This is especially used in the 
Gospels. For example, fundamentalists often spiritualize what is known 
as the "Magnificat" (Luke 1:46-SS)(Yoder, 1972: 18). In one section this 
passage states 
He has shown strength with his arm, 
He has scattered the proud in the imagination of their hearts, 
He has put down the mighty from their thrones, 
And exalted those of low degree; 
He has filled the hungry with good things, 
And the rich he has sent away empty. 
If interpreted literally, such a verse would clearly have radical polit-
ical implications. However, such an interpretation would not fit well 
with a group that usually "sacralizes" capitalism. Therefore, the pas-
sage is taken to express spiritual truth, i.e. The hungry who are filled 
are the "spiritually" hungry. 
DISPENSATIONAL THEOLOGY 
A second technique used to avoid interpreting passages literally 
is what is known as dispensational theology. Very briefly, dispensa-
tional theology divides the history of the world into a number of dif-
ferent stages (or dispensations) each with its own cultural and spirit-
ual laws and rules. What may be an appropriate behavior or religious 
practice in one stage may not be in the next. With such an assumption 
it is easy to avoid following literally the religious requirements of 
other times without denying the literalism of Bible. For example, the 
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glossolalia and economic communal sharing of the first-century church 
are seen as no longer applicable since this church was under a different 
dispensation. 2 
ANTI-TRADITIONALISM 
The second manner in which fundamentalists differ from evangeli-
cals is in fundamentalism's anti-traditionalism and anti-history per-
spective (Hill and Owen, 1982:85-86). Many evangelicals and most other 
Christian traditions see, for the most part, "the present as being con-
ditioned by the events and forms of the past." These groups accept the 
fact that from the time of the first-century Christian church until now, 
some great theologians and philosophers have added to the understanding 
of the Christian message and that the addition of new rituals has 
improved worship. In general, they believe that God continues to some 
degree to reveal more knowledge of his likeness through the workings of 
their churches and through their continued study of the Bible. Funda-
mentalists not only reject this view but see it as a heresy. Hill and 
Owen (1982: 85) describe this view with reference to one of the NCR's 
minister/leaders as follows. 
2. Another way in which fundamentalists view the Bible dif-
ferently is in their use of "proof-texting". They take specific sen-
tences and passages, sometimes out of their written contexts, to prove 
specific points of belief. An evangelical would more likely try to dis-
cern the meaning of a passage within the context it was written in. 
Examples of proof texting are abundant in the literature of the NCR. 
Falwell (1980:13), in his book Listen America, uses this technique to 
demonstrate that the free enterprise system is Biblically mandated. An 
even better example is the Moral Majority's nationally advertised Chris-
tian Bill of Rights where each amendment includes a corresponding Bible 
reference. 
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Falwell represents yet another Protestant perspective in which the 
erosion and nurture of time is not felt ... Church history- indeed, 
the whole life of the church- must count for naught as we equate two 
mystical moments, the earliest church and our congregation here and 
now. The notion of development is heretical from this perspective, 
for it suggests images of growth and increased understanding- con-
cepts now in the lexicon of Darwinian evolution. Against a static 
model of the New Testament Church, all development constitutes devi-
ance. 
The view is held to such an extreme extent in some quarters of fundamen-
talism so that some fundamentalists (one I observed for this project) 
deny that fundamentalism has any historical connection with Luther, Cal-
vin, or the Protestant Reformation in general. William Ward Ayer, a New 
York City radio evangelist of the 1950s, expressed the same beliefs. 
Fundamentalism represents a resurgence of ancient practices, which 
began not with Martin Luther but at Pentecost. Fundamentalism is 
apostolic and the doctrine of justification goes back to Paul. That 
branch from which the fundamentalist movement sprang lived obscurely 
through the ages had never been completely silenced even in the Dark 
Ages. (Gasper, 1963:2) 
EXTREME SEPARATISM 
The last distinguishing feature of fundamentalism to be mentioned 
here is its strict separatism (Ammerman, 1982:171). Fundamentalists 
take literally the Biblical admonition not to be unequally yoked, not 
only with reference to marriage but in every other relationship as well. 
In fact, the only time being in the company of non-fundamentalists is 
not discouraged is when the fundamentalist is attempting to "win the 
soul" (convert) of the "non-believer". This belief has resulted in, as 
Ammerman (1982: 171) states, "distinctive fundamentalist lifestyles and 
in organizational isolation from the evangelical mainstream." Both of 
these results will prove important to our later analyses. 
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FUNDAMENTALISM VERSUS THE NCR AND NEW RIGHT 
Let· us now distinguish fundamentalism from the NCR. The NCR will 
simply be defined as a right-wing politico-religious movement of 1970s 
and 80s America made up mostly of politically active fundamentalists. 
The NCR then in this dissertation's usage, is a subgrouping of fundamen-
talism. 3 
I must also mention that in this dissertation that the term "New 
Right" will not be used as a synonym for NCR. There are many groups 
involved in this "new Conservatism" that do not identify themselves as 
fundamentalist (e.g., Richard Viguerie). Such groups have ties to the 
religious groups but the nature of these ties have not yet systemati-
cally been analyzed. One minor aim of this research will be to analyze 
this relationship. 
Having differentiated between the NCR and other terms, I will now 
discuss what the NCR believes. In this section I will briefly outline 
the basics of New Christian Right ideology, taking most of this informa-
tion from the works of Jerry Falwell. Falwell, pastor of the Thomas 
Road Baptist Church in Lynchburg Virginia, is a chief spokesman for this 
movement having founded one of its major SMO' s-- The Moral Majority. 
Although Falwell does not speak for the whole movement, his viewpoints 
are fairly representative of the movement. 
3. Although Catholics, Mormons, Jews and many broader base evangel-
icals are members of New Christian Right organizations they represent 
only a small percentage of the group, and hardly any of the leadership. 
(Zwier, 1982; Hill and Owen, 1982:31) 
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IDEOLOGY 
The NCR sees present America as a chosen nation fallen from grace. 
Falwell states that America was a nation founded upon Christian princi-
ples. The Puritans "had come in search of a place where they could 
freely worship God and live in total commitment to His laws." (Falwell, 
1980: 30) The American Revolution was fought with and for Christian 
ideals. The Constitution of the United States was created after much 
prayer and meditation. While Falwell does not believe that all individ-
uals involved in the founding of the nation were born-again Christians, 
he does believe they were all very much influenced by Christian princi-
ples. 
According to the movement, America today has wandered away from 
these moral principles and so is experiencing decline. We have substi-
tuted for the divinely created free enterprise system, welfarism and 
socialism. In supporting the SALT talks and detente, we have become 
more concerned with security than with the eternal principles of free-
dom. We have made the government God instead of making it humankind's 
servant. We have substituted welfare programs and food stamps for the 
divinely inspired work ethic. Attacks by homosexuals, feminists, and 
"secular humanists" have been destroying the traditional family system 
ordained by God. At the same time, drug use and pornography have become 
widespread. To many members of the NCR, these are signs that America 
has forgotten its original calling. 
Falwell says that there are four factors causing the economic and 
moral decline of America: secular humanism, centralization, increase in 
'.\,· 
''>.} 
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moral decadence, and lack of Christian leadership. First, is the rise 
of secular humanism. Secular humanism, although somewhat vaguely 
defined, is thought of as a "No God" religion that puts its faith in 
humanity instead of God. It provides no universal authority or values 
and instead places final authority within each individual. The NCR 
believes that secular humanism leads to political and moral anarchy 
where everyone does his/her own thing without concern for anyone else. 
A nation in this state is vulnerable to totalitarian control. 
Since secular humanism sees human beings as not being created in 
the image of God, reasons Falwell, it also relegates humankind to the 
level of animals. Since humanism centers on the self, it creates self-
ish human beings unwilling to help each other. Secular humanism is 
destroying, in this movement's view, the Christian principles which have 
made America great. It is destroying the rules and regulations which 
have kept American society together and replaced them with anarchy, 
self-centeredness and apathy. (The Messenger, 1981:1) 
Falwell identified three means by which secular humanists spread 
their "Satanic" philosophy: public education, television, and the popu-
lar arts. In stressing social and psychological growth instead of fac-
tual knowledge, public education socializes its students in humanistic 
values. Students learn no moral absolutes and instead are left to 
develop their own value systems. They enter the world with a value sys-
tem that is relative and take with them ethics that are situational. 
According to Falwell (1981: 192), "television is brainwashing children, 
young people, and adults to accept an amoral lifestyle." It reinforces 
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human beings' baser aspects, like sexual immorality and violence, while 
espousing the relativistic and self-centered philosophy of the human-
ists. The popular arts, especially rock music, do the same.~ 
The second factor responsible for the decline of American society 
according the NCR is the centralization of government. This centraliza-
tion is contrary to what the Founding Fathers' imagined government to 
be. They saw government as a servant of the people while centralization 
has made it the American people's God. We have exchanged the divinely 
inspired free enterprise system for an all-embracing government; welfa-
rism for self initiative; Divine Providence for the super-state. The 
result has been a decline in productivity and the work ethic. Centrali-
zation has produced an apathetic nation which depends on the state for 
all its needs instead of on God and the nation's own initiative. 
The third factor has been the increase in moral decadence. As 
Falwell states 
We are quickly moving toward an amoral society where nothing is 
either absolutely right or absolutely wrong. Our absolutes are dis-
appearing, and with this disappearance we must face the sad fact 
that our society is crumbling. 
This moral decadence is the root of all America's problems, from juve-
nile delinquency to lagging defense spending, from abortion to infla-
4. According to many NCR leaders, one of the ways rock musJ.cJ.ans 
are spreading humanistic philosophy is through "back-masking" messages 
on their records. The musicians are allegedly recording messages back-
wards when they tape their music. These messages are supposedly not 
caught by the conscious mind which would normally block-out such subver-
sive, subliminal messages if heard in the normal direction. However, 
the messages are understood by the unconscious mind which acts upon this 
information, leading to a whole assortment of perverted, "Satanic" 
behaviors. 
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tion. 
Lastly, according to the leaders of the NCR, America's decline is 
due to a crisis in leadership. 
The drift into purposelessness of secular humanism, the apathy cre-
ated by a centralized government, and the loss of a positive moral 
direction in our society has led to a sense of national lostness. 
Tragically, there is a lack of leaders to grasp the situation and 
lead us out of this morass of uncertainty. (Webber, 1981:44) 
For America to return to its greatness it needs Christian leadership. 
According to Falwell, America needs people who will bring us back "to 
the principles this country was founded upon" (i.e., "Biblical princi-
ples "). For this to happen, the Christian citizen and church must 
become politically active and vote this leadership into office. 
SUMMARY 
In this section I have examined some of the terms often used as 
synonyms in discussions of the NCR. I have defined evangelical using 
Quebedeaux's criterion. Fundamentalists are a subgroup of evangelicals 
who can be distinguished from the evangelical by their extreme separa-
tism, anti-traditionalsim and their extreme literalism in interpreting 
the Bible. The NCR is made up mostly of politically active fundamental-
ists who hold a politically conservative ideology legitimated by a 
Christian fundamentalist theology. 
CHAPTER III 
LIFESTYLE CONCERN AND FUNDAMENTALISM 
The aim of this chapter is to test the following hypotheses per-
taining to Lifestyle Concern and NCR. 
(1) The NCR is the result of increased lifestyle concerns in Sunbelt 
fundamentalism. 
(2) These lifestyle concerns are the result of Snowbelt migration into 
the Sunbelt. These will be tested using regression and correlation 
techniques to analyze a content analysis of fundamentalist publications 
between 1955 and 1980. 
SAMPLING STRATEGY 
A sample of seven fundamentalist publications (see Appendix I) were 
selected out of the "Religion and Theology" section of The Standard 
Periodical Directory 7th edition. The following four criteria were used 
to make this selection. 
(1) The publication identifies itself as fundamentalist in its descrip-
tion in the Directory, or it is published and/or distributed by a funda-
mentalist organization (e.g., Jacob's Religious List). 
(2) The periodical must have been in publication from 1955 to 1980 since 
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this is the time period under study. 
(3) The publication must not be a specielized magazine but geared to a 
general fundamentalist audience. Publications which focus specifically 
on a certain topic, or are written for a certain group of people were 
eliminated. For example, the publication Railroad Evangelist was not 
chosen since it is written specifically for those interested in evangel-
izing railroad workers. 
(4) Each publication must have a circulation of 50,000 or more. This 
avoids skewing the results with smaller publications which do not actu-
ally represent much influence. 
A proportional stratified sample 1 of issues was taken from this 
group of publications. A random sample of 16 issues was chosen for each 
year. Half were taken from publications published in the Sunbel t and 
the other half from the Snowbelt. This will yield a total sample size 
of 416. Of this total sample, 359 publications were analyzed. 
VARIABLES MEASURED 
The following are the variables measured from the above sample of 
issues. 
(1) The place of publication coded as either Sunbelt or Snowbelt. The 
1. 'In a stratified sample we divide all individuals into groups or 
categories and then select independent samples within each group or 
stratum. '(Blalock, 1972:516) This assures that no category of individu-
als is over or under represented. In this case, in order to assure a 
reasonable amount of cases for each year, each ·year will be treated as 
an independent sample in which 16 cases were chosen. 
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Sunbelt consists of those states which fall into the Census categories 
of South and West. 2 The Snowbelt consists of all other states. 
(2) The number of articles in each issue. Regular columns (e.g., Regu-
lar Bible Study lessons), sections and features (e.g., crossword puzz-
les) were not included in this number. 
(3) The number of articles whose major theme deals specifically with 
politics. In practical terms, this means counting the number of arti-
cles within an issue that make explicit reference, within the title or 
thesis paragraph of the article, to any of the various processes and 
issues pertaining to the state such as political campaigns, elections, 
legislative action, and judicial activities. Although such an opera-
tional definition will eliminate many articles dealing with politics, 
the results should not be hurt since our aim is not to count the abso-
lute number of political articles but to observe the trends within fun-
damentalism from year to year. 
(4) The view expressed in each political article, if any, toward funda-
mentalist involvement in political activities. 3 
(5) The number of articles whose major theme is concern over lifestyle 
2. The Southern states are Delaware, Maryland, District of Colum-
bia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 
Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississppi, Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Oklahoma, and Texas. The Western states consist of Montana, Idaho, Wyo-
ming, California, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, 
Colorado, Alaska and Hawaii. · 
3. In the view of many writers, fundamentalisms recent political 
involvement represents a behavioral and attitudinal shift on the part of 
this group. Pre-seventies fundamentalism frowned on any "official" 
church organization taking political action (see Moberg, 1972). 
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threats. This was operationalized as any article that explicitly states 
within its title or thesis paragraph that certain societal trends pose a 
threat to the lifestyle of fundamentalists or Americans in general. 
Lifestyle, according to Zurcher et al (1971), "refers to the system of 
values, customs and habits distinctive to a ... group." 
(6) A listing of the political issues the article mentions. 
(7) Year of Publication. 
(8) Publication. 
Three dependent variables were created from this data. The first 
variable, representing a measure of lifestyle concern, is the percentage 
of articles in an issue on lifestyle concern. This was created by 
dividing the number of lifestyle concern articles in an issue by the 
number of articles. The second variable, representing political con-
cern, is the percentage of articles in an issue on politics. This was 
created by dividing the number of political articles in an issue by the 
number of articles. The last variable is the percentage of articles 
that call fundamentalists to take political action. These last two 
variables, while not strictly helping us in testing our hypotheses, will 
be used to serve as general indicators of fundamentalist concern. If it 
proves that lifestyle concern was not a motivating factor in NCR mobili-
zation, this still does not mean some other social psychological motiva-
tion was not behind the movement. These variables may serve as a gen-
eral indicator of such motivations. 
Besides the above variables, various national contextual variables 
have also been matched to each case according to year. The following 
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national indicators will be used. 
(1) Consumer Price Index (ConPrice). 
(2) Consumer Price Index (lagged 1 year) (ConPrice1)- Since the effects 
of some national trends are not seen or manifested in the same year of 
their occurence it is necessary to discover their effects by lagging 
their values by a few years. This will be done with many of the national 
contextual variables used in this research. 
(3) Consumer Price Index (lagged 2 years) (ConPrice2) 
(4) Homicide Rate (HomRate) 
(5) Homicide Rate (lagged 1 year) (HomRatel) 
(6) Homicide Rate (lagged 2 Years) (HomRate2) 
(7) Net Migration to Sunbelt (NetMigSun) 
(8) Unemployment Rate (Unemp) 
(9) Unemployment Rate (lagged 1 year) (Unempl) 
(10) Unemployment Rate (lagged 2 years) (Unemp2) 
(11) Presidential Election year? 1=yes O=no. (PresElect) 
(12) Party of President. l=Democrat O=Republican. (PartPres) 
(13) Gross Average Weekly Earnings of Production or Nonsupervisory Work-
ers on Private Non-Agricultural Payrolls. (Constant) (GAWE) 
(14) Above variable lagged 1 year (GAWEl) 
(15) Above variable lagged 2 years (GAWE2) 
(16) Median Family Income (MedFam) 
(17) Median Family Income (lagged 1 year) (MedFaml) 
(18) Median Family Income (lagged 2 years) (MedFam2) 
(19) Percentage of Total Population Under Poverty Level (%ToPov) 
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(20) Above variable lagged 1 year (%ToPov1) 
(21) Above variable lagged 2 years (%ToPov2) 
TESTING THE PLC HYPOTHESES 
The first of the PLC hypotheses will be tested by examining the 
changes in lifestyle and political concern in fundamentalist publica-
tions. If there is an increase in lifestyle concern in the Sunbelt and 
not in the Snowbelt in the time preceding and during the rise of the 
NCR, we may accept the hypothesis. Any other result may mean that 
increased lifestyle concerns was not an important factor giving rise to 
the NCR. Such results may substantiate resource mobilizations conten-
tion that social movements and their organizations do not arise from 
increased grievances or social psychological discontent in a population. 
If the above hypothesis is accepted, it is necessary to examine, 
as hypothesis two queried, whether the above patterns of lifestyle con-
cern are the result of Sunbelt migration. To examine this hypothesis, 
two types of data analyses must be done. The first step calls for see-
ing whether the lifestyle concern measures of Sunbelt publications col-
lected in the content analysis covary with migration rates to the Sun-
belt. To do this, it is necessary to conceive of the content data as 
macro-phenomenon, a fairly common practice (e.g., Gosta, Dahlberg and 
Rosengren, 1981; Inglis, 1938; Davis, 1952; Beniger, 1978), so ~hat they 
can be compared with the pattern of another macro-phenomenon (migration 
to the Sunbel t.) If the migration rates are positively related to 
lifestyle concern at a significantly high level while the other macro-
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rates are not than we will go to the next step. If lifestyle concern is 
not related to the migration rate, I will reject hypothesis two. Sec-
ondly, it is necessary to determine whether there really is a signifi-
cant difference between the values, beliefs, and attitudes of native 
Sunbelters and newly arrived Sunbelters from the Snowbelt, since it is 
the contrast between lifestyles which is the cause of status concerns. 
This comparison can be done using the General Social Survey (1972-1978). 
Through various items pertaining to place of residence now and in the 
past, it is possible to divide this data into two groups-- those who 
have always lived in the Sunbelt (native Sunbelters), and those who 
moved into the Sunbelt from the Snowbelt after age 16. The above two 
groups can be compared in their responses to political, social, relig-
ious, and moral questions asked in the survey using contingency table 
analysis. If the two groups are significantly different, and the native 
Sunbelters are found to be more conservative, I will accept hypothesis 
two. Any other result will cause the rejection of the hypothesis. 
ANALYSIS OF DATA 
TESTING THE LINEAR RELATIONSHIP 
The first step in testing the PLC hypotheses is to discover 
whether linear trends can be found in lifestyle concern, political con-
cern, and calls for political action. (I am attempting to find if any 
of these variables increase over time.) This will be done by placing 
each of these dependent variables into separate regressions with the 
independent variable YEAR and to perceive if the independent variable 
accounts for a statistically and theoretically significant proportion of 
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explained variance in the dependent variables. 
Table 2 contains the necessary statistics to examine the above 
relationship over all areas of the country. As can be seen, none of the 
three models shows any type of linear trend in the dependent variables. 
All have R squares below .01, indicating that YEAR accounts for little 
or none of the variance in either Lifestyle Concern, Political Concern, 
or Calls for Political Action. Furthermore, none of the three models 
produced statistically significant relationships. 
TABLE 2 
Regressions of Dependent Variables on Year 
Dependent 
Variable 
Lifestyle 
Concern 
Political 
Concern 
Political 
Action 
2 
R 
.0014 
.0000 
.0001 
(All Regions) 
F-Value Significance 
.508 n.s. 
.001 n.s. 
.05 n.s. 
These same patterns exist when we examine these relationships by 
region of the U.S. In Table 3, we see the relationships for Snowbelt 
publications. As in the above table, none of the models produce a sta-
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tistically significant relationsip. The R squares are again all under 
.01. As with the "All Regions" relationships, the percent of articles 
expressing lifestyle concern, political concern, and calls for political 
action have not significantly increased or decreased in a linear way in 
the Snowbelt. 
TABLE 3 
Regressions of Dependent Variables on YEAR 
Dependent 
Variables 
Lifestyle 
Concern 
Political 
Concern 
Political 
Action 
(Snowbelt Publications) 
2 
R 
.004 
.0004 
.0009 
F-Value Significance 
.822 n.s. 
.08 n.s. 
.19 n.s. 
In the Sunbel t the relationship is just the same (see Table 4). 
YEAR still does not account for a statistically significant amount of 
variance. R squares range from .0001 to .0047 with none having. a sig-
nificant F-value. The data in these three tables seem to indicate that 
a significant linear trend in lifestyle concern, political concern, and 
calls for political action does not exist in these publications even 
within regions. 
TABLE 4 
Regressions of Dependent Variables on YEAR 
Dependent 
Variables 
Lifestyle 
Concern 
Political 
Concern 
Political 
Action 
(Sunbelt Publications) 
2 
R 
.0001 
.0041 
.0007 
F-Value 
.012 
.615 
.561 
Significance 
n.s. 
n.s. 
n.s. 
TESTING THE CURVILINEAR RELATIONSHIP 
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Although a linear relationship was not found between the three 
dependent variables and Year this does not mean that a relationship does 
not exist. It is possible that curvilinear relationships exists 
instead. What I will do now is use regression analysis to test for 
these non-linear relationships. 
To test for a curvilinear relationship, it is necessary to add in 
successive steps successive powers of the independent variable into a 
model already containing the original independent variable. At each 
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step, one tests "whether a higher degree polynomial adds significantly 
to the variance of the dependent variable." (Kerlinger and Pedhazur, 
1973: 209) One ends the process at the last step where a significant 
increment of variance can be explained. "The highest power to which the 
independent variable is raised indicates the degree of polyno-
mial. "(Kerlinger and Pedazur, 1973:209) It also indicates the number of 
"bends" (n-1) that exist in the regression curve. Thus, a curvilinear 
regression model, whose highest power is the second, will have one bend 
in it. Once the final model is discovered, it is possible to plot its 
regression curve using its polynomial equation. 
In Table 5 we see the results of a regression done on the three 
dependent variables, and, YEAR and YEAR squared for all publications. 
As can be seen, YEAR squared does not add a statistically significant 
increment of explained variance to the models containing Lifestyle Con-
cern and Political Action as the dependent variables. This means that 
no curvilinear trend exists over time in lifestyle concern or calls for 
political action in the publications as a whole. However, YEAR squared 
does add a significant increment to the model containing political con-
cern. The addition of YEAR squared adds close to .02 to the R squared 
which is significant at the .01 level. The next step then, is to see if 
YEAR taken to the third power adds a significant amount of variance to 
the model containing the dependent variable political concern and the 
independent variables YEAR and YEAR squared. 
Table 6 presents the results of the Cubic model. As this Table 
shows, YEAR cubed does not add significantly to the variance. YEAR 
Dependent 
Variable 
Lifestyle 
Concern 
Political 
Concern 
Political 
Action 
TABLE 5 
Regression of Dependent Var. on YEAR and YEAR Squared 
Total 
2 
R 
.0017 
.0179 
.0019 
(All Publications) 
Increment 
of Total 
R squared 
Added by 
YEAR squared 
.0003 
.0179 
.0018 
F-Value 
of 
Increment 
.603 
8.95 
.64 
Sign. 
of 
Increm. 
n.s. 
.01 
n.s. 
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cubed adds only .0028 to the total R squared and this value yields an 
F-value of 1 which is not statistically significant. Statistically 
speaking, this means that the previous model containing only YEAR and 
YEAR squared is a better model. However, does this mean that a theoret-
ically important curvilinear trend exists in political concern? Not 
necessarily. Although YEAR squared did add a statistically significant 
increment in the Political Concern model, the total amount of variance 
explained by the model in Table 5 is still relatively weak. Only around 
2% of the variance in Political Concern is explained by YEAR and YEAR 
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squared. Therefore, while YEAR squared's increment may be statistically 
significant it is hardly theoretically significant. Like the other two 
models tested in Table 5, no important curvilinear trends can be found 
in Political Concern over all publications. 
TABLE 6 
Political Concern on YEAR, YEAR Squared, YEAR Cubed 
(All Publications) 
Increment 
of Total 
Total R squared F-Value Significance 
2 Added by of of 
R YEAR Cubed Increment Increment 
-----
Political 
Concern .0207 .0028 1.00 n.s. 
A similar pattern of relationships was found when I tested for 
curvilinear relationships in Snowbelt publications (see Table 7). In 
each of the three models, YEAR squared does not add a significant amount 
of explained variance to the original linear models. No more successive 
steps will then be necessary. So like in the above cases, it is safe to 
conclude that no significant trend in either lifestyle concern, politi-
cal concern, or calls for political action exists in the fundamentalist 
Snowbelt publications. 
In the Sunbelt the relationships are different (Table 8). Year 
squared does not add a statistically significant increment to either the 
Dependent 
Variable 
Lifestyle 
Concern 
Political 
Concern 
Political 
Action 
TABLE 7 
Regressions of Dependent Var. on YEAR and YEAR squared 
Total 
2 
R 
.0052 
.0147 
.0057 
(Snowbelt Publications) 
Increment 
of Total 
R squared 
Added By 
YEAR Sgua. 
.0012 
.0143 
.0048 
F-Value Significance 
of of 
Increment Increment 
.244 n.s. 
2.97 n.s. 
.98 n.s. 
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lifestyle concern model or the political action model. However, like in 
Table 5, Year squared does add a significant amount of variance to the 
political concern model. The increment is statistically significant at 
the .01 level. As in the previous case, the next step is to add Year 
taken to the third power to this model. 
In Table 9, we find that YEAR CUBED does not add siginificantly to 
the Political Concern model containing YEAR and YEAR SQUARED.· There-
fore, the model having YEAR and YEAR SQUARED is the best model. But 
again, does this mean this is a theoretically significant model? The 
TABLE 8 
Regressions of Dependent Vars. on YEAR and YEAR SQUARED 
Dependent 
Variable 
Lifestyle 
Concern 
Political 
Concern 
Political 
Action 
Total 
2 
R 
.0064 
.0497 
.0007 
(Sunbelt Publications) 
Increment 
of Total 
R- square 
Added by 
Year Squared 
.0063 
.0488 
.0006 
F-Value Significance 
of of 
Increment Increment 
.926 n.s. 
7.50 .01 
.882 n.s. 
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answer is no. As in Table 5, although YEAR SQUARED's addition to 
variance has statistical significance, the total R squared for the model 
in Table 8 is not very large. YEAR and YEAR SQUARED only account for 
approximately 5% of the variance in political concern, leaving 95% of 
its variance unexplained. Such a small amount of explained variance 
hardly indicates a theoretically important relationship between the 
variables. Therefore, for all practical purposes, we can conclude that 
no important trend exist in political concern between 1955 and 1980 in 
Sunbelt publications. 
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TABLE 9 
Political Concern on YEAR,YEAR SQUARED,YEAR CUBED 
(Sunbelt Publications) 
Increment 
of Total 
Total R Squared F-Value Significance 
2 Added by of of 
R YEAR Cubed Increment Increment 
-----
Political 
Concern .0633 .0136 2.125 n.s. 
What can be concluded from these trend analyses? That no signifi-
cant temporal trend in either lifestyle concern, political concern, or 
calls for political action existed in fundamentalism between 1955 and 
1980 in the nation as a whole or within the Snowbelt or the Sunbelt. 
Such a results means that I must reject my first hypothesis. The NCR 
was not preceded nor caused by increasing lifestyle concern in the Sun-
belt. 
FUNDAMENTALIST DISCONTENT AND THE CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES 
Since I have rejected the first hypothesis, a detailed examination 
of the relationships between the dependent variables and contextual 
variables is unnecessary. The above findings have already called into 
question the hypothesis that lifestyle concern is responsible for the 
NCR. A detailed examination of the contextual variables and lifestyle 
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concern would therefore, tell us about the nature of lifestyle concern 
in fundamentalism, not about the nature of the NCR which is my concern. 
As such, only an examination of the relationships over all publications 
will be done. 
Tables 10 and 11 present two correlation matrices for these rela-
tionships over all publications. As is indicated in these tables, the 
relationships between the dependent variables and these other variables 
are rather weak. Only the relationship between Net Migration to the 
Sunbelt (NetMigSun) and Political Concern, and the Unemployment Rate 
lagged two years (Unemp2) and Political Concern show statistically sig-
nificant relationships (.05 level) (see Table 10). Even these relation-
ships are rather weak with the contextual variables accounting for only 
1% of the variance in each relationship. Irrespective of these weak 
relationships, it is interesting to note that NetMigSun is related to 
Political Concern and not Lifestyle Concern as hypothesized. Also the 
weak relationship that does exist between the Unemployment Rate lagged 
two years and Political Concern is a negative relationship. This means 
that political concern in fundamentalist publications increases slightly 
as the unemployment rate decreases-- not what one would expect. Since 
the unemployment rate lagged two years increased on the average between 
1970 and 1979, the years most NCR SMO's were founded, political concern 
should have decreased by a very slight level as well in this period. 
However, because the NCR did arise in this period, one would expect not 
a decrease in political concern but an increase. So while the Unemploy-
ment Rate may help us slightly in predicting fundamentalist political 
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concern it does not help understand the rise of the NCR. 
CONCLUSION AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
As is evident the following analysis has yielded some unexpected 
results. Instead of finding, as Lorentzen (1980) and Zwier (1982) have 
implied, rising levels of lifestyle concern, political concern, and 
calls for political action among fundamentalists we find that from 1955 
to 1980 these social psychological variables remained relatively steady. 
Also, all three variables do not covary with Sunbelt migration. This 
does not mean that fundamentalists do not feel lifestyle or political 
concern today, but rather the level of these concerns is no higher than 
before the development of the NCR and so therefore they can not be used 
to explain the appearance of the movement. For these reasons we must 
reject the two hypotheses presented in this chapter and look elsewhere 
for an explanation of this social movement. 
These results do have a number of theoretical implications for the 
study of social movements. First, the thesis presented by Lipset and 
Raab (1973), among others, that the rise of right-wing extremist move-
ments can be accounted for with reference to status or lifestyle 
threats, is questionable, at least in the case of the NCR. When a 
proper research design is used we see that the conclusions Lorentzen 
(1980) reached regarding the relationship between lifestyle concern and 
the political mobilization of the NCR do not exist. This does "not mean 
that the present members of the NCR do not feel lifestyle concern but 
that the degree of lifestyle concern is no higher now than any time in 
the recent past. 
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Secondly and more generally, the fact that all three dependent 
variables remained steady thoughout the time period studied, tends to 
support the resource mobilization approach's contention that increased 
discontent and concern cannot account for the rise of a social movement. 
These results seem to support the findings of other researchers (e.g. 
Portes, 1971) who have concluded that the social psychological 
approaches are inadequate for explaining social movements. At least 
with reference to the NCR, such an approach does not offer us much in 
the way of understanding social movement phenomena. 
Thirdly, the following analysis warns us of the dangers of using 
social movement ideology in judging member motivation (cf. Wallis, 
1975). Although the leader rhetoric and movement ideology claim that 
the NCR grew out of increased discontent, lifestyle concern, and politi-
cal concern (see Falwell 1980; Viguerie, 1980), our results indicate no 
that such trends have existed. While the study of ideology adds an 
important facet to our understanding of social movements, we must not 
use it like Zwier (1982), as direct indicator of member motivation. 
Social movement ideology has other functions (e.g., legitimation) which 
may not be compatible to accurate analysis. 
If the above analysis has not helped us account for the New Chris-
tian Right where then shall we look for answers? One possible area is 
in the relationship of the pre-existent social network with possible 
resource sources and with their more general societal environment. The 
next four chapters will attempt to examine these relationships. 
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TABLE 10 
Correlations of Dependent on Contextual Variables (1) 
(All Publications-Part 1) 
Dependent Variables 
Contextual Lifestyle Political Political 
Variables Concern Concern Action 
ConPrice -.03 -.05 -.01 
ConPrice1 -.03 -.05 -.01 
ConPrice2 -.03 -.06 -.01 
HomRate -.02 .08 .04 
HomRate1 -.02 .06 .03 
HomRate2 -.02 .02 .02 
NetMigSun -.01 .10 * -.03 
Unemp -.02 .06 -.01 
Unemp1 -.04 -.01 -.04 
Unemp2 -.07 -.11 ~': -.07 
* Significant at the .05 level 
Contextual 
Variables 
PresElect 
PartPres 
GAWE 
GAWEl 
GAWE2 
MedFam 
MedFaml 
MedFam2 
%ToPov 
%ToPovl 
%ToPov2 
TABLE 11 
Correlations of Dependent on Contextual Variables(2) 
(All Publications- Part 2) 
Dependent Variables 
Lifestyle Political Political 
Concern Concern Action 
.01 -.07 .04 
-.06 -.10 -.08 
-.05 -.01 .00 
-.03 -.04 -.01 
-.03 -.04 -.01 
-.04 .08 .05 
-.03 .06 .04 
-.03 .05 .02 
.02 .02 -.02 
-.04 .00 -.05 
.01 .04 -.09 
No significant relationships 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE NCR SOCIAL NETWORK:A METHODOLOGICAL CHAPTER 
Before the questions pertaining to the preexistent social network 
can be answered, I must first ascertain what the New Christian Right 
network looked like in 1980. From this "picture" I will attempt to dis-
cover what preexistent networks could account for this structure. 
To deliniate the 1980 social network structure of the New Chris-
tian Right I will use what network analysts have called the Structural 
Equivalence approach. This approach partitions network actors into sub-
groups and examines the linkages between subgroups by aggregating these 
actors into groups according to the degree the actors hold a common set 
of ties to other system actors. (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982:59) This 
approach will be operationalized by computing continuous distance meas-
ures for a group of NCR leaders and spatially representing these scores 
using multidimensional scaling. The continuous distance score is a 
measure of the dissimilarity between a pair of actors in their relations 
to others within the network. This approach and its operationalization 
will become more apparent as I take a step-by-step examination of the 
1980 subgroup structure of the New Christian Right. 
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THE DATA 
-----
A list of major NCR leaders along with their organizational affil-
iations will be used for this analysis. Fortunately, Huntington and 
Kaplan (1982) have already created such a list. The list, however, is 
not perfect since it includes names not affiliated or supporting the NCR 
(e.g., John Alexander of Inter Varsity Fellowship) and omits the names 
of fairly important leaders (Terry Dolan). The Huntington and Kaplan 
list has therefore been supplemented by information collected from vari-
ous New Right organizations (see Appendix B). 
The reader should notice that a few of those individuals listed by 
Huntington and Kaplan but who are not really affiliated with the NCR 
have been kept in this analysis because of their nonetheless close ties 
with various New Right leaders (e.g., Graham and Mooneyham). Including 
such leaders may help us in interpreting the configuration that is later 
found as well as highlight the shady boundary between the NCR and other 
conservative religious groups. 
MATRIX REPRESENTATION OF NETWORK RELATIONS 
The first step in my analysis was to take the information col-
lected about the NCR leaders and their organizational affiliations and 
create a matrix algebraic representation of the interlocking membership 
relations between members (c.f. Forsyth and Katz, 1946; Festinger, 
1949). The constructed matrix (see Table 16) simply indicates whether 
each pair of leaders belongs to one or more of the same organizations. 
(Because of the size of Table 16 (55x55) it has been located in Appendix 
C) If a link exists between two leaders a value of one is placed in the 
cell which intersects the two leaders. 
placed in the cell. 
60 
If no link exists a zero is 
A number of statistics can be calculated from this matrix. First, 
the density of the network can be calculated. The density is the pro-
portion of all network ties divided by the number of all possible ties. 
Density scores may range from 0 to 1. The higher the score the more 
interconnected are the network actors. In the the matrix we see the 
density to be .24, a relatively small score which may indicate a rela-
tively loosely connected network. This score will play a part in my 
later analysis. 
Another statistic which has been calculated for each actor is an 
index of network centrality. This is simply the number ties an actor 
has with other actors divided by all links within the network. The 
higher the value, the more linkages the actor has with other actors. 
This, and other measures of network centrality, have been viewed by many 
researchers as valuable indicators of the importance of an actor to a 
network (Burt, 1983; Knoke and Burt, 1983; Cook, 1982). Marsden and 
Laumann (1977:217) see it as a measurement of an aspect of power. Those 
with more links with others in a network tend to be more central to the 
network, have more people dependent on them, control the flow of more 
resources and information and thus have more power. The centrality ra~­
ings for NCR leaders range from a low of .002 for both Billings(Sr.) and 
Van Andel of Amway to a high of . 09 for Richard Viguerie the "king of 
direct mailers" (not unexpected). 
These centrality scores uncover some interesting findings. First, 
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it seems to show that, despite what the media have stated, the so-called 
tele-evangelists have not been, with reference to network linkages, 
overly important to the NCR. Of the four teleevangelists (Falwell, Rob-
ertson, Robison, and Bakker) included in the matrix, only Robertson (who 
later left the movement) is above .04. Interestingly enough, the most 
well known of the T.V. preachers, Jerry Falwell, scored only a . 02. 
These results may indicate that Falwell and the other electronic preach-
ers are really not the leaders of this movement but simply the most vis-
ible "aspect" of the movement to the news media. Their perceived impor-
tance may simply be due to their media visibility and not to any actual 
power or leadership. 
A second interesting result is the relatively high centrality 
score of individuals not usually mentioned in discussions of the New 
Christian Right. Especially surprising is Bill Bright's (founder of 
Campus Crusade and creator of the Here's Life, America evangelistic cam-
paign) .07 score. Bright is very rarely mentioned in articles about the 
New Christian Right yet, except for Viguerie and conservative author 
Russ Walton, no one has a centrality rating as high or higher. As Hunt-
ington and Kaplan (1982) have stated, more study must be done on 
Bright's role in the movement which, I will do in a later chapter. I 
will show how Bright's organization, Campus Crusade for Christ, was 
"used" as a starting point for some political organizing which later on 
became valuable to the NCR. 
While the above matrix analysis has offered us some interesting 
results, it cannot at this point tell us all that is necessary for 
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understanding the NCR network system. The preceding has only showed us 
the linkages between individual actors within the entire system. For my 
purposes, however, it is not only necessary to view this but to parti-
tion this network into its subgroups and to identify the relations (or 
the lack of them) between these subgroups. The matrix just created will 
serve as the basis for this sectioning. 
STRUCTURAL EQUIVALENCE AND CONTINUOUS DISTANCE 
Knoke and Kuklinski (1982) identify two approaches for identifying 
the subgroups (or positions) 1 within a social network. The first is the 
social cohesion approach which places individuals together into groups 
to the degree that they hold ties to each other (Knoke and Kuklinski, 
1982:19). The second, structural equivalence, aggregates actors "into a 
jointly occupied position or role to the extent that they have a common 
set of linkages to the other actors in the system."(Knoke and Kuklinski, 
1982: 20) While the first approach judges the existence of a subgroup 
based on the degree of common ties within a subgroup, the second parti-
tions system actors into groups based on the similarity of their ties to 
other actors. 
Both of these approaches to subgroup partitioning may lead to 
slightly different results. The researcher, thus, cannot choose to use 
one or the other simply as a matter of personal preference. The choice 
must be determined by the research questions the analyst is as~ing and 
1. Positions are defined by Knoke and Kuklinski (1982: 18) as "sub-
groups within a network defined by the relations that connect empirical 
actors together." 
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the assumptions s/he is making. It is not important to outline all the 
differences between the two approaches here (see Burt, 1978). It is 
only important to state here that the structural equivalence approach 
will be used here in this study because the social cohesion approach 
offers no methods for discovering the linkages between subgroups which 
this analysis needs. Identifying such linkages will offer possible 
important information on the development of this NCR network from preex-
istent structures. 
Structural equivalence can be operationalized by calculating con-
tinuous distance scores for each pair of actors and subjecting these 
scores to multidimensional scaling, thus obtaining a graphic representa-
tion of the subgroup structure of the social network under study. The 
continuous distance score is a measure of the dissimilarity between a 
pair of actors in their relations to others within the network. These 
scores can be calculated from the matrix in Table 16 using the following 
formula. 
Where (z,-Zji> 
they init"iate 
in relations 
1982:61) 
d•• =dJ·,· J.(z• -z. ~ + lj ,.. '\ J't 2. (z..~ -z • ) ,. 1J 
is the difference between two actors in the relations 
with a third actor. . . and (~j-Zc{v is the discrepancy 
received from a third actor. <.'lnoke and Kuklinski, 
The higher the value, the more dissimilar the pair are in their links to 
other actors . It is important to note that the above calculation 
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assumes that the data being calculated take into account the direction 
of the relationship between the actors (e.g., who initiated the contact) 
and that the matrix used displays the direction in column versus row 
scores. My data do not measure the direction of the relationship. Such a 
difference will not, however, affect the usefulness of the scores calcu-
lated. (cf. Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982) 
Table 17 gives the distance scores for each pair of actors. 
(Because of the size of Table 17 it has been located in Appendix D.) 
They range from a 1.41 score between Graham and Bakker, and Gimenez and 
Bakker to the 9.06 score Richard Viguerie holds with two other actors. 
These continuous distance scores can be used to create a graphic 
representation of this network and its structurally equivalent subgroups 
by subjecting them to multidimensional scaling. 
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a useful mathematical tool that 
enables us to represent the similarities (and dissimilarities) of 
objects spatially as in a map ... MDS procedures represent objects 
judged experimentally similar to one another as points close to each 
other in resultant spatial map. Objects judged to be dissimilar are 
represented as points distant from one another. (Schiffman, Reynolds 
and Young, 1981:9) 
The resultant map can be in any number of dimensional space, that is, 
any number of coordinate axes can be used to represent the stimulus 
space. The final result may then be interpreted by the researcher who 
attempts to discover the "hidden" structure causing the pattern. Multi'-
dimensional techniques have been used in a number of network analysis 
studies (see Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982). 
The first step in multidimensional scaling is to choose the number 
of coordinate axes (dimensions) to solve for. The overall consideration 
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in determining the number is explaining the most amount of information 
with the least amount of dimensions. A number of criteria are involved 
in this determination. First, a maximum level of dimensions can be 
determined by dividing the number of stimuli by 4. In this case I 
should solve for no more than 14 dimensions (55 divided by 4), a rather 
large maximum level. Fortunately, no studies have used this many dimen-
sions. Such a solution would be almost impossible to interpret. 
A second criterion for determining the proper dimensional solution 
is to plot the stress value (a goodness-of-fit statistic which decreases 
as a better solution is reached) for each dimensional solution by the 
dimensions--Scree Test. This value will normally decrease with increas-
ing dimensionality. What I am looking for in this plot is the point at 
which an increase in dimension does not add a significant increase in 
goodness-of-fit (decrease in stress). In more practical terms, I am 
looking for that point where the stress by dimensions line flattens out, 
since at this point the best dimensional solution should be found. 
In my data this point is fairly obvious as both Figure 1 and Table 
12 show. As can be seen, the differences between the stresses for the 1 
and 2, and 2 and 3 dimensional solutions are fairly large, indicating 
that the addition of dimensions 2 and 3 adds significantly to the good-
ness-of-fit of our solutions. However, the difference between 3 and '4 
is quite small. Although the 4th dimension decreases the stress value, 
indicating a better solution, the small size of this decrease may not be 
worth the loss of parsimony. It would therefore seem from this Scree 
test that the three dimensional solution would be the best solution to 
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solve for. 
The last criterion for determining the appropriate dimensional 
solution is its ease of use. As is obvious, anything over a three-
dimensional solution is difficult for us "three dimensional beings" to 
conceptualize. Therefore, the analyst must take into consideration 
his/her own limitations when determining the appropriate solution. 
Fortunately, the ease-of-use criterion will not come into play here 
since the three-dimensional solution found in the Scree test is quite 
easy to conceptualize. The distance scores, therefore, will be 
subjected to a three-dimensional solution. 
INTERPRETING THE GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION 
The usual procedure for interpreting a multidimensional map is to 
look for the "hidden" axes existing in the data on which the stimuli 
points will fall in some order, representing the degree to which these 
points hold certain properties. The "invisible" axes represent the 
dimension or factor effecting the stimuli. Often, however, especially 
in network analysis, this type of interpretation scheme is not possible 
or even desired, even though the map does yield useful results. In ref-
erence to network analysis, the concern is with the subgroup clustering 
of the stimuli and not with discovering underlying dimensions.(Knoke and 
Kuklinski, 1982; Schiffman et al., 1981:13) 
Figure 2 is the graphic representation of a three-dimensional 
solution for the distance scores. The figure is plotted in two dimen-
sions with the coordinates of the third in parentheses besides each 
point. Each point represents one leader. The closer the leaders are 
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TABLE 12 
Stress by Dimensions 
Dimensions 
1 2 3 4 
Stress .47 .286 .178 .162 
together the more similar the leaders are in their ties to other lead-
ers. 
As can be seen, atleast seven groups can be identified in Table 
13. Notice that a few leaders included in the analysis do not fall 
within any of these groups. 
The first group (Group I) seems to be made up of rather wealthy 
financial supporters of many fundamentalist and evangelical projects 
particularly those projects of Bill Bright. The group includes Richard 
DeVos, president and co-founder of AMWAY, Nelson Bunker Hunt, a member 
of the National Governing Board of the John Birch Society, and John G. 
Talcott of Ocean Spray Cranberry Company. 
In Group II I found religious leaders with close ties to the more 
general evangelical movement (as indicated by the inclusion of such non-
New Right individuals as Mooneyham and Graham). All in this group 
participated in some capacity in the Washington for Jesus demonstration 
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ILLUSTRATION 2: Multidimensional Representation of NCR Leaders 
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TABLE 13 
NCR Group Breakdown 
Group .!.! Group III 
Bakker Beckett 
Couch Roger 
Gimenez Robertson 
Graham 
Hill 
Lundquist 
Mooneyham 
Shakarian 
Group Y 
Dixon 
Falwell 
Group VII 
Billings, SR. 
Bonney 
Grimsted 
Hargis 
Lyons 
Manion 
Phillips 
Van Andel 
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mostly through the efforts of Bright. Besides the two individuals 
mentioned above also included within this group are Jim Bakker, host of 
the P.T.L. Club T.V. program, Demos Shakarian, President and founder of 
the Full Gospel Business Men's Fellowship, and Dr. H. Lundquist of the 
National Association of Evangelicals. 
Group III includes only three individuals, all of whom were 
involved in both the Washington for Jesus campaign and the Religious 
Roundtable-- an organization meant to mobilize Christian leaders around 
"moral" (i.e. conservative) issues. The group includes John D. Beckett, 
president of Intercessors for America, Adrian Rogers, former president 
of the Southern Baptist Convention, and Pat Robertson , president of the 
Christian Broadcasting Network and host of the 700 Club T.V. program. 
Group IV includes many of the rest of the members of the Religious 
Roundtable. Within this group I have Phyllis Schlafly, founder of the 
Eagle Forum, William Billings, former president of Hyles-Anderson 
College in Hammond, Indiana, Major Edgar C. Bundy, president of the 
Church League of America, and Bob Dugan, director or Public Affairs 
National for the Association of Evangelicals. 
The pattern of common organizational affiliation found in groups 2 
to 4 is more than just an interesting configuration. It also serves as 
an indicator of the degree of political and religious activism of the 
group. Washington for Jesus was at least presented to the public as a 
strictly religious-evangelistic service despite its political overtones. 
On the other hand, the Religious Roundtable is overtly political. The 
relative proportion of participation in these activities in each group 
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indicates the primary activities of the group members. 
To summarize, Group II is dominated by the Washington for Jesus 
group-- individuals who were primarily involved in evangelistic 
religious work. Some may agree with the goals of the New Christian Right 
but eschew overt political involvement, because their "calling is to 
preach the gospel." In group III, on the other hand, are individuals 
involved in both political and religious activities. This is indicated 
by their membership in both Washington for Jesus and the Religious 
Roundtable. A glance at a typical 700 Club program, the creation of one 
of this group's members, should demonstrate this balance. The show is 
fairly evenly balanced between expressly religious preaching and Bible 
study and examining political and social issues from an ultra 
conservative viewpoint. In group IV are individuals whose primary 
activity is political and/or social activism. Many are religious and 
express typically fundamentalist beliefs. However, most see their 
"calling" to serve in politics and social activism. The one major 
difference between these three groups, then, is their relative 
involvement in politics and religion. I will now return to outlining 
the rest of the subgroups found in the network. 
Group V includes only two members, Jerry Falwell and Reverend Greg 
Dixon. Both are members of the Moral Majority as well as being 
Independent Baptists ministers. 2 All members of Group VI are involved 
with the Christian Voice, a "Christian" lobbying organization founded in 
2. Later, I will examine the Independent Baptist phenomena in more 
detail. 
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1978 in order to represent the so-called "Christian" position on the 
issues being debated in Washington. The reader should notice the strong 
ties this organization has to Congress. The group includes Senator 
Orrin Hatch of Utah, Represenative Robert Dornan of California, and 
Senator Roger Jepsen. The last group (VII) is difficult to interpret. 
the individuals have really nothing in common except most have few ties, 
as indicated by their low centrality ratings, with others in the 
network. The group includes Robert Billings (.002) and Jay Van Andel 
(cofounder of Amway) (.002). The one real exception to this is Howard 
Phillips, who has relatively many ties. We will view this group at this 
point as a residual category group. 
As can be noticed a few leaders did not fall within any of these 
groups. Of these only a few will be included in later analysis due to 
their relatively large centrality ratings. The leaders that still will 
be included are Bill Bright, Russ Walton, Ed McAteer and Richard 
Viguerie. 
DISCOVERING THE LINKAGES 
Thus far I have only delineated the structurally equivalent groups 
the New Right leaders can be partitioned into. I have not yet discov-
ered the links between these groups as well as those individuals not in 
groups. The continuous distance approach offers the researcher a method 
of discovering whether or not significant ties exist between subgroups 
of a social network. 
This method is quite simple. The analyst first calculates the 
density of ties that exist between each pair of groups. The density is 
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calculated by dividing the number of ties between the members of the two 
groups by the number of possible ties that could exist between the the 
two groups. The resulting percentage is then compared with the density 
of the entire network. (In this case, the NCR entire network density is 
.24. see Table 16). If the density of ties between two groups is 
larger than the density of the network as a whole, we say that a signif-
icant tie exists between the groups. If the density is less than that 
of the network we say that no significant tie exists (Knoke and Kuklin-
ski, 1982:74-7) 
Table 14 presents the between group density of ties for each pair 
of NCR subgroups as well as for the individuals to be included. Notice 
that by my criterion very few direct ties exist between Groups I through 
VII. There exist significant ties only between Groups II and III, III 
and IV, and IV and V. Groups I, VI, and VII do not have a significant 
density of ties with any other group, although they do have a signifi-
cant density of ties to some of the lone individuals. Only Groups III 
and IV have more than one tie to other groups. Notice also that all 
groups, except Groups II and III, and all the individual leaders have a 
siginificant tie to Richard Viguerie pointing to Viguerie as the central 
"hub" of this network. 
The centrality of Richard Viguerie, or maybe more accurately the 
Richard Viguerie Company (RAVCO), can be seen even more graphically 
through a "flow chart" (Illustration 3) of the ties catalogued in Table 
14. We see that all ties "flow" toward Viguerie. Even Groups II and 
III, which are not tied directly to Viguerie still are tied indirectly 
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TABLE 14 
The Density of Ties Between Groups & Selected Leaders 
Groups 
GrouEs I II III IV v VI VII Bright 
I 
II .05 
III .00 .96 
IV .00 .01 .81 
v .00 .00 .00 .25 
VI .00 .00 .00 .20 .06 
VII .06 .00 .00 .11 .00 .13 
Bright 1.00 .88 .67 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Viguerie .91 .00 .00 .78 1. 00 .64 .59 1.00 
Walton .73 .13 1.00 1.00 1.00 .00 .00 1.00 
McAteer .09 .00 .00 1.00 .67 .00 .00 .00 
Table 14 continued on next page 
Table 14 continued from last page 
Groups Viguerie Walton 
Viguerie 
Walton 1.00 
McAteer 1.00 1.00 
Groups 
McAteer 
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through their direct connections to Bill Bright and Russ Walton. In the 
next chapter, I will discuss how this result is due to Viguerie's pos-
session of certain resources (direct-mailing techniques) which the other 
groups wished to use and which other groups could strengthen through 
Viguerie's use of their own resources. This chart also serves to reem-
phas ize another result, that is, the real lack of interconnectedness 
between the major groups identified. 
SUHMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our analysis thus far has been purely descriptive. In the next 
chapter I will begin to attempt to answer the questions pertaining to 
the NCR social network. Our concern is not ultimately with describing 
how the NCR network looks but explaining what preexistent structures 
could account for its present configuration, the effect these structures 
have on the strategies used, and the effect the strategies used have had 
on the movement. The present chapter has only been meant to give us a 
preliminary clue of where to look for the preexistent structures. As 
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such, it will be used as a guide or outline to the historical analysis, 
using both primary and secondary sources of material, which follows. 
The picture just drawn of the NCR will not serve as a rigid pattern from 
which each link must be accounted for, nor even each group in detail but 
a general guide for sensitizing the researcher to the possible important 
pre-NCR groups and individuals, their relationships to each and their 
importance to the rise of this movement. 
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ILLUSTRATION 3: The Network Ties of the New Right 
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CHAPTER V 
THE NCR PREEXISTENT NETWORK 
In this and the next chapter I will examine the first three ques-
tions pertaining to the NCR's preexistent social network. 
(1) What networks did the fundamentalist preference structure use to 
mobilize collectively on a national level? 
(2) How did this social network develop? 
(3) Following from Morris (1981), how has this social network affected 
the nature and extent of the strategies and tactics the New Christian 
Right has taken? 
The answering of these questions will be guided by the "flow" chart 
(Illustration 3) created in the last chapter. The sources of the mater-
ials for this chapter and the next include interviews, 1 secondary and 
primary publications, and observations. In brief, this chapter will 
show how the NCR developed out of two different networks. The first, a 
network which grew out of a segment of the "Old Right", became prominent 
when Federal Legislation increased the "value" of certain resources the 
1. Some of the interviews used in the next three chapters were 
gathered in a group project at Loyola University of Chicago in which I 
participated. I would like to thank Sonia Aladjem, Robert Lynott, 
Suhail Miari, Prof. Philip Nyden, and Shobha Srinivasan for their kind 
permission in allowing me to use these data. 
group held. The second network consists of fundamentalists groups 
which, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, developed rational evan-
gelistic techniques which could be translated into political persuasion 
methods. In this chapter I will examine the first network, and in the 
next the second. 
THE NEW RIGHT PREEXISTENT ORGANIZATIONAL BEGINNINGS 
Many commentators, as well as New Right and NCR leaders themselves 
(e.g., Viguerie, 1980:14-5), have partially attributed the rise of this 
movement to a growing conservatism within the American populace. How-
ever, according to Janowitz (1978: 121), there has been no such large-
scale shift toward right-wing politics (see Table 15). "Of those who 
expressed a choice (in political ideology), the long term trend is one 
of striking stability." Between the years of 1936 and 1974 (the year 
many of the initial New Right groups were founded), conservative attach-
ment rose only 6%, hardly a significant shift. Even this rise was not 
steady but fluctuated in between those years according to Janowitz. A 
more recent Harris poll (Harris, 1982) confirms this ·as well. The 
results of this poll show no large conservative shift but a population 
opposed to much of the beliefs of this movement. According to the poll, 
a 2 to 1 majority are opposed to an amendment banning abortion. Fifty_-
nine percent supported the Equal Rights Amendment. Sixty-six percent 
favor a federal law registering handguns. Sixty-nine percent support 
the federal laws requiring affirmative action programs. Eighty-five 
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percent of Americans want enforcement of air and water pollution 
controls. These results hardly demonstrate an overwhelmingly conserva-
tive population. The rise of this movement, therefore, cannot be 
explained by a national ideological shift. 
TABLE 15 
Political Preferences:Conservative vs. Liberal 
Year Conservative 
1936 53% 
1962 51% 
1974 59% 
SOURCE: 
Janowitz, 
The Last Half Century, 
Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978, 
page 112. 
Liberal 
47% 
49% 
41% 
If this explanation and that tested in chapter 3 are false, how 
then do we explain the rise of this movement? A partial answer may be 
found by examining the NCR's preexistent social network and its rela-
tionship to certain societal trends which affect these structures. It 
is the argument of this chapter that the critical trigger which caused 
the arising of the New Right and the NCR was the enacting of certain 
campaign-finance laws which increased the importance of certain campaign 
techniques which were used mostly by fringe political groups such as 
those on the radical right. These fringe groups gained prominence 
because of this and sought to make coalitions with social networks 
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(mostly in fundamentalism). These networks had developed other tactics 
and techniques that could be used even more to further the aims of the 
former fringe groups. I will now elaborate on this process. 
THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACTS AND DIRECT MAILING 
Amid all the rhetoric about decreasing the importance of party 
politics, The Election Campaign Act of 1971 was passed. Among other 
requisites, the act required that detailed disclosure be made of all 
campaign contributions and expenditures. The act also allowed both cor-
porations and labor unions to create political action committees (PACs) 
which have as their aim the solicitation of "voluntary" contributions 
from their employees/members for the PAC's own political aims. 
For our purposes, however, it is the 1974 amendments to this act 
which are most important. Created in the aftermath of many of the 
Watergate "SLUSH Fund" unveilings, the manifest intent of these amend-
ments was to decrease the importance of money in national elections. 
The amendments, among other requirements, limited individual contribu-
tions to one thousand dollars per candidate per election, limited the 
amount of money PACs could give candidates (Rees, 1980: 28), put a ceil-
ing on the amount of money candidates could spend, and created a system 
of matching funds (Federal Election Commission, 1980; 1982; Crawford, 
1980: 46). 
Despite its high moral intent, the Act did not really succeed in 
making money less of a factor in federal elections. In 1976 $64 million 
was still spent by each of the various candidates in the primaries; $46 
million by Carter and Ford for the final election (Marger, 1981: 162) 
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Both PACs and the candidates discovered many loopholes to the laws which 
allowed them to unofficially spend much more than allowable. Most 
importantly, for our purposes, the law did not change the importance of 
money in federal elections so much as shifted its source, away from 
organizations and networks attached to a few "fat cat" industrialists to 
" 
other type of organizations and networks that had the ability to raise 
large sums of money from the small contributions of many individuals 
(Crawford, 1980:34-44). The direct mailing techniques of many rightist 
groups could do the latter, giving these groups a new-found importance 
in the electoral process. 2 Direct mailing methods uses large mailing 
lists and computer systems to solicit small contributions from and get a 
message across to like-minded individuals. It is not hard to see how 
such techniques became valuable in a political environment such as was 
created by the 1974 amendments. These large lists of names and 
addresses gave the potential candidate, at least in his/her own eyes, a 
ready, "legal" source of campaign money, while at the same time spread-
ing his/her message. Direct mailers soon became important advisors and 
II II resources . 
The whole process just briefly outlined fits in well with the 
approach of Charles Tilly in his various works. Tilly argues, as many 
resource mobilization theorists do, that a political contender's ability 
2. The reader should note that this explanation is not totally new. 
Viguerie (1980:34) touches on this point himself. As I will show later 
the difference between my explanation and their view is that I do not 
underestimate the importance of this process and I offer an explanation 
of why the right should have been so well prepared for this shift. 
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to mobilize politically depends on the contender's access to important 
resources. Often the ability to gain these resources is a result of 
structural transformations which affect "a contender's potential for 
political mobilization (and) in some cases (like the one here) bring new 
contenders into existence."(Useem, 1975:22) The difference, however, 
between Tilly's scenario and the case of the NCR and New Right is that 
the structural changes (i.e., campaign laws) did not give them the abil-
ity to gain and use new resources so much as increase the value of a 
resource already held by the Right. 
Before going on, the reader should note that no pluralist assump-
tion is being made about this process. Although these Election Campaign 
laws may have limited the direct influence of businessmen and corpora-
tions in the electoral process, this by no means means the decrease of 
corporate America's influence and power in society as a whole. Even 
within the election process itself, corporate PACs still outspent those 
PACs depending upon direct mailing (Koenig, 1983). In a certain sense, 
the laws may be relatively unimportant and may, in fact, serve corporate 
America in an ideological way by reinforcing pluralist belief ("The sys-
tern is open to all, not only the rich. 11 ) and hiding corporate America's 
actual power. If so, this also has implications for our study of this 
movement's actual power. If the NCR's influence lies only within the· 
rather narrow area of electoral politics, the anxiety of those opposing 
it (the left and moderates) may be unfounded while at the same time they 
lose sight of who their actual II II enemy is. Further research in this 
area will be necessary. 
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Even though I have partially shown why the New Right gained promi-
nence, I am still left with a more important question relevant to my 
purpose of discovering the structure and functioning of this movement's 
preexistent social network. Why was the Right so well prepared for this 
source shift in campaign financing? It is obvious that a mailing list 
cannot be created overnight so why should the radical right have had 
this structure and technique intact while mainstream political organiza-
tions did not have did not have such campaign mechanisms? The answer 
lies in an examination of the New Right's preexistent structure- the Old 
Right. 
LIFE ON THE POLITICAL FRINGE 
Life outside the political mainstream is difficult for fringe 
political movements, not only in reference to the implementation of 
their goals but in the area of mere survival as well. The perimeter 
groups not only find it difficult to influence those in power or gain 
access to the news media (see Molotch and Lester, 1968) but must also 
deal with the more mundane problem of finances. Those in the political 
mainstream such as major political parties and candidates have tradi-
tionally been supported by the generous donations of large corporations 
and rich business magnates. On the fringe, these types of sources are 
few and far between. As such these groups have had to develop other 
methods to survive financially; techniques which vary from group to 
group and environment to environment. One need only glance at a small 
number of groups to see this diversity. 
86 
LIMITING EXPENDITURES 
The Bolshevik party of pre-Soviet Russia serves as one example. 
Lenin (1902) in his book, What is to be Done? outlines the plan for a 
Bolshevik party organization outlawed in Tsarist Russia. Lenin limited 
membership to only those willing to be full-time professional revolu-
tionaries. While the stated aim of this organizational requirement was 
to make it difficult for the authorities to catch up with the Bolshe-
viks, a latent function of this requisite was to keep expenses down. A 
small group does not use as many resources. Also by limiting membership 
to those truly committed, you narrow the membership to those willing to 
make sacrifices for their ideals. (Lenin and his full-time revolution-
aries received only 30 rubles or less a month as a salary.) 
Despite the bare-bones structure, however, the Bolsheviks were 
still often in financial trouble. The money of rich sympathizers like 
Kalmykova and Morozov were often not enough. The Bolsheviks responded 
"creatively" to their situation by "expropriating" their needed funds 
through the armed robberies of banks. This not only gave the Bolsheviks 
some needed funds but it also gave some of their up and coming young 
revolutionaries (e.g. Joseph Stalin) experience in certain II • organ1.za-
tional" skills. (Appignanesi and Zarate, 1977:100-1) 
Another political movement in our own society uses techniques to 
survive financially a little less drastic than those above. The Gray 
Panthers (GPs), a group which has concerned itself mostly with problems 
of ageism, implements techniques common in many American movements. 
Each local chapter of this SMO is almost totally responsible for sup-
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porting its own work. A good deal of its finances come from mandatory 
dues, supplemented by grants and donations as well as money raised in 
such fundraising endeavors as garage sales and the like. Costs, at 
least in the one chapter observed, are kept down by having most of the 
work done(e.g., office work and telephoning members about activities) by 
member volunteers. Of course such a system is possible in a movement 
which is made up of a great many retired individuals who have may have 
more time to spare on voluntary activities. 
INCREASING RESOURCES: MONEY 
The pre-1970 Radical Right is another collection of groups outside 
the political mainstream and so lacking the resources of "legitimate" 
political organizations. One such Radical Right SMO of particular 
interest to us was the Young Americans for Freedom, a New York City 
based ultra-conservative youth movement created in the early 1960's by 
William F. Buckley. The YAF was one of the better financed right-wing 
organizations of this time (although in its first year it did succeed in 
accumulating a reasonably large debt), mostly due to the efforts and 
techniques of conservative fundraiser Marvin Leibman and his associates 
and co-workers. Even though the group was relatively well financed com-
pared to other right-wing groups it still lacked the resources of some 
more mainstream groups attached to either of the political parties. 
Even though the YAF had many relatively wealthy contributers (e.g., 
Buckley), they still did not seem to be able to muster the large single 
corporate contribution. They depended on Marvin Leibman's box of 3 by 5 
cards containing the addresses of former contributers to solicit funds. 
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This fact brings us to an interesting question. Why was it that, even 
though the ideology of the radical right was consistant with corporate 
interests, the radical right could never get consistent and extensive 
financial support from large corporations and their executives? 
There are many possible answers. Hugh C. Newton of the conserva-
tive Heritage Foundation accounts for the ultra-rich's reluctance to 
support ultra-conservative causes as due to just "plain cheapness." 
For a long while you could not get money out of conservative busi-
nessmen. H.L. Hunt would take you to lunch and give you a ham sand-
wich out of his desk. Now you've got people interested in building 
the network in changing the American Nind. 01organ, 1982; cf. Gam-
son, 1968: 96) 
A better explanation though has been offered by Burd (1978). Corpora-
tions and their executives are not stingy; they contribute to other mod-
erate political groups. The reason such people and institutions do not 
consistently support radical right groups has to do more with the way 
the business world views political contributions. They view political 
contributions as investments. In typical cost/benefit thinking, the 
corporation or businessman is looking to contribute to causes where sfhe 
believes there is a reasonable chance of "return". A radical rightist 
group in the 1960s, while espousing free enterprise principles which a 
businessman may well agree with, would not gain corporate support 
because they had little chance of publicly enacting these principles in 
their position on the fringe. Thus, they would not be a smart invest-
ment to a corporation looking to influence the public. On the other 
hand, a moderate incumbent Democratic congressperson with a reasonable 
chance of being elected is a good investment. Although such an individ-
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ual may not agree entirely with "free market" economics, there is a good 
chance, in the corporations eyes, that when s/he is in Congress that 
sjhe will remember where his or her's campaign finances came from. It 
is for this reason why for many years business has consistently sup-
ported incumbents, Democrat or Republican, over challengers. Incumbents 
are a better bet to be elected and thus a sure place to place one's 
money if one is concerned with influencing political decisions. Busi-
ness has only begun to support the radical right in the mid-1970s at a 
time when ultra-conservatism has become a more "legitimate" alternative 
(Morgan, 1982; Koenig, 1983). 
I shall now return to the YAF. As I have already mentioned, this 
organization used a "primitive" type of direct mailing process in order 
to gain funds. For its needs, this procedure served the group well; for 
as the organization developed its goals became more and more modest; its 
membership more and more ingrown. It became more of country club than a 
political proselytyzing organization (Crawford, 1980). Although their 
"3 x 5 card in a box" system worked to a limited degree for the YAF, for 
groups with broader goals these present techniques would not be effi-
cient. A very large number of names would need to be stored in a more 
efficient manner than on 3 x 5 cards. Any large mailing, in turn, would 
need many people to process it faster than under the YAF system. 
Some of the YAF workers (including a young college dropout named 
Richard Viguerie) realized these problems. Viguerie, an associate fun-
draiser for YAF at the time, left the organization in the early 60s bor-
rowing the basic approach to fundraising he learned from Leibman and 
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combining it with the new technology of the computer to form his own 
fundraising company (RAVCO) (see Illustration 3). The computer allowed 
for the potential storage of a large number of names and addresses and 
the processing of them in a fast and efficient manner. 
The development of RAVCO in its early days is interesting. When 
Viguerie left YAF he took with him only the few names Leibman had col-
lected. To increase this list, he went to the Library of Congress to 
copy by hand (the photocopying of this information was illegal) the 
names of all individuals who gave $50 or more to Goldwater's Presiden-
tial campaign in 1964 (Goldwater had used direct mail to a limited 
degree).(Viguerie, 1980:27) This increased his list by a modest 12,000. 
Through acquisitions like this, however, RAVCO built a fairly large list 
of people who were known to have supported right-wing causes. 
Although RAVCO began to make a name for itself in certain circles 
in the late 60s and early 70s (prior to the campaign election laws by 
Viguerie's own admission), the company only attracted the modest busi-
ness of various fringe groups and longshot Congressional candidates. 
Viguerie's largest endeavor during this time was George Wallace's long-
shot 1968 third-party try for the presidency. That same year, George 
McGovern had asked for RAVCO's help in his Senatorial campaign which, as 
is obvious, the company refused. Later on, RAVCO worked for the Rever-
end Sun Myung Moon, founder of the Unification Church, on raising funds 
for an American organization for freeing North Korea. On the other 
hand, incumbents and those of the political mainstream never sought RAV-
CO's assistance. As I mentioned earlier, they had no need to pay for 
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the expense of direct-mail funding when "free" donations were available. 
Richard Nixon, for example, refused Viguerie' s offer of assistance in 
the 1972 campaign. W. Clement Stone and others of the ultra-rich were 
more than enough support for Nixon. Clearly, before the election laws, 
RAVCO and other direct mailing groups remained in the realm of longshots 
and lunatics. 
As I mentioned already in the beginning of this chapter, those 
changes in campaign finance laws changed this situation very quickly. 
Candidates needed new ways to raise large sums of money. Some looked 
for the proverbial loopholes in these laws. Others attempted to raise 
large sums of money from the small individual contributions of many 
individuals. This demanded a large list of potential contributers which 
the right-wing RAVCO company already had intact through years of collec-
tion. It is partially for this reason, as well as media publicity (which 
will be discussed in the eighth chapter) that the right wing seemed to 
gain strength in the late 1970s; it was not because of any ideological 
shift by the American population in this era. 
INCREASING RESOURCES: GRASSROOT SUPPORT 
Although the elections laws did give prominence to companies like 
RAVCO, Viguerie' s organization could not really develop an effective 
modern social movement on direct mailing alone. Direct mailing can also 
facilitate what political scientists call "grassroots lobbying". 
Instead of an organization paying a professional lobbyists to contact 
legislators in Congress, grassroots lobbying depends on the grassroots 
membership of an organization to contact the legislators through a mail-
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ing campaign. Members are contacted through the mail and told to imme-
diately write or phone their legislators in order to urge them to vote a 
certain way on an issue or bill (Zwier, 1982:63). With a direct-mail 
list and a computer, such a tactic is efficient, fast, and sometimes 
effective. However, no matter how effective grassroots lobbying is, a 
modern movement needs more. Local organizations are needed to support 
grassroot events such as door-to-door canvassing and the distribution of 
political literature. Because of the power of the media in our society 
to define political alternatives and issues, tactics geared toward gain-
ing media access must be developed. RAVCO, even with its increasing 
financial resources and mailing list, did not have the expertise to do 
these things. To remedy this problem, RAVCO spread its "tentacles" (as 
can be seen in Illustration 3 in the last chapter) in order to create 
coalitions with those groups having the resources and skills necessary 
to perform these tactics. Unlike past right-wing coalitions, RAVCO's 
main concern was not just finding those of the politically conservative 
persuasion but those with resources and organizations as well. RAVCO 
exchanged its prominence and fundraising ability for other organiza-
tions' lists of names and, more importantly, for their ability do things 
politically that RAVCO could not do alone. 
RAVCO contacted many groups. Many old-right individuals and thei,r 
resources became involved as Group VII in Illustration 3. Billy Joe 
Hargis, Edgar Bundy, and Phyllis Schlafly are ust a few of these. More 
importantly, however, RAVCO looked within the "sleeping 
giant"--evangelicalism and fundamentalism-- for it was here that certain 
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organizations and media access techniques were being developed, albeit 
for different purposes. In the next two chapters I will discuss these 
organizations and techniques. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE NCR SOCIAL NETWORK AND THE SELLING OF RELIGION 
Berger (1967: 138-39), in The Sacred Canopy, states that a key 
characteristic of religiously pluralist societies is that religions can 
no longer take the allegiance of their "client population" for granted 
as in societies with religious monopolies. In a pluralist society 
religion is voluntary and the prospective religious consumer has a num-
ber of religions to choose from. Religion, then, becomes a consumer 
product. Religion "must be 'sold' to a clientele that is no longer con-
strained to 'buy'."(Berger, 1967:138) As in any other "business", in 
order to survive, the religion must produce results, i.e., attract and 
retain members. 
One of the effects of this market situation, according to Berger, 
is the rationalization of religious organization, that is, the develop-
ment of religious organizations guided by ends-means rationality (as in 
bureaucracies) instead of by traditional or charismatic criteria. Such 
an organization, regulated by such concerns as efficiency and pragma-
tism, seems more suited to the competition that pluralism produces. 
Although the above process may in a general sense be true, it does 
not affect all religions in a pluralist situation at the same time or at 
the same rate. Some religions, because of their theological, structural 
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and/or demographic characteristics, were more resistant to the process 
of organizational rationalization than others (cf. Hunter, 1983). This 
had been the case with fundamentalism and to a lesser extent evangeli-
calism. While their more liberal counterparts were creating organiza-
tions guided by an ends-means logic, fundamentalists were still attempt-
ing to maintain their organizations along traditional fundamentalist 
forms. 1 Those fundamentalists of the mid-twentieth century who deviated 
somewhat from these forms (e.g., nee-evangelical movement of the 1940s 
and 1950s) were accused of substitutiing "true Christianity" for the 
"Jesuit ethic" of ends-means rationality, an accusation still made today 
by certain fundamentalists in reference to their NCR brothers and sis-
ters (e.g., Messenger, 1982). 
Before going on, I should emphasize that when I said that, up 
until recently fundamentalists and some evangelicals were resistant to 
rationalizing their organizations I was talking not of an unwillingness 
to use modern technology but of a refusal to use efficient, effective, 
and/or pragmatic techniques in order to "market their religion" with 
these material items (cf. Ellul, 1964). For example, fundamentalists 
and evangelicals have been using radio and television almost since their 
inception. Charles Fuller's radio program, "The Old Fashion Revival 
Hour", and later Billy Graham's, "Hour of Decision", are just two promi:-
1. Interestingly enough, many of these so-called traditional funda-
mentalist forms of fundamentalism, especially in the case of revival 
techniques, were actually taken from an early 19th century work by ex-
lawyer turned evangelist, Charles Finney, a book ironically written to 
get "evangelical" sects to use more pragmatic techniques in their revi-
val services. 
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nent programs broadcast over the airwaves in the '40s, '50s, and, '60s 
(Gaspar, 1963: 76-80). However, these programs differ fundamentally in 
technique from some of today's prominent programs (e.g., 700 Club, PTL 
Club) in that the older programs simply translated fundamentalist forms 
of worship through an electronic media, while today's programs not only 
borrow secular technology but secular program forms and styles of pro-
duct ion to express their message. "The Old Fashion Revival Hour" was 
essentially a fundamentalist Sunday evening worship service presented 
over the radio, complete with opening prayer, congregational singing, an 
"amateur" choir, and finally ending with a typical fundamentalist ser-
mon. The 700 Club, on the other hand, with the sound off, may be indis-
tinguishable from such T.V. magazines as "Today" or "Good Morning". 
There are interviews with prominent individuals, news closeups by futu-
rist Tom Sine, health and beauty tips, cooking and nutrition segments, 
and Las Vegas-type "Christian" comedians or singers all interspersed 
with "Evangelistic" commercial plugs. The difference between the two 
eras of fundamentalist broadcasting is less one of technology and more 
one of production and presentation. 2 Both were attempts to evangelize, 
but the latter programs were willing to use rational techniques to do 
it. 
Why were evangelical and fundamentalist organizations more resi~-
2. Of course, not all of today's programs have forsaken traditional 
forms. Many of the locally produced shows are essientially filmed dur-
ing ordinary services. Also many prominent national programs, most 
notably Jerry Falwell's "Old Time Gospel Hour", also follow the worship 
service format. 
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tant to rationalizing influences? The idealists among us may use these 
groups' conservative theology to explain their resistance. They might 
argue that conservative beliefs may severely constrain and limit what 
adaptations can be made by organizations. These beliefs, in their 
insistence on maintaining tradition, may effectively thwart change. In 
my view, however, such an explanation obscures more than it explains, 
for the conservative beliefs may themselves be indicators of a deeper 
process. 
An explanation which looks at social and structural variables for 
answers would seem better. For example, according to Hunter (1983:58), 
this resistance may be because evangelicalism and fundamentalism have 
been traditionally located further away from the "institutions and pro-
cesses of modernity" than more mainstream religious groups. 
To begin, there is the gender composition of each group. Evangeli-
calism finds its greatest popular support among women. A large per-
centage of Evangelical men are older and retired. Thus a sizable 
proportion of Evangelicals are protected within the private sphere 
from the constraining forces of the highly rational public sphere ... 
Another dimension on which one can measure relative proximity to 
modernity is geographic. "The rural hegemony of the South was lit-
tle disturbed by the immigration, industrialization, new intellec-
tual currents and all those other forces which were elsewhere trans-
forming society." (Handy, 1971: 69) The same could be said of the 
rural areas of the Midwest and the mid-Atlantic region, and in the 
main it holds true today. By virtue of their concentration in these 
areas, Evangelicals once again avoid the constant and inevitable 
contact with the constraining forces of modernity ... Another index 
is education. Contemporary Evangelicals are among the poorest edu-
cated of religious groups. Thus they have not been exposed at 
length to the secularizing forces of public education (Hunter, 
1983:58). 
However, no matter how resistant to change the group's ideas may 
make the group nor how far away from modernity they are located, the 
process of rationalization inevitably has an effect on a religious group 
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(cf. Hunter, 1983). The resistance to change just delayed the process 
of rationalization; it did not block it. In the late 1960s and early 
1970s one movement within fundamentalism and evangelicalism-- the Church 
Growth Movement-- best typifies the early stages of this process. The 
aim of this movement was to convert America and build large evangelical 
and fundamentalist churches (numerically and physically) using rational 
techniques of persuasion. It was from this movement which Viguerie 
recruited organizations and networks for his right-wing coalition. 
Why choose this movement for recruitment? To understand why we 
need only return to Berger (1967:139). 
The spread of bureaucratic structures through the religious institu-
tions ha~ the consequence that these organizations, irrespective of 
their va: ious theological traditions, increasingly resemble each 
other sociologically. 
This homogenization of religious structure can be taken one step fur-
ther, however. Not only does the rationalization of religious organiza-
tions produce religions that appear similar organizationally, it also 
begins to produce religious structures which are similar to other secu-
lar organizations including the political. This means organizations 
structured for religious aims can be easily transformed and used for 
secular aims. In our case, the techniques and organizations created by 
the Church Growth Movement to persuade Americans to become "born-again" 
could be adapted to persuading Americans to vote conservatively. It is 
for this reason that Viguerie chose the Church Growth networks for a 
coalition rather than other fundamentalist politically conservative 
groups. It was not enough that a network or organization espoused 
right-wing ideology, Viguerie and the political right needed a network 
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that could be molded and transformed into a modern political movement of 
practical value to the right (cf. Viguerie, 1980). 
To illustrate this transformation, I will examine the two expres-
sions of the Church Growth Movement (the Campus Crusade Connection and 
the Independent Baptists) which became involved in the NCR, through RAV-
CO's urgings. I will examine (1) how these segments developed and (2) 
the resource characteristics which made these segments valuable to the 
secular right. 
CAMPUS CRUSADE AND GROUPS .! , .!.! , AND I I I 
In the last chapter I mentioned my surprise at discovering that 
Bill Bright, founder of Campus Crusade for Christ (CCC), was so promi-
nent in the NCR social network. I found that Bright had a relatively 
high centrality rating and also occupied a strategic network position 
having intenvening ties between Viguerie and Groups I, II, and III (see 
Illustration 3). However, upon examining Bright more closely, it comes 
as no surprise to me that he occupies such a position. Through the CCC 
and its various projects, Bright developed an extensive grassroots 
organization and rational media techniques which proved to be of inter-
est to Richard Viguerie and his secular New Right compatriots. In this 
section I will examine Bill Bright and the development of groups I, II, 
and III. 
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CAMPUS CRUSADE FOR CHRIST 
The development of the "Bill Bright" network begins with the 
founding in 1951 of the CCC on the campus of UCLA. The aim of the CCC 
was to evangelize college students. The ~rganization's beginnings were 
modest. Only a handful of students attended the early meetings held in 
Bright's home near the campus. However, despite these meager begin-
nings, Bright was still able to attract evangelical "heavyweights" to 
sit on his advisory board (e.g., Billy Graham of Group I) giving him 
important early connections which served to build his organization. By 
1960, 9 years later, the CCC' s staff was enlarged to 109, working on 
forty campuses in fifteen states. The organization's headquarters were 
moved from a mansion (purchased during the fifties) near UCLA to a once 
famous Southern California resort in Arrowhead Springs. At the same 
time, the organization began to dump many of its old advisory board mem-
hers, most of whom were evangelists and ministers, in favor of fundamen-
talist and evangelical businessmen some of whom appear in Group I 
(Illustration 3) By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the advisory board 
was mostly made up of executives, while at the same time the CCC itself 
had expanded to having representatives on some campus in most major met-
ropolitan areas in the U.S. and around the world 3 (Quebedeaux, 
1979:1-26). 
In his biography on Bill Bright, Quebedeaux seems to imply that 
part of Bright's and the CCC's success can be attributed to his pragma-
3. The CCC was also beginning to develop a program geared for high 
schools at this time as well. 
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tism. Bright took literally the Pauline admonition to be "all things to 
all men." He would use almost any technique in order to persuade col-
lege students to convert, to the dismay of many evangelicals and funda-
mentalists. Although criticized by many evangelical theologians for 
oversimplifying and cheapening the Gospel's plan for salvation, his lit-
tle booklet, The Four Spiritual Laws, gave the would-be "soulwinner" an 
easy and understandable cookbook technique for "leading friends and 
strangers to Christ" (being born-again). Churches found the booklet a 
great tool to their own evangelism program (cf. Hunter, 1983:75-6). His 
organization's strategy of always attempting to first convert the cam-
pus' student leaders in hopes that their influence over fellow students 
would make the evangelism of the rest of campus easier and more effec-
tive, was criticized for putting those with prestige first instead of 
last as the Gospels' stated. Yet it seemed a fairly effective path for 
an organization trying to make inroads into a campus. When student 
unrest began on the Berkley campus, CCC met the evangelism challenge by 
having its UC representatives dress more in the counterculture styles of 
the sixties to the dismay of evangelical parents who were attempting to 
stop the wearing of "long hair and beads" on their own children. It is 
the culmination of this rational ends-means orientation in later CCC 
projects which ultimately made the CCC social network so appealing to 
RAVC0. 4 Let us now turn to those projects which attracted RAVCO's inter-
4. Of course, this is only part of the story of CCC' s success. 
Another cause of this organizations rapid expansion may be the exploita-
tion of its staff. One minister I interviewed told me about the very 
small salary staff members get for literally 16-hour days and 7-day 
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est. 
BRIGHT AND HIS EVANGELISTIC CAMPAIGN 
As has already been mentioned, evangelist Bill Bright's CCC was a 
perfect organization upon which to build a national network -- whether 
for strictly religious concerns or political reasons. Since its aim was 
to evangelize college and high school students, it had at least one rep-
resentative on most major college campuses in most major metropolitan 
areas in the United States. As a nondenominational organization, its 
support and staff came from many denominations, meaning it had contacts 
throughout fundamentalism and evangelicalism. CCC was also well 
suported by wealthy evangelical and fundamentalist businessmen. CCC had 
all the resources on which to build an extensive national evangelistic 
campaign and, in fact, attempted to do just that through its "Here's 
Life, America" crusade. 
According to Bright, the aim of "Here's Life" was "to turn our 
nation back to God." This would be done through the conversion of the 
American people to Christianity. Bright believed America was ready for 
conversion if only someone were there to show them how. Through a well 
planned strategy, "Here's Life" would do just that. 
Michaelson and Wallis (1976) have described the technique "Here's 
Life" used. 
"Here's Life, America" is a city saturation evangelistic effort that 
organizes and utilizes the resources of local churches with the 
weeks. Quebedeaux, himself, talks of the high staff burnout rate and 
the consequent high rate of turnover. 
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assistance of Campus Crusade staff. Its goal is to train five mil-
lion Christians from 50,000 local churches to carry out intensive 
evangelistic efforts. In each city the focus becomes a three week 
saturation campaign, where billboards, radio, and T.V. advertising 
attempt to provoke responses with slogans like, "I found it! You can 
find it too!" and then giving a telephone number to call. Individu-
als who call are then contacted by those trained from various coop-
erating churches and presented with the gospel, utilizing Campus 
Crusade style materials. Other efforts, such as publicized testimo-
nies and witnessing in local neighborhoods, organized down to each 
city block, are all designed to reach the city for Christ and culmi-
nate together during this same time. 
One should note that "Here's Life", unlike other such evangelist pro-
jects, got most of its labor from laymen. While the CCC staff provided 
materials and some staff, it was the local churches which provided the 
vast manpower and financial resources. There were no mass rallies with 
evangelists and such. "Here's Life" was strictly a cooperating inter-
church project guided by the CCC staff which relied strictly on modern 
media techniques to evangelize America. 
While this campaign did not yield the results Bright had "prayed" 
for, they did yield other important outcomes. National religious lead-
ers, some celebrities (e.g., Roger Staubach, former quarterback for the 
Dallas Cowboys), and some of those appearing in Groups II and III came 
together to add their influence, networks, and organizations to this 
larger campaign. 5 The campaign itself was attempted in 18 major cities, 
200 or so smaller metropolitan areas, and 18,000 smaller communities. 
Each campaign brought people together on a local level and tied them to 
5. One of the projects these leaders cooperated on was another 
brainchild of Bright, the Christian Embassy. This "Embassy", located in 
Washington D.C., has as its purpose the evangelization of the U.S. 
political elite. Most of those in Group II and some in Group III were 
involved in this project's creation. 
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an overarching national network. It gave many local church leaders a 
chance to learn how to use the media, cooperate with other churches, and 
get the local congregation involved in a national movement. This grass-
roots network, while failing in its initial evangelical endeavor, became 
a resource for some of Bright's "other projects". 
THIRD CENTURY PUBLISHERS 
One of Bright's pet projects, outside of his evangelistic concerns 
with CCC, was Third Century Publishers. This organization published 
right-wing, religio-political literature, including Rus Walton's (see 
Illustration 3) book, One Nation Under God. 
-----
This book had a major 
influence on the political thoughts of the New Christian Right leaders 
including Jerry Falwell. Also published were political Bible study kits 
meant to educate evangelicals and fundamentalists in "proper" political 
beliefs and effective political organizing.' Furthermore, Third Century 
created a congressional rating service which, like the Christian Voice's 
today, rated senators and congresspersons according to the "morality" of 
their voting record. 
Working with Bright in Third Century was former Arizona congres-
sperson John Conlan. Conlan seemed to become a sort of unofficial 
speaker for CCC, speaking nationally at churches and at the CCC's summer 
retreat. According to Sojourners, Conlan's message was anything but 
strictly religious, however. Conlan stated his message. 
6. Bill Bright's involvement with this organization seems to be a 
bit hypocritical on his part for one of his rules for CCC staff was that 
they not take any political stances or action. 
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During the first 175 years of this nation, we let that spiritual, 
moral, ethical, biblical concept permeate our society. That made 
America great ... In the past 25 year, the philosophy being taught 
in our classrooms and expounded in our media is the philosophy of 
humanism, of secularism ... The extreme of this philosophy is found 
in communal, pseudo-religious philosophy that is gaining greater 
control in the world ... One of the greatest evidences that we are 
in the process of progressive surrender is the shrinking perimeter 
of the free world and the increasing control government has over our 
everyday lives (quoted in Wallis and Michaelson, 1976). 
Both Bright and Conlan were not content with Third Century's then 
current influence and sought to expand it. In June, 1974, they held a 
meeting with 20 to 25 major conservative fundamentalists, evangelical 
leaders, and businessmen (Group I, see Illustration 3) in an attempt to 
raise money for a national political effort. (Many of those present 
were already active in Campus Crusade.) The object of this effort would 
be to create a national grassroots movement with the aim of putting 
"Christian" (i.e., ultra-conservative) men and women into office. 
Bright and Conlan took several steps in an attempt to implement 
their plan. First, they took over and reorganized another right-wing 
organization-- the ailing Christian Freedom Foundation. The purpose of 
this move was to obtain an organization already structured for a 
national political strategy and to gain tax-exempt status. The second 
step was to hold a seminar, for some of the CCC's regional representa-
tives during the week of March 21-26, 1975, on creating a grassroots 
political movement. The plan was to 
recruit and manage a team of representatives from each congressional 
district who would develop a program of home study groups, motivat-
ing evangelical Christians to get involved in politics, training 
them in methods of political organizing and teaching them the prin-
ciples and political philosophy to use for knowing the "Christian 
candidates" to support (Michaelson and Wallis, 1976). 
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The home-study groups were supposed to be organized in the image 
of the typical evangelical or fundamentalist Bible study so that partic-
ipants felt comfortable and were more open to discussion. The studies 
were held in the representatives' homes in an informal atmosphere. 
Study materials from Ynird Century were used. 
Realizing that not all evangelicals, as opposed to fundamental-
ists, held right-wing beliefs, it was suggested that group leaders care-
fully screen those who wished to participate in these groups. In the 
groups' early stages there was no attempt to invite people in order to 
convert them politically but to build up a local network of like-minded 
Christian political conservatives and teach them political organizing 
techniques. Those who were not sympathetic to conservative causes were 
discouraged from attending or were not invited at all. The screening of 
individuals was done simply by asking interested individuals whom they 
would support as a presidential candidate-- Ronald Reagan or Nelson 
Rockefeller? If they answered "Reagan", they were invited to the study 
group. If they answered "Rockefeller", they were politely discouraged 
from attending. 
Where were these organizers to find their contacts? Various writ-
ers (Wallis and Michaelson, 1976; Maclean, 1976) have pointed to the 
network and names collected by "here's Life". "Here's Life" provided a 
ready source of names of media-sophisticated and organization-wise, 
potential, political activists. 
Third century did not use this network effectively. Their plans 
to use the religious leaders, ordinary layman, organizations (Groups II 
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and III), and business support (Group I) of the Here's Life campaign did 
not materialize in 1976 partly, it would seem, because of the critical 
exposure the Christian Left gave Third Century before it had a chance to 
get off the ground (Pierard, 1980). However, despite the initial fail-
ure, Bill Bright and Groups I,II, and III did come to the attention of 
RAVCO during RAVCO's quest to expand its resources and to develop a more 
viable right-wing, coalition. RAVCO made use of "Here's Life's" con-
tacts for their own direct mailing operation (MacLean, 1976). The 
organization also made use of Group I and its financial resources. 
More importantly, the grassroots organization and media techniques 
developed in Groups II and III for evangelistic purposes were used by 
the NCR in their strategies. For example, it was the leaders of Group 
II and III and the network of local churches who were responsible for 
the moderately successful Washington for Jesus demonstration in 1980 
(Clendenen, 1980). This march in Washington, D.C., was attended by 
thousands of demonstrators and attracted a moderate amount of media 
attention. Some of the same media techniques learned in "Here's Life" 
campaign were used in the Washington for Jesus march for political 
goals. The same interchurch cooperation and organization "Here's Life" 
depended on served as a source of communication for Washington for 
Jesus. In summary, the techniques and organization developed for the 
CCC and the Here's Life campaign in Groups I,II, and III created a net-
work appealing to the secular right. The same rational techniques and 
organization which could be used to persuade individuals to be born 
again could be used to persuade individuals to vote conservatively. 
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THE INDEPENDENT BAPTISTS AND GROUP IV 
--- --- ----- --
In 1978, Richard Viguerie, Paul Weyrich, and other political 
organizers of the secular right approached a little-known T.V. evange-
list, Jerry Falwell, about heading and organizing his own political 
organization ( Newsweek, September 15, 1980.) Out of this meeting, the 
now famous NCR SHO- the Horal Majority- was formed. Many commentators, 
(including those in the above Newsweek article) have implied that Fal-
well's appeal to the secular right was due to his experience with the 
media through his weekly T.V. program, "The Old Time Gospel Hour" and 
its resulting influence over a right wing oriented audience. While this 
no doubt accounts for part of Falwell's appeal, it touches only the vis-
ible part of the iceberg. Many other T.V. evangelists using flashier 
production techniques and possessing larger audiences could have been 
asked (cf. Hadden and Swann, 1982:60). Falwell's appeal lay not only in 
his use of media but also in his leadership role in a segment of funda-
mentalism known as the Independent Baptists (see Hill and Owen, 1982). 
As the previously examined CCC, this group also developed some rational 
organization and persuasive techniques in order to pursue evangelism, 
albeit in a different segment of the evangelical population. 7 These 
7. While Falwell and Bright's empires overlap, it is important to 
realize that the networks they attracted people from are different. 
Bright's Here's Life network was more diverse politically, religiously, 
and probably economically. This accounts for the reason his political 
organization had to screen participants for its study groups. Many of 
those who felt "led" to participate in the evangelistic campaigns were 
not necessarily right-wing fundamentalists even if Bright was. Falwell, 
on the other hand, needed no such screening process. His attachments 
and those of his parishioners were never part of the broader evangelical 
movement and in fact he dislikes the term "evangelical", prefering "fun-
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techniques and organization could also be adapted for political goals as 
those of "Here's Life" were. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDEPENDENT BAPTISTS 
Independent Baptists (IB) have many characteristics similar to 
other fundamentalists (see Chapter II). 8 They interpret the Bible liter-
ally, have contempt for tradition and liturgical forms, and are strict 
separationists. Besides these characteristics, however, the IB hold two 
other characteristics which distinguish them from most other fundamen-
talists and evangelicals: (1) an extreme adherence to congregational 
forms of polity, 9 and (2) an extreme emphasis on evangelism. Both of 
damentalist" instead. His right-wing political preferences, even before 
he became politically active, were always quite explicit. His followers 
have , for the most part, held to his ideology as well. 
8. The following information on Independent Baptists was collected 
through a number of sources. Part of the information comes from secon-
dary information collected on Jerry Falwell and his church the Thomas 
Road Baptist Church, and Jack Hyles and his church, First Baptist 
Church-Hammond Indiana (e.g., Lanier, 1980). Other materials come from 
observations of and personal interaction with the New England Baptist 
Temple (now Church), formerly of Easton, Massachusetts (whose pastor 
"Dr." Thomas Ward is the head of the Moral Majority in Massachusetts), 
and the North Baptist Church of Brockton, MA during the 1970s. Addi-
tional material about one of these churches was collected through their 
newsletters. I must warn the readers that I am being very careful about 
generalizing about Independent Baptists from these materials. Indepen-
dent Baptist churches in New England may be significantly different 
from their counterparts in the "Bible Belt". Hunter's (1983) data show 
that evangelicals and fundamentalists compose an extremely small segment 
of the religious population in New England as compared with their much 
larger "showing" in the South and the West. Their minority status in 
New England may cause these churches to act and organize somewhat dif-
ferently than in other places. One minister, for example, commented on 
how much more difficult his job was in New England because of all the 
"heathen liberals" living in New England. Such a different environment 
may distort many of my generalizations. 
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these characteristics are important to our understanding of the IB' s 
involvemen~ in the NCR and the structure this involvement took. 
CONGREGATIONAL POLITY 
At least in their rhetoric, all IB churches hold to strict congre-
gationalism. "The congregational form of polity is characterized by 
high degrees of autonomy of the local congregation, including the power 
to call or dismiss clergy." (McGuire, 1981: 77) Implied within this defi-
nition of congregationalism are two aspects about the nature of this 
form of polity. The first aspect is the highly decentralized nature of 
congregationalist "denominations". In a purely congregationalist denom-
ination the local church would be completely autonomous, accountable to 
no higher "worldly" authority than the local congregation itself. The 
second aspect is adherence to democratic, decision-making procedures in 
the local congregation. Again, in a pure type of congregational church, 
all decisions would be brought to the whole membership to vote upon, 
with the minister, deacons or elders, and other officials of the church 
having no more voting power than other members. If one reads the bylaws 
of IB churches, hears the rhetoric of their ministers, or sees the 
"official" organizational flowchart of a congregation, it may seem as if 
IB churches exhibit both these aspects of a congregational polity. In 
actuality, while IB hold strictly to the first aspect, a decentralized, 
9. It is worth noting at this point that the Independent Baptists 
are not a denomination in the organizational sense. The connections 
between local congregations are through informal ties, not an overarch-
ing formal organization however weak. 
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system, the existence of democratic forms is a myth (at least in the 
churches I have examined). I will look at each of these aspects more 
closely. 
CHURCH AUTONOMY 
As I mentioned previously, IBs are not a denomination in an organ-
izational sense. There is no overarching, centralized, denominational 
structure holding IB churches together and guiding their actions. 1 0 
There is neither a centralized denominational office controlling what 
IBs do nor a headquarters ready to bail out an ailing church. Even 
local IB churches may treat their own crosstown counterparts more as 
competitors than as "co-workers in Christ". The local church must make 
it on its own. 
This odd, almost Social Darwinist philosophy of IB churches 
becomes understandable when one considers that the IBs are only reflect-
ing the assumptions of the social era from which fundamentalism grew 
(cf. Stinchcombe, 1981). Marsden (1980:34) offers a description of this 
social era in his discussion of the D.L. Moody empire. 
That the YMCA rather than any denomination should be Moody's main 
formal contact with the Christian community was indicative of an 
important tendency in American evangelicalism, greatly furthered by 
10. IB churches may have weak ties with other IB churches, at 
least regionally, through some of the "pre-packaged" programs they 
choose to run. For example, if they create a Christian El~mentary 
school using the Texas based "Accelerated Christian Education" (ACE) 
program, they gain connections with other churches with ACE schools. If 
they use the Awana or Word of Life Club youth programs, they gain these 
same type of ties. In any case these connections are not anything like 
the formal ties between churches that the denominational hierarchy of 
let's say even the Southern Baptists provide. 
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Moody himself ... This system encouraged the personal empire-build-
ing which developed during Moody's time. Events in the business 
world of the Gilded Age paralleled this trend and likewise encour-
aged initiative and freedom from centralized regulation. Moody him-
self followed such a pattern. His success soon took him beyond the 
YMCA and, although he cultivated cordial relations with all evangel-
ical denominations, he had formal connections with none. Many of 
his associates followed a similar pattern. While most of them 
retained some formal denominational ties, their stronger allegiances 
were a variety of specialized works: revival agencies, prophetic 
conferences, school, publications and local churches. These prac-
tices were perpetuated in later fundamentalism. Even where denomi-
national concerns continued, the organizational dynamic of the move-
ment was built around individual leaders and empires made up of 
agencies dedicated to specific causes. It was a religion structured 
according to the free enterprise system. 
The effect which this rigid decentralization has on IB churches is 
not fully appreciated until one observes such churches close up. All 
church activities and programs are run by the local church and com-
pletely under their control. There is no denomination supplying Sunday 
School materials, tracts, and the like. The church is left with the 
problem of deciding from which of the many sources of fundamentalist 
materials to buy their supplies or whether to produce their own. Of 
course, the latter option entails the purchasing of other equipment such 
as printing presses. 11 In all, close cooperation between churches, even 
with those holding similar beliefs, is discouraged. For example, one of 
the churches I examined first hand had several unused buses in its park-
ing lot. Another like-minded church offered to either rent or buy one 
of these unused buses for their own evangelism efforts, but the first 
11. Despite the obvious expense this latter path creates, it is 
often chosen for reasons amounting to little more than pride. One 
debt-ridden church bought a printing press to print Spanish New Testa-
ments for their missionary to Mexico even though it probably would have 
been cheaper to buy an inexpensive Spanish version already in existence. 
113 
church refused and the buses remained unused. Such competition, even 
with so-called "brothers-in-Christ",is fairly common. After all, as one 
IB minister had remarked, competition not cooperation is a Christian 
virtue. 
DEMOCRATIC DECISION-MAKING 
While the first aspect of the congregational form of polity may 
exist in IB churches, the second aspect-- the democratic decision-making 
process of the local church-- is a myth. Although the church bylaws, 
minutes from meetings, and organizational flow-chart may indicate that 
the local church members govern IB churches, usually the minister wields 
the power and makes the final decision. In fact, IB ministers prot :·";ly 
exert more power over their churches than their counterparts in parishes 
governed by episcopalian or presbyterian forms of polity. Unlike their 
counterparts, IB ministers have no regional or national denominational 
hierarchies to constrain their actions. In turn, the disgruntled church 
member has no religious institution beyond the local church to go to 
when things go bad in his/her church. 
The contradiction between the rhetoric of democratic decision-mak-
ing and the actual political process in IB churches can be well illus-
trated by a situation that happened recently in one New England IB 
church. The minister of this church was under attack by some members of 
his congregation for a number of reasons, ranging from improper use of 
finances to making racist remarks to other church members. Some members 
left while others organized a movement to oust the pastor from his job. 
This movement brought their concerns to a church business meeting where 
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a vote of the majority of the congregation called for the removal of the 
minister. According to church bylaws and the ideals of congregational-
ism, the minister would no longer be permitted to perform his job nor 
receive any pay from the church after a period of time. However, the 
pastor did continue to perform his duties and receive a pay check after 
his termination, as if nothing had happened. Although this pastor did 
not control or gain the sympathy of the majority of the members, he did 
control certain individuals in key posts. The treasurer, for example, 
still paid the minister's salary and utility bills for the parsonage. 
The heads of other committees still took his lead on decisions. The 
staff of the church's elementary school still took their orders from 
him. In order to maintain the image of democracy, the pastor, through 
his control of the church newsletter, simply discredited those who voted 
against him saying his opposition was unwittingly the "tools of Satan". 
Therefore, he reasoned, their votes were "illegitimate" and standing in 
the way of the "will of God". To this day, even though voted out of 
office, this individual still acts as minister of this church. 
Of course, the example given above is an exceptional case. The 
power wielded by a pastor and the contradiction this entails were never 
quite as visible in the other churches I have observed. In the other 
churches the process of power is more subterranean, and as such open 
conflict never becomes visible to outsiders. The partial reason why the 
conflict was so visible in the church in the example may the fact that 
the congregation in this church existed before the pastor took his posi-
tion. This pastor had to gain power in an already existing structure of 
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interests. The membership, because they viewed the church as their own 
and not the pastor's, were willing to fight against the minister. 
However, in the other churches examined (and it is my impression 
of many other IB churches), it is the present pastor who founded the 
church and gathered the congregation. (For example, There was no Thomas 
Road Baptist church before its present minister, Jerry Falwell, founded 
it.) In this situation the pastor is able to structure the church to 
his benefit, and get placed in office only handpicked individuals loyal 
only to himself. People join the church because of the efforts of the 
pastor and so seem to feel a special obligation to him. Most impor-
tantly, the pastor, because he is the church's founder, often cultivates 
in his congregation the feeling that it is he and not the congregation 
that "owns" the church. Falwell has remarked, for example, that if the 
Gospel were not being preached in his church after he was dead, the con-
gregation had his permission to burn the church down. Who else but the 
owner of a church could give such permission? In this situation, a min-
ister does not have to really resort to force since he has screened from 
important posts those who might disagreee. He has a congregation which 
feels a certain amount of obligation to the minister. He has a congre-
gation which views, to some degree, the church as the pastor's property 
which he can dispose of in any way he wishes. 
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EMPHASIS ON EVANGELISM 
The second characteristic that distinguishes IBs from other groups 
in the evangelical/fundamentalist tradition is their enormous emphasis 
on evangelism. At first glance, it is difficult to distinguish their 
emphasis from other evangelical groups, for all evangelicals claim 
evangelism to be their first priority. However, IBs will mean something 
different by this. To them, to speak of one's first priority is to 
speak of one's only priority (cf. Stott, 1975:35-7). 
To illustrate, this it is only necessary to compare an IB church's 
weekly program of events with a more mainstream evangelical church's 
weekly schedule. The week begins in both cases with a number of Sunday 
services. In the more mainstream evangelical church, these services 
would be geared toward admonishing and uplifting the members, all 
assumed to be "saved souls" where sermon topics would include Christian 
piety or discipleship and other such concerns only of interest to some-
one already born again. Occasionally, an "altar call" will end the ser-
vice, in hopes that "those not already saved" will respond to the call. 
On the other hand, in IB churches" the main focus of the Sunday services 
is evangelism. The services are essentially revival services. Sermon 
topics are geared to "winning souls to Christ". Church members are 
urged to bring their "unsaved friends and love ones" to the service in 
order that they be "converted". Where piety and discipleship are men-
tioned, it is always in reference to evangelism. Members are admonished 
for their neglect of their "soul winning" duties. An altar call ends 
each service. 
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In many evangelical churches, the only other regular weekly ser-
vice, besides Sunday's, is the midweek prayer service. IB churches also 
have this service albeit with a more evangelistic, revivalist flavor. 
However, IB churches also include one or two weekly visitation nights in 
their calendar of activities as well. Usually one night during the week 
IBs organize visitations to the houses of prospective converts, the 
names of these converts often coming from the visitation cards filled 
out by visitors to the last Sunday services or from the leads members 
give those who do the visiting. The visiting church members, armed with 
a Bible and maybe Bright's Four Spiritual Laws pamphlet, attempt to "win 
the souls" of those they visit and at least get them to promise to show 
up at next week's service. Often, at the end of visitation night, the 
visitation team gets together to pray and trade "war stories". 
For those churches with a bus fleet, Saturday afternoon is also a 
time for visitation. Each bus driver, bus captain, and his/her team go 
out on Saturday afternoon to places where children are known to congre-
gate and try to get children to ride their bus to church the next day. 
Often candy or other such inducements are offered to the children if 
they attend (cf. Lanier, 1980). 12 
12. Another difference between the IB view on evangelism and that 
of many other evangelicals is the sense of urgency IBs bring to their 
methods. IBs have this feeling that the world is very close to -its last 
days and that Christ will soon be returning at any time. Those who are 
not saved before his return will be doomed to an eternity in hell, 
therefore, it is necessary to save as many of these people as soon as 
possible. As such high pressure sales tactics, which constantly demand 
the potential convert to an immediate decision for Christ, are often 
used by IBs. Many non-IB evangelicals on the other hand tend to soft-
sell their evangelism, being light on the pressure or sense of urgency, 
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With such a strong emphasis on "soul-winning", the IBs needed some 
way to measure whether they were successful at it (i.e., doing God's 
will). If the IBs were truly as literal in their interpretation of the 
Bible as they said they were, they would have only needed to show that 
they "brought the good news" to those who had not heard it to prove they 
were successful, for as Stott (1975:38) states, that is all evangelism 
means-- to bring the good news. However, IBs, as well as many other 
evangelicals, added a facet to this word which did not exist in the 
ancient Greek. They have defined the word "evangelism" in terms of 
results. In other words, it is not enough for an individual to be 
brought and hear the "Gospel" in order to say that he or she has been 
evangelized (as the original Greek meaning does); he or she must also 
respond to the message and become "born again". 
While this emphasis on results has infuriated many theologians, it 
did make the IBs job of judging the success of their evangelism easy. 
Instead of choosing any one of a number of qualitative measures of suc-
cessful evangelism, such as the piety of a convert or the convert's com-
mittment to God, IBs chose to measure the success of their evangelism by 
the number of converts and church attenders their church has. While such 
a measure laid them open to theological critiques of offering their 
flocks "cheap grace", the IBs had no trouble in judging who was doing 
God's will. It was simply a matter of seeing which church "packed them 
in" every Sunday. A "godly church" became synonomous with a big church. 
"allowing God to work in his own time and way." 
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THE IB CHURCH GROWTH MOVEMENT AND THE NCR 
--- -- --- --- ---
With the IBs emphasis on evangelism and their numerical operation-
a liz at ion of this term, the IB churches of the late 1960s and early 
1970s began to try a number of techniques to increase their church 
attendance and the number of individuals "making decisions for Christ." 
The techniques were many and diverse. There were Sunday "give-aways" 
where some type of "valuable" prize would be given away to each person 
who attended church or to that person bringing the most people. One of 
the New England churches I have observed once had a special Easter con-
test wherein the child who brought the most people would win a "real 
live" rabbit. Other churches have given silver dollars to each of those 
who attended church. Another strategy was to have a contest which pit-
ted half of the church Sunday school against the other half to see which 
side within an allotted time period could bring in the most people. The 
winner again often received some type of prize. 13 Large bus fleets were 
created by some churches in order to make church attendance more conven-
ient and to expand the geographical area from which potential members 
13. The offering of prizes in order to coax people to do their 
"religious duty" has culminated in a number of religious T.V. game 
shows. A rather tame one called "Bible Baffle" is essentially a Bibl,e 
quiz mixed in with a little scrabble. A children's game show called the 
"Bible Bowl" is a bit more bizarre and manipulative. In one segment a 
ten-dollar bill is placed in a child's hand and he or she is told that, 
if he or she answers the following question, the bill will be his or 
hers. The child chosen to answer this question is usually selected by 
the host closing his eyes, pointing his finger, spinning around and say-
ing "Around, and around and around I go and where I stop only Jesus 
knows." This show culminat-es with the winning team of children having 
an ice cream party while the losing team is forced to sit there and 
watch the winners eat. 
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could come from. The First Baptist Church of Hammond, for example, 
buses children to their church from many Chicago neighborhoods (Lanier, 
1980). Extensive door-to-door canvasing of the church's neighborhood 
was also used. Whether or not the actual techniques used -- or some 
other cultural or societal level variable-- were responsible, by the 
late 1960s, churches began to show more success at increasing their 
church size than others. 14 Jerry Falwell's success in building the 
Thomas Road Baptist church is one such successful IB church. 
Falwell began his ministerial career in Lynchburg, Virginia 15 in 
1956. His first church service took place in front of a few people in 
an old soda bottling factory which he rented. Within a few weeks he was 
also buying time on a local radio station and later still on T.V. He 
later bought a bus fleet to bring people to his church. His church's 
attendance grew so that by the late 1960s he had one of the largest 
churches in the country (17,000 active members). Besides his use of the 
media, buses, and other techniques such as door-to-door canvassing of 
Lynchburg, Falwell claimed at least partially explain his success. He 
14. It is worth noting that the successful IB churches have always 
attributed their success to both God and the techniques used, never to 
cultural or societal factors. When some members of one New England 
church attributed their church's failure at growth to the fact that 
those techniques used in the Bible belt do not work with New Englanders, 
the minister chastised them. In this minister's view, since God is 
unchanging and universal, so are the techniques used to bring p~ople to 
Him. To speak of cultural and societal factors is to allow "relativism" 
and "secular humanism" to creep into your thinking. 
15. It is interesting to note that Lynchburg was Falwell's birth-
place and the region where he grew up. This causes one to speculate 
whether much of Falwell's success in church building can be attributed 
to his use of friendship networks (cf. Snow et al, 1980). 
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built a Bible college and a new church building. His church, along with 
other IBs 1 (like Hyles 1 s church in Hammond, Indiana), were viewed by 
fundamentalists as the model which all ministers should strive to create 
(Current Biography, 1981; Lanier, 1980). 
At this point I should warn the reader against taking the atten-
dance figures quoted by IBs at face value. Falwell has been known to 
often exaggerate about the size of his television audience (Hadden and 
Swann,1982; Martin, 1982). Falwell has claimed his program attracts 50 
million viewers, when actually his viewership is 1.5 million. The fig-
ures churches give of weekly conversions are often slightly distorted as 
well. In one of the New England churches observed, often many individu-
als would come up week after week to be "saved" even though, as strict 
Calvinists, the church believed that a person "once saved" was "always 
saved". Some of those repeaters were adults who during their salvation 
testimony would state that they really were not serious about their pre-
vious conversions. Others were children who seemed to enjoy the atten-
tion they got when they went down to the pulpit for conversion. Despite 
their theology, this church still counted repeat converters in their 
figures, did not delete their past conversion from church records, and 
presented their figures as if each conversion counted was of a different 
individual. With the great emphasis which churches place on numbers and 
the resulting prestige it can bring in the IB community, it is not sur-
prising that such "fudging" of figures goes on. Researchers of church 
growth and revivals, however, must be aware of these problems when they 
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study such churches (cf. McLoughlin, 1983:106). 16 
Being separationists, it would have been against IBs beliefs to 
cooperate with other churches in evangelistc endeavors such as those of 
the CCC. However, there was nothing in their beleifs which would pre-
vent successful IB churches from teaching others their techniques. So 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s many IB churches began holding 
Church Growth conferences. Falwell was one individual holding such con-
ferences. His were and still are held in early summer for approximately 
a week and are usually advertised in fundamentalist publications like 
the Sword of the Lord and on his own T.V. program. 
During the week, seminars are held on an array of topics. There 
are sessions on door-to-door evangelism where individuals learn various 
salesmanship techniques such as how to persuade potential converts to 
allow you into their homes, how to guide the conversation in your direc-
tion, how to meet the objections of potential converts. "Trainees" 
often learn and practice Bright's Four Spiritual Laws pamphlet. Such 
seminars also demonstrate techniques for systematically canvassing your 
local community. 
Seminars on using buses to increase church size are also included. 
The bus seminars offer a systematic plan for organizing a church's "bus 
ministry." Each of the church's buses are to be manned by a team o·f 
16. In all fairness to IBs they are not the only ones guilty of 
such deceit. Individuals who watch Billy Graham crusades may often be 
impressed by the great number of people who respond to Graham's calls 
for repentance and conversion. What they fail to realize is that many 
of the individuals they see leaving their seats to go to the front are 
crusade counselors. 
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individuals which include a bus driver, a bus captain, and various other 
helpers. 17 Each team is suppose to be responsible for a certain geo-
graphical area and compete against other bus teams by attempting to 
bring more people to church than the other buses. The bus teams' 
responsibilities do not start and end with Sunday iorning ride but also 
include the canvassing of their appointed areas usually on Saturday 
afternoons. Finally seminars on the media are often offered which give 
"trainees" suggestions on how to use T.V. and radio for evangelism.u As 
time passed by, these conferences in Falwell's church, as well as oth-
ers, attracted a fairly large crowd of both IBs and other fundamental-
ists. 
These church-growth conferences developed certain resources 
appealing to the old secular rightists when they began to get ideas of 
expanding their movement. First, these conferences, along with Fal-
well's T.V. show, were the source of Falwell's large national network. 
Those attending those conferences were urged to sign Falwell's mailing 
list. Pastors and other church leaders were also asked to sign the 
names of those in the local church who would be interested in receiving 
Falwell's newsletter. For Viguerie, a man always interested in expand-
ing his direct-mailing business, this list was very appealing (Newsweek, 
September 15, 1980). Also such a list later gave Falwell a network upon 
17. Some churches have what is known as "bus pastors"- assistant 
pastors whose responsibility is strictly the church's bus ministry. 
18. Other seminars such as youth ministry and choir direction are 
also held but these are not directly important to our understanding of 
the NCR. 
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which to build his own national organization-- the Moral Majority-- for 
many pastors attending his conferences later became leaders of the 
regional chapters of the organization (cf. Pines, 1981; Huntington and 
Kaplan, 1982). Second, many of the techniques taught to increase church 
size could be easily transferred ~o political usage. Such techniques as 
door-to-door canvassing, the bus ministry, or the use of the media could 
be quite useful to the political right. The door-to-door canvassing 
procedures could be used (and in some cases were) for voter registration 
drives. The same type of bus ministry organization could be adapted to 
getting people to the polls. The use of the media by the movement (see 
the next chapter) has been much more obvious. In 1978, these resources 
came to the attention of the old-right activists who asked Falwell to 
use them for their right-wing causes. Falwell accepted and founded the 
Moral Majority (Newsweek, September 15, 1980). 
There was one "resource" that the IBs had, however, which did not 
prove beneficial to the NCR in general or the Moral Majority in particu-
lar. As I mentioned earlier, IBs believe in the rigid autonomy of the 
local church, a belief Falwell built into his Moral Majority organiza-
tion. Each state chapter of the organization was autonomous and there-
fore not under control of the national office. Such an organizational 
structure has been the source of embarrassment to Falwell and others in 
the national office, as many of the local chapters have exhibited, under 
the name of Moral Majority, some rather strange, detrimental behaviors 
which Falwell had no power to control. For example, the Maryland chap-
ter boycotted a bakery selling anatomically accurate gingerbread people. 
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The protests, instead of molding public opinion against the bakery, 
simply made the Moral Majority a national joke, much to Falwell's disap-
pointment. 
CONCLUSION 
In this and the previous chapter, I have examined the first three 
questions pertaining to the NCR's preexistent social network. In answer 
to the first question (what networks did the fundamentalist preference 
structure use to mobilize collectively on a national level?), I have 
identified two major networks. The first, both in importance and chro-
nology, is the network of old rightists which has as its focal point 
YAF. The YAF became the source of many of those who went on to work for 
RAVCO. The second more visible network consists of a number of funda-
mentalists groups and to a lesser extent evangelicals, which had 
involved themselves in the church growth and evangelistic movements of 
the early 1970s. 
Question 2 on how these networks developed I have also dealt with. 
The first network was on the political fringe up until the early 1970s 
when the Election reforms legislated by the U.S. Congress put them into 
a position of increased power. The tactics (direct-mailing) which this 
group used for survival during the 1950s and 1960s took on increased 
importance when political organizers were forced to depend much more on 
the small contributions of many contributers. The increased prominence 
of this first group prompted them to seek out other likeminded groups 
with other resources to further their position. The second network was 
one such group, for it had developed rational techniques and organiza-
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tion for its envangelistic endeavors which could be as transferable to 
political activities. 
When I constructed the third question (how has this social network 
affected the nature and extent of the strategies and tactics the New 
Christian has taken?) I was not aware of the underlying assumption I and 
other writers (e. g., Morris, 1981) were holding about the nature of 
social movements; our assumption was that the relationship between the 
choice of tactics and the social network was a simple cause and effect 
relationship with the social network as the cause and the tactics and/or 
strategies as the effect. In some cases, the simple relationship is 
evident. I have shown, for example, how the nature of the old-right 
network made it necessary to develop direct-mailing techniques in order 
to survive. But such a model does not capture the complexity of the 
social network/tactics relationship. It gives us an oversocialized view 
of those involved in social movements, portraying them as individuals 
whose tactics are strictly the result of the constraints the social net-
work places upon the social movement. However, such is not always the 
case. I have also shown how the Old Right leaders, once they gained more 
prominance, chose certain strategies and tactics (e.g., media exposure) 
they wished to use first and then looked to see what network they could 
attach themselves to to produce such tactics. In this case, the choice 
of tactic becomes the independent variable while the social network is 
the dependent. Further research is needed to identify what type of 
situations produce what type of tactics/social network relationships. 
From my own research here, it would seem that two factors are the degree 
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of closeness of the social network to the political fringe, and the 
amount and importance of the resources the network holds. A network on 
the political fringe with little resources is forced to make do with 
what the network has already provided. It has no resources or promi-
nence which it can "trade" for other resources necessary for other tac-
tics. It must make do with what it has. On the other hand, a network 
with more prestige and valuable resources can use their resources to 
appropriate other resources or networks for their chosen tactics. The 
choice of what tactic to use is much less at the mercy of those 
resources the social network originally has control over. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT AND THE NEWS MEDIA 
In this chapter I will discuss the last question pertaining to the 
preexistent social network: How have the strategies and tactics 
affected the NCR? To answer this question, I will focus on only one 
strategy-- strategy for gaining media access. I have chosen to investi-
gate this strategy rather than others used by the NCR for two reasons. 
First, it is the most well-known means used by the NCR. Much of the 
commmentary, inside and outside academia, discussing the NCR at some 
time focuses on their use of the media. Despite this, however, little 
or no theoretic or systematic discussion takes place. Second, because 
of the prominence of the media in shaping our political opinions and 
viewpoints (Tuchman, 1978), social movements attempting to become legit-
imate political alternatives will sooner or later have to gain media 
exposure. The political reality of modern society would deem it neces-
sary for a movement to implement such tactics. Having decided to study 
only this type of means, I must clarify that, because of the special 
nature of the media, generalizations I reach about media tactics wiil 
not necessarily apply to other major strategies of change or in~luence. 
One further point should be mentioned. It may seem that this 
fourth question has already been touched upon in last chapter's discus-
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sion of question (3), for I have already mentioned how the choice of a 
strategy affects what network a group chooses to make a coalition with. 
All that should be said is that in this chapter my concern is with how 
the implementation of a certain strategy actually affects a movement, 
not with how a choice of strategies affects another tactical choice. 
INTRODUCTION 
When a discussion of the importance of the media to the NCR takes 
place, the discourse usually centers on the televangelists, those T.V. 
preachers such as Falwell, Robertson, Bakker, and Robison, who appear 
weekly on their respective programs and who became involved in the poli-
tics of the NCR. While such examinations of the NCR are important 
(e.g., Hadden and Swann, 1983), they distort the real role the media 
have played in this social movement. The media have been important to 
NCR but not because of religious programming. Unlike this common 
assumption, these T.V. programs were not responsible for publicizing the 
movement to those outside the movement. The average non-NCR-ist only 
has to ask him/herself how he/she first heard of the NCR to begin to 
comprehend the relative unimportance of these programs in gaining socie-
tal-wide attention for the NCR. Did the non-NCR-ist first hear of this 
movement from the haphazard tuning in one night of one of these tele-, 
vangelists; or instead did this individual first hear of this movement 
from the secular news media? This latter situation is the most proba-
ble. If this is so, then, the discussion should not concentrate on the 
religious programming as such but on the NCR's use of the secular news 
media. The aim of this chapter is to examine the dialectic relationship 
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between the New Christian and the news media, using Molotch' s (1979) 
theoretical framework supplemented by other works, as an out line. In 
simple form, Molotch identifies three moments in the relationship 
between the media and a social movement. 
(1) GAINING MEDIA ACCESS-- Since what the news media present as news is 
accepted by its readers as an issue of importance (Tuchman, 1978:2), the 
social movement must attract the media's attention in order to be taken 
seriously. To attract attention a social movement must present itself 
as newsworthy(as being something readers want to or need to know). This 
may be a difficult challenge for a social movement to meet, since social 
movements usually do not naturally fit the media's definition of being 
newsworthy. 
(2) TRANSFORMATION OF EVENT INTO NEWS PERSPECTIVE-- The media do not 
just present newsworthy events; they also transform the events into what 
Altheide (1976) has called the news perspective. The media distort the 
actual event by taking it out of its real context and recontextualizing 
it into the world of the media with its own interests and needs. 
(3) NEWS PERSPECTIVE TRANSFORMS MOVEMENT-- The transformed view of the 
social movement created by the media reacts back upon the social move-
ment itself. The social movement begins to take its image of itself 
from what the media writes about it. 
This chapter will examine each of these moments in reference to 
the New Christian Right. This analysis is not intended as a test of the 
validity of Molotch's theoretical construct; rather Molotch's framework 
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is used as a heuristic device for explaining an important aspect of this 
recent social movement. 
THE NEWS f'IEDIA AND THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT 
The public assumes that those events which are disseminated by the 
news media are the most objectively important events happening that day, 
while those events that do not appear are not important. The knowledge 
we get from media is perceived as important. The political agenda and 
opinions it espouses are seen as the only realistic alternatives. (Tuch-
man, 1978: 2) However, many studies have found that a variety of stan-
dards are used by the news media in deciding the newsworthiness of an 
incident. These standards are not idiosyncratic to the individual mak-
ing the decisions but rather are guided by the interests, needs and 
organizational structure of the news media. 
What then are the standards by which the news media decide whether 
a story is newsworthy or not? Both Bagdikian (1972) and Molotch and 
Lester (1974) claim stories are often judged for their political content 
(whether manifest or latent). Most of the mass media, by virtue of 
their corporate ownership and ties have a stake in maintaining that 
order. The media help maintain that order existing by presenting sto-
ries which do not seriously question its fundamental assumptions. While 
political alternatives may be presented and battles between the govern-
ment and the media may go on, the fundamental legitimacy of the estab-
lished order goes unquestioned. Tuchman (1978:2) states that since the 
media shape our political knowledge and opinions, it serves the estab-
lished order as an effective means of social control. 
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Another factor in determining an event's newsworthiness is its 
entertainment value (Altheide, 1976:14). All sources of media are busi-
nesses involved in making a profit, and a profitable "news business" is 
one that attracts important sponsors and advertisers. Therefore, the 
choice of a story for airing may come down to the question of what 
attracts the largest readership or viewership. As one reporter of a 
Chicago newspaper stated, "there is no point to write about it if the 
reader is not going to read it." (From interview by Nyden, 1982) A Chi-
cago radio personality put it another way. 
Let's take an unpopular group... A splinter Maoist group will be 
less likely to appear on my program than Gus Hall. It's not a case 
of whether their ideas are popular or not but whether they are a 
group that represents large segments of society. (From interview by 
Miller, 1982) 
The· standards by which the news media decide what is newsworthy pose 
significant problems for many social movements. They need the is sue 
defining power of the media; but however important their message may be, 
a social movement is often not newsworthy. 
There are several reasons why social movements often face diffi-
cul ty in obtaining the kind of media coverage they desire. First, by 
definition, social movements are anti-institutional (Traugott, 1978). 
Their aims include the changing of the societal order which newspapers 
and television news have a large interest in preserving. To give sympa-
thetic news coverage to a social movement, would legitimate the social 
movements aims and at least tacitly undermine the legitimacy of the 
established social order. Second, social movements frequently do not 
offer much entertainment value. The expression of a social movement's 
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grievances may be too dry, "intellectual", or radical to attract the 
average laymen's interest. A socia'l movement usually represents a 
numerical minority, therefore the coverage of the movement would not 
significantly raise readership or ratings. 
How does a social movement gain media coverage? Basically, by the 
leadership using whatever resources possessed to make themselves new-
sworthy. Social movements develop strategies which will fill the news 
media's need for interesting and entertaining stories. They may also 
try to present themselves as supported or tied to the institutional 
order. Let us examine some of the strategies the New Christian Right 
has used to gain media coverage. 
GAINING ACCESS THROUGH CREATING MEDIA APPEAL 
One of the news media's considerations when judging a potential 
event for coverage is the number of people involved in the happening. 
Snyder and Kelly (1977), for example, found that the larger number of 
participants in a riot, the more likely the news bureaus would cover it. 
Incidents with only a few participants tend to be of little interest to 
news consumers. Unfortunately, social movements, especially in their 
initial stages, usually have few members and many of these are not com-
mitted. However, this has not stopped social movements from using this 
consideration to gain media access. Therefore, social movements like 
the New Christian Right have used certain strategies to make them appear 
larger than they really are. 
One strategy the New Christian Right has used to appear larger 
than they actually are is to simply inflate their membership. For exam-
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ple, during the 1980 Republican convention in Detroit, Jerry Falwell 
claimed to have a T.V. audience for his "Old Time Gospel Hour" program 
in excess of 50 million. The week before he had claimed it to be only 25 
million. According to Hadden and Swann (1982 :47-8) and Hartin (1981), 
Falwell's audience is actually much smaller, 1.5 million at most. This 
type of creative accounting by the televangelists is quite common. 
A second strategy, which is a logical progression from the first, 
is to claim the allegiance of a whole population already known to be of 
a large size even when this population is divided in its loyalties. For 
example, the New Christian has claimed to represent the interests of 
"all evangelicals", a group the Gallup polls estimate to be in the mil-
lions. However, as many scholars (e.g., Hoberg, 1975) have stated, 
evangelicals are much too diverse culturally, socially, and politically 
for any one political group to represent. A 1980 Gallup poll (Newsweek 
September 15, 1980) supports this claim. Except on the issues of abor-
tion and prayer in schools, evangelicals were no more conservative in 
their politics than non-evangelicals. In fact, in this poll, non-evan-
gelicals were more likely to support Reagan than evangelicals. 
GAINING ACCESS THROUGH THE UNIQUE EVENT 
If an event is entertaining enough, it may help attract more news 
consumers and keep those already reading or watching. Another strategy 
for a social movement seeking media coverage is to give the media an 
entertaining, unusual event. Unfortunately, social movements have lit-
tle control over how the viewers or readers interpret their performance. 
While the social movement may have little trouble staging a unique 
135 
event, the news consumer may miss the symbolism and meaning behind the 
performance and instead just laugh at those "crackpots" making fools of 
themselves. (Molotch, 1979) 
This has been the case with many events staged by the New Chris-
tian Right. For example, in early 1980 the Maryland chapter of the 
Moral Majority staged a demonstation in front of a Baltimore bakery 
because the establishment sold anatomically accurate gingerbread people. 
The action which this chapter thought would raise an important public 
issue actually discredited the organization. Consequently, Falwell him-
self criticized their actions as extreme. (Scheer, 1981) 
As time passes, the news consumers' tastes change; and so what is 
considered unique, entertaining and incredible at one time may not be so 
later on. In this type of situation, a social movement must keep up 
with what is percieved as unique. A tried and true "formula" that 
worked for them or others at one time may be passe at a later time. 
This was the case with the New Christian Right's "Washington for Jesus" 
campaign. (Clendinen, 1980) In the Spring of 1980, Bill Bright of Campus 
Crusade, Pat Robertson of the 700 Club and others organized a demonstra-
tion in Washington D.C. to celebrate a day of national prayer, fasting, 
and repentance. Thousands showed up for the demonstration; in fact, it 
was estimated to be the third or fourth largest demonstration to have-
ever been held in Washington up to that time. Demonstration leaders 
felt that it did not gain the media attention its size justified. While 
the leaders saw the limited media coverage as another example of their 
being ignored by the liberal media, the real reason is probably much 
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simpler and less conspiratorial. Even large demonstrations have become 
a much more common event in recent years (Altheide, 1979). Therefore, 
today the media no longer see a large demonstration as a story that will 
be interesting to their readers or viewers simply because of its size. 
GAINING ACCESS THROUGH PUBLIC FIGURES 
In their study of the Santa Barbara oil spill, Molotch and Lester 
found that national political officials and business spokespersons had 
more access to the media than both conservationists and local officials. 
The statements of the national and business leaders were more likely to 
be published even when local officials and convervationists presented a 
more accurate depiction of relevant events. Tuchman reached similar 
conclusions. As he put it (1978: 133), "Those who hold recognized reins 
of legitimated power clearly have more access to the media than those 
who do not." Even those in the news media recognize the bias. When a 
Chicago reporter was asked whether he would cover a press conference by 
the Gray Panthers vs. one held by the city 1 s Mayor 1 s Office of Senior 
Citizen 1 s Affairs, he stated, "The Mayor 1 s office would be covered 
because they have control over resources, they have power." (From inter-
view by Nyden, 1982) These findings are predictable, since events are 
chosen and presented in a manner which legitimates the social order and 
its distribution of power and wealth. Both national and business lead--
ers are representatives of this order and therefore, their statements 
serve a legitimating function. 
Most social movements lack ties to the elites. However, there are 
strategies by which they can create the appearance of having such ties. 
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The New Christian Right used just such a strategy. During the 1980 
election, all three major candidates claimed to be "born again" Chris-
tians. Since the New Christian Right had claimed to represent the 
interests of all evangelicals and fundamentalists, the group seized the 
opportunity to claim ties to all three candidates. With this self-pro-
claimed tie and a little "ministerial" truth-stretching, the New Chris-
tian Right was able to gain news coverage. A well publicized incident 
involving Jerry Falwell can illustrate this point. 
In an interview, Jerry Falwell brought up the issue of public jobs 
for homosexuals. In denouncing homosexuals and those who hire them, 
Falwell related a conversation he had with the then President Jimmy Car-
ter. Falwell stated that Carter admitted hiring homosexuals in his 
administration because he was President of all Americans, homosexual and 
heterosexual. In fact, Carter never made such a statement to Falwell or 
anyone else. Even though Falwell admitted he lied about the incident 
and later apologized to Carter, it still functioned in the manner Fal-
well wished. It gave him news coverage by identifying him with the 
major institutional figure. 
TRANSFORMING THE EVENT 
-----
Choosing an event is only the first step in the news making pro-
cess. Even if the news media were objective in the process of both 
choosing an event and of publishing and broadcasting it, the event would 
still be distorted through the process of translation and description, 
that is, through the process of creating a news perspective. The whole 
complexity of an event becomes words on paper or images on a 21 inch 
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screen. The whole process of mobilizing individuals becomes a three-
minute summary (Altheide, 1976:23). Even the seemingly objective pro-
cess of filming an event may change the event. Tuchman (1978: 111-2), 
using Hall's personal space approach, has shown how the camera angle 
shot, how close the camera is filming the event, etc. effect the "mes-
sage" presented to the audience. A close up (personal distance) of, 
let's say, a wounded soldier may have much more impact on the viewer 
than a shot of the same incident taken from farther away (public dis-
tance). Just the process of translating an event into a media format, 
even under the most ideal conditions, cannot help but distort the actual 
nature of the event. 
Since ideal objective conditions do not exist in the news process, 
the average process of distortion is even worse than in the above cases. 
Events are not only distorted by the translation process but also by the 
organizational imperatives of the news media itself. Events must be 
presented in a manner consistent with the interests of the media. This 
is done by the decontextualizing an event out of context and recontextu-
alizing it within the news perspective (Altheide, 1976:24-81). 
How is a story placed in this perspective? Altheide mentions two 
ways. First, events must be presented as narratives. They are given a 
beginning, a middle, and an ending. The event thus becomes easily-
digestible to the public; the audience is not left hanging or waiting 
for answers. Second, reporters, writers, and editors look for "angles" 
to the story. They look for human interest slants, unusual coinci-
dences, and the like which may take an event further out of its context 
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by exaggerating or ignoring certain aspects of its original context. As 
one reporter states, "it is a little hard to write about an event with-
out some theatrics to spice up the story. We sometimes can add some 
theatrics to the story." (From interview by Nyden, 1982) If a social 
movement's aware of the news perspective, it faces a real dilemma. On 
the one hand, movement leaders realize that news coverage is needed if 
public visibility is to be created. On the other hand, the news media's 
process of decontexualizing an event and the "recontexualizing" in the 
news perspective may destroy credibility and negate the objectives for 
which visibility was sought. This distortion is even more likely if the 
social movement's message questions the present order. 
The New Christian Right has not been immune to this decontextual-
izing/recontextualizing process. One of the more notable examples is 
the media's presentation of the New Christian Right's perceptions of 
Jews. On the one hand, we have some articles which present the group 
solely as anti-semitic; others paint them as Zionists in their support 
of Israel. Both perceptions distort the actual viewpoint of the New 
Christian Right by taking the movement's statements out of their relig-
ious and social context. 
The articles that have pointed to anti-semitism usually use the 
Rev. Bailey Smith's statement that "God doesn't hear the prayers of the 
Jews" as an example of such feelings. However, one must be e?{tremely 
careful about accepting such an interpretation without examining the 
context in which the statement was made. As many researchers (e.g., 
Johnstone, 1975) have noted, there is a thin but distinct difference 
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between a Christian group's statement on the validity of Judaism and 
outright anti-semitism. Irrespective of Smith's underlying motives, he 
was making a statement reflecting his religious beliefs, no more differ-
ent than a rabbi who states that Christ was not the son of God, an athe-
ist who says there is no God, or a vegetarian who proclaims that meat is 
bad for one's body. Each is making a statement of belief which in its 
proclamation condemns the beliefs and/or practices of other groups (Had-
den and Swann, 1982). Probably none one would consider them bigots, 
however, because of such statements. 
There are also those close to the New Christian Right (like Jerry 
Falwell) who deny hatred of the Jews. They are presented or present 
themselves as the Jews' best friends based on their hard-line support 
for Israel. What such a presentation does not reveal, however, is that 
their position on Israel is based not on inherent support for Jews or 
Israel but on millenialist eschatological beliefs. Supporters of the 
New Christian Right believe the Bible mandates support for Israel and 
teaches that the state of Israel plays an important part in the last 
days before the second coming of Christ. In fact, they believe that the 
creation of the state of Israel is a sign of Christ's coming. 
In both of the above cases, the media have ignored such contextual 
details and present the New Christian Right's views on Israel and Jews 
in general in a simplistic, highly "digestible" news perspective: 
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THE MEDIA IMAGE REACTING BACK 
--------
The media play an important part in constructing the public's view 
of reality. It is the major source of news consumers's political knowl-
edge, shaping the public's view of what are acceptable political alter-
natives. What the public accepts as "reality", however, is greatly 
influenced by the needs and interests of the news media. Members of 
social movements are members of the public which consumes the news. As 
a result, they too have their political knowledge and alternatives par-
tially defined by the news media. If the social movement has been at 
all successful in media access, then its self-image may come partly from 
the image the news media constructs. This media-created image may, in 
turn, affect the direction of the social movement. 
Tuchman (1978) illustrates this process based on the relationship 
between the media and the feminist movement. According to Tuchman, 
early feminist ideology held that for true sexual equality to exist the 
whole institutional order of capitalism had to be transformed. This 
anti-institutional belief system made it difficult to gain access to 
the media since this belief opposed the institution's male-dominated 
interests and needs. In order to gain media access, feminism had to 
present a different image. 
Certain segments of feminism did attempt to change, presenting-
themselves as part of the institutional order. The message bacame not 
one of radical change but of women being allowed to "make it" within the 
given institutional order. This image in turn reacted back on the move-
ment. Many men and women attracted to the movement were more interested 
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in giving women greater access within the system than in changing the 
underlying assumptions. 
It is too early to know just what effect the media coverage has 
had on the New Christian Right. However, at least one important yet 
subtle change in the New Christian Right (and fundamentalism in general) 
has occurred since its mobilization. Martin Marty (Buursma, 1982) notes 
that fundamentalism has shifted from legitimating its beliefs by claim-
ing to be a persecuted minority to legitimating itself through claims of 
its power and size. This shift in legitimation and theology can at 
least be partially attributable to the effects of media coverage. 
Prior to the emergence of the New Christian Right, fundamentalism 
was viewed by the rest of society as a curious survival from the past. 
The "fundies", as liberal theologians called them, were seen as a small, 
insignificant group mostly of rural, lower-class individuals who held 
bigoted social attitudes, a primitive view of science, and an ultra-con-
servative political ideology. Fundamentalists were perceived as out-of-
touch with society. Fundamentalists were well aware of how they were 
viewed but curiously enough made no effort to change this image. In 
fact, they were contented with the image because, in their minds, it 
only served to prove the truth of their beliefs. They pointed out bib-
lical references prophesying that Christ's followers would be laughed 
at, "despised and rebuked by men" and (like Christ) even put to death. 
The "sinfulness" of their critics served to further justify their prem-
illenial beliefs concerning the "wickedness of the last days". Their 
persecution was only "a sign of Christ's imminent return". Therefore, 
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society's low image of them only served to prove that they and not the 
rest of society, were right, that they were "the true followers of 
Christ". 
This belief system served fundamentalism well while it wished to 
be separate from the mainstream of society, but it was not as useful 
when the New Christian Right began to seek political influence and fav-
orable media coverage. The New Christian Right therefore used a number 
of techniques to exaggerate its size and create an image of institu-
tional attachments. The media, in turn, constructed the distorted image 
of the New Christian Right as a movement to be reckoned with. 
The New Christian Right began to accept this image. Dave Breese, 
a T.V. evangelist, stated (Wallis, 1981:23), " ... It no longer fits to 
picture us as redneck preachers pounding the pulpit. Evangelical Chris-
tianity has become the greatest show on earth. Twenty to forty years ago 
it was on the edge of things. Now it has moved to the center." Funda-
mentalists no longer viewed themselves as a persecuted minority but as a 
powerful political group. This made it impossible, however, for most 
fundamentalists to use the persecuted minority scenario to legitimate 
their beliefs. Therefore, a different legitimating belief was substiti-
uted for persecution. Fundamentalists now asserted the truth of their 
vision and beliefs on the basis of alleged widespread support and accep-
tance. It is too early to determine the total impact of this triumphal-
ist legitimation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Using the work of Molotch as an outline, I have analyzed the rela-
tionship between the New Christian Right and the news media in order to 
discover how the use of the media-attracting tactics have affected the 
NCR. I have seen that the New Christian Right has used many tactics to 
gain media access. The media have taken what the New Christian Right 
has chosen to present and has transformed the NCR's message into a form 
consistent with the news media's interests and needs. The transformed 
image of the movement presented by the media has in turn reacted back on 
the New Christian Right, changing the way the New Christian Right and 
fundamentalism views itself. 
If this analysis is accurate, we are led to ask further questions 
implied by this research. First, if the media do present a distorted 
view of social movements, what effect, if any, does this have on member 
recruitment to the movement? Does the distortion effectively thwart the 
ability of the movement to recruit because the movement has received an 
unattractive image, or does the distortion attract members of a differ-
ent social background or psychological disposition than the original 
members? In the case of the New Christian Right, has the image of the 
New Christian Right as anti-semites discouraged potential supporters 
from joining or has this image actually attracted more anti-semites into 
the movement? 
These questions imply still further questions. If the media are a 
source of social control, what social control purpose does the distor-
tion of a social movement serve? Is the image-creating ability an 
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effective means of destroying a movement? Is the image presented meant 
to affect the legitimacy of a movement in the eyes of the public or is 
the image-creating ability simply a means by which the media gain higher 
ratings and not a social control mechanism at all? If this ability 
helps a movement attract certain types of members, does this new 
"cohort" of members hamper the overall effectiveness of the New Chris-
tian Right to mobilize and gain legitimacy? 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The purpose of this study has been to investigate the NCR from a 
sociological perspective. The major aim of this dissertation was to use 
the political activity of Christian fundamentalists as a "laboratory" in 
which to test and expand on two of the currently held sociological theo-
ries on social movements. This study analyzed two main questions. 
(1) What is the source of the social psychological motivations leading 
these Christian fundamentalists to political action? 
(2) By what organizational structures have these individuals been able 
to collectively mobilize on the national level? 
The conceptual frameworks tested and used were taken basically 
from two theoretically compatible sociological perspectives on social 
movements: (1) the Politics of Lifestyle Concern approach and (2) the 
Resource Mobilization approach. The Politics of Lifestyle approach 
views right-wing social movements as originating out of a social group's 
feelings that their values, attitudes and lifestyle are being threatened_ 
by certain social forces. In order to protect their lifestyle, the 
social group unites to form a social movement. From this approach I 
tested two hypotheses: 
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(1) The NCR preference structure is the result of increased lifestyle 
concerns in Sunbelt fundamentalism. 
(2) These lifestyle threats are the result of Snowbelt migration into 
the Sunbelt. 
The Resource !'tobilization approach examines the variety of 
resources a social movement needs in order to explain how a movement 
arises. It takes the social psychological motivations of individuals as 
given and instead focuses on the "linkages of social movements to other 
groups, the dependence of social movements upon external support for 
success, and the tactics used by authorities to control and incorporate 
movements." (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1213) From the Resource Mobiliza-
tion approach four questions were asked about the NCR. 
(1) What early 1970s networks was the fundamentalist preference struc-
ture able to use to mobilize collectively on the national level? 
(2) How did this social network develop? 
(3) Following from Morris (1981), how has this social network affected 
the nature and extent of the strategies and tactics the NCR has taken? 
(4) How have these stategies and tactics affected the NCR? 
One of the primary aims of this dissertation has been to try to 
join together these two social theories as a preliminary attempt to 
bring together the old and new in social movement theory. The ·Politics 
of Lifestyle Concern approach (see Lorentzen, 1980), a derivative of the 
Status Politics approach, was to be utilized to examine the social psy-
chological motivations which have caused Christian fundamentalists to 
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mobilize at this time. The Resource Mobilization approach (see McCarthy 
and Zald, 1977)-- currently the dominant perspective in social movement 
theory-- was to be used to explain how these motivated fundamentalists 
were able to mobilize in coordinated action. Because of some of this 
dissertation's findings, this synthesis proved to be impossible since 
the PLC framework did not prove useful in understanding the NCR. My 
data forced me to reject the PLC hypotheses. 
PLC FINDINGS 
As I showed in chapter 3, the following analysis has yielded some 
unexpected results. Instead of finding(as Lorentzen 1980 and Zwier 1982 
have implied) rising levels of lifestyle concern, political concern, and 
calls for political action among fundamentalists, I found that from 1955 
to 1980 these social psychological variables remained relatively steady. 
This does not mean that fundamentalists do not feel lifestyle or politi-
cal concern today; but rather, the level of these concerns is no higher 
than before the development of the NCR and so therefore they cannot be 
used to explain the appearance of the movement. For these reasons I had 
to reject the two PLC hypotheses and look elsewhere for an explanation 
of this social movement. 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF PLC FINDINGS 
These PLC results do have a number of theoretical implications for 
the study of social movements. First, the thesis presented by Lipset 
and Raab (1973), among others, that the rise of right-wing extremist 
movements can be accounted for with reference to status or lifestyle 
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threats is questionable, at least in the case of the NCR. When a proper 
research design is employed (i.e., a longitudinal design which measures 
the lifestyle concern of a group before they are politically active), we 
see that the conclusions Lorentzen (1980) reached, regarding the rela-
tionship between lifestyle concern and the political mobilization of the 
NCR, do not exist. These results do not mean that the present members 
of the NCR do not feel lifestyle concern, but that the degree of lifes-
tyle concern is no higher now than in the recent past. 
Secondly and more generally, the fact that all three dependent 
variables remained fairly constant throughout the time period studied 
tends to underpin the resource mobilization approach's contention that 
increased discontent and concern cannot account for the rise of a social 
movement. These results seem to support the findings of other research-
ers (e.g. Fortes, 1971) who have concluded that the social psychological 
approaches are inadequate for explaining social movements. At least 
with reference to the NCR, such an approach does not offer us much in 
the way of understanding social movement phenomena. If the NCR proves 
to be the norm in this regard, social psychologically oriented theorist 
must begin to rethink their position. If the NCR proves to be an excep-
tion, theorists must explain why some SMs arise because of social psy-
chological factors and others do not. 
Thirdly, the following analysis cautions us as to the dangers of 
utilizing social movement ideology in judging member motivation (cf. 
Wallis, 1975). Although the leader rhetoric and movement ideology con-
tends that the NCR germinated out of increased discontent, lifestyle 
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concern, and political concern (see Falwell, 1980; Viguerie, 1980), 
these results exhibit that no such trends have existed. While the study 
of ideology adds an important facet to our understanding of social move-
ments, we must not use it (like Zwier 1982) as a direct indicator of 
member motivation. Social movement ideology has other functions (e.g., 
legitimation) which may not be compatible with accurate analysis. 
SOCIAL NETWORK FINDINGS 
While the PLC approach did not help in understanding the NCR, the 
resource mobilization approach proved to be more useful. In the 
Resource Mobilization chapters, I examined the four questions pertaining 
to the NCR's preexistent social network. In answer to the first ques-
tion (what networks did the fundamentalist preference structure use to 
mobilize collectively on a national level?), I have identified two major 
networks. The first, both in importance and chronology, is that network 
of old rightists which has as its focal point-- the Young Americans for 
Freedom (YAF). The YAF became the source of many of those who went on 
to work for Richard A. Viguerie Company (RAVCO). The second more visi-
ble network consists of a number of fundamentalists groups and to a 
lesser extent evangelicals which had involved themselves in the church 
growth and evangelistic movements of the early 1970s. 
Question two, how did these networks develop?, I have dealt with 
as well. The first network was on the political fringe up until the 
early 1970s when the election reforms legislated by the U.S. Congress 
put them into a position of increased power. The tactics (direct-mail-
ing) which this group used for survival during the 1950s and 1960s took 
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on increased importance when politicos were forced to depend much more 
on the small contributions of many contributers. The increased promi-
nence of this first group prompted them to seek out other like-minded 
groups with other resources to further their position. The second net-
work was one such group, for it had developed rational techniques and 
organization for its evangelistic endeavors which could be easily 
adapted for modern political organizing. 
When I constructed the third question-- how has this social net-
work affected the nature and extent of the strategies and tactics the 
New Christian Right has taken?-- I was not aware of the underlying 
assumption that I and other writers (e.g., Morris, 1981) were holding 
about the nature of social movements: our assumption was that the rela-
tionship between the choice of tactics and the social network was a sim-
ple cause and effect relationship-- with the social network as the cause 
and the tactics and/or strategies as the effect. In some cases, this 
simple relationship is evident. For example, I have shown how the 
nature of the old right network made it necessary to develop direct-
mailing techniques in order to survive. But such a model does not cap-
ture the complexity of the social network/tactics relationship. It 
gives us an oversocialized view 1 of those involved in social movements, 
portraying them as individuals whose tactics are strictly the result of-
the constraints the social network places upon the social movement. 
However, such is not always the case, for I have also shown how 
1. By an "oversocialized view", I mean an overly social determinis-
tic view which leaves no place for human freedom or creativity. 
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the Old Right leaders, once they gained more prominance, chose certain 
strategies and tactics they wished to use first (e.g., media exposure) 
and then looked to see what network they could attach themselves to in 
order to produce such tactics. In this case, the choice of tactic 
becomes the independent variable while the social network is the depen-
dent. Further research is needed to identify what type of situation 
produces what type of tactics/social network relationships. From my own 
research here it would seem that two factors are the degree of closeness 
of the social network to the political fringe and the amount and impor-
tance of the resources the network holds. A network on the political 
fringe with few resources is forced to make do with what the network 
has already provided. It has no resources or prominence which it can 
"trade" for other resources necessary for other tactics. It makes do 
with what it has. On the other hand, a network of more prominence and 
possessing valuable resources can use their resources to appropriate 
other resources or networks for their chosen tactics. The choice of 
what tactic to use is much less at the mercy of only those resources the 
social network originally has control over. 
The last preexistent network question on the effect of tactics on 
the movement itself was answered in the last chapter. I have shown how 
the use of media by the NCR has affected the way fundamentalists legiti-
mate their beliefs. They moved from a persecuted minority mode of 
legitimation to a triumphalist mode once they began to believe their own 
"press-clippings" and perceived themselves as a power to be reckoned 
with. 
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THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL NETWORK FINDINGS 
Like the PLC conclusions, these results also have theoretical 
implications. First, this study represents one of a handful of resource 
mobilization studies wqich have focused primarily on the internal struc-
ture of a social movement and an SMO in order to explain a movement's 
rise. 2 Most past resource mobilization studies (cf. McCarthy and Zald, 
1978 ; Oberschall, 1978) have concerned themselves with how organiza-
tions external to the movement (e.g., institutions of social control 
such as the police or the political system) are responsible for the rise 
or demise of a social movement. On the other hand, this dissertation has 
at least partially sought to understand the NCR by examining its inter-
nal structure, that is, the preexistent social network from which it 
sprouted and those environmental factors which affected this internal 
structure. 
A second sociological implication, which has already been men-
tioned briefly, is how the results mentioned can be used to partially 
modify an insight discussed by Charles Tilly. Tilly argues, as many 
resource mobilization theorists do, that a political contender's ability 
to mobilize politically depends on the contender's access to important 
resources. Often this ability to gain these resources is a result of 
structural transformations which affect "a contender's potential for -
political mobilization (and) in some cases bring new contenders into 
2. Another example of a study concentrating chiefly on the internal 
structure of the social movement is Morris' (1981) analysis of the civil 
rights movement. 
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existence" (Useem, 1975: 22) by giving groups access to new resources. 
The difference between this scenario and the case of the NCR and New 
Right is that the structural changes (i.e. campaign laws) in the latter 
case did not give the NCR the ability to gain and use new resources so 
much as increase the value of a resource already held. This type of 
scenario is not really accounted for by Tilly. 
Lastly, these results have some non-sociological significance to 
the study of the NCR itself. Hadden (1983:82) in his review of Hill and 
Owens, The New Religious Political Right in America, states that "to 
deal with the religious right as though they emerged and exist in a vac-
uum (separate from the broader conservative movement) is to misunder-
stand what is happening in America." In this study, I have attempted to 
examine the connection between the NCR and the secular right. I have 
attempted to show why this connection developed and the advantages such 
connections give both parties. Such an analysis has been lacking in 
other works on the NCR as Hadden implies. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The results of this dissertation raise many further questions 
about social movements in general, and the NCR in particular. In what 
remains of this dissertation, I will discuss these questions. 
THE STATUS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY TO SMS 
I have already discussed my research's implications for social 
psychological approaches to social movement phenomena. Like other 
sociological studies (e.g., Partes, 1971; also Oberschal, 1978), I have 
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found that examining the social psychological discontent and motivations 
of this movement 1 s members over time does not help in explaining the 
movement 1 s rise. Such results lead us to ask a very general research 
question: what is the role, if any, of social psychological variables 
in social movements? 
To my thinking, this question can only begin to be answered after 
researchers begin to differentiate the structural conditions for a 
social movement (which this work examined) from the reasons for individ-
ual 1 s joining and supporting an already existing movement. It is the 
latter that most social psychologists of social movements are actually 
studying, whereas (I am afraid) they think they are studying the former. 
This is not to say that the area of joining and recruitment does not 
need to be studied. Some valuable studies (e.g., Olson, 1965), both for 
social movement theorists and social movement recruiters, have already 
discussed some of the motives behind member activity. My warning is not 
to confuse the objective causes of a movement with the subjective rea-
sons for an individual joining a movement. 
There are still those who contend that the social psychological 
approach is still valuable in understanding the rise of a social move-
ment (e.g., Law and Walsh, 1983; Walsh, 1981; Useem, 1980). Without 
discussing the pros and cons of their arguments, let me just say that, 
even if their contention is correct, they are still left with a theoret-
ical problem in the view of the present study and also some others. Why 
do social psychological variables play a part in the construction of 
some movements they have studied and not in others? What factors can be 
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attributed to causing this difference? 
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND STRUCTURAL THEORIES 
The above discussion in no way means that resource mobilization 
alone holds all the answers to social movement questions either. Many 
questions, such as those which deal with the creation of interests, the 
distribution of resources throughout society, and the structure of rela-
tionships between external institutions and social movements cannot be 
answered adequately by resource mobilization alone, and so the 
researcher must look elsewhere as well. A possible theoretical avenue 
for researchers to follow in solving these questions is to attempt to 
combine the organizational insights of the resource mobilization school 
with those of the structural and comparative-historical approach (both 
Marxist and non-Marxist) (cf. Skocpol, 1976), or some strain of World 
System theory (cf. Thompson, 1983). Both seek to explain social move-
ments "by focusing (to some degree) on the interrelated situations of 
groups within specified societal institutional nexuses, and the interre-
lations of societies within dynamic international fields"(Skocpol, 
1976:170). 
The job of combining the insights of resource mobilization to 
these "structural" approaches has already begun. One notable prelimi-
nary step has been taken by Garner and Zald (1982). In this work, the 
authors attempt to explain the cross-national variation between the 
social movement sectors (SMS) of different societies by examining how 
various structural constraints shape the SMS. According to Garner and 
Zald, the SMS is defined as the total amount of social movement activity 
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within a society. The SMSs of societies differ on various dimensions 
including (1) size (the number of SMOs and/or SM participants relative 
to other societal institutions); (2) degree of organization (ratio of 
membership in formal SMOs to all other types of participation); (3) its 
social location (e.g., class base, geographical distribution); (4) 
autonomy from other organizations; and (5) alignment within the left-
right political spectrum (Garner and Zald, 1982:3-7). 
Some of these dimensions, such as 1, 2, 4, and in some cases 3, 
are already of interest to resource mobilization. In this study for 
example, the whole question of the degree of organization of fundamen-
talism and its value to the secular right, and the autonomy of fundamen-
talism from other institutions has yielded valuable insights for our 
understanding of why the NCR arose. However, resource mobilization has 
only been concerned with how these particular variables affect particu-
lar movements. Garner and Zald's aim is much larger. They are not pri-
marily interested with how the dimensions of the SMS affect a particular 
movement but with what macrosociological factors affect the dimensions. 
With the addition of structural analysis to resource mobilization, we 
not only begin to understand how certain resources and their amounts 
affect the chances of a movement but how various structural factors 
affect the distribution of resources themselves. 
What structural factors do Garner and Zald see constraining a 
society's SMS? Garner and Zald discuss a number of possible factors 
ranging from the structure of the economy (e.g., the degree to which an 
economy is segmented) and the class structure, to the structure of the 
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political system (e.g., many political parties vs. one or two parties). 
For example, the authors discuss how the state of the economy limits the 
actions social movements can take. 
Portuguese economy acted as a limit for the leftward shift and the 
upsurge of left movements following the revolution of 1974. This 
limit was manifested in the high rate of inflation that followed the 
successes of left movements; the structural limit was translated 
into political action on the one hand by the voting behavior of the 
middle strata and the Northern small-peasant proprieters and on the 
other hand by International Monetary Fund pressures for austerity. A 
similar example is provided by Jamaica: the leftward shift under-
taken by Manley (in a "creeping revolution") ran into the limiting 
factor of Jamaica's economy; once again the limiting situation was 
translated into the experience of an economic downturn, IMF pres-
sures and consequent voting behavior. 
What the limiting effect of the economy means for movements is 
that the "real alternatives" that they can propose and pursue (if 
they come to power) may not correspond to the position of their 
larger support base and/or their own militants. (Garner and Zald, 
1982:7) 
One question which both structural theory and resource mobiliza-
tion may prove useful for answering has already been mentioned in my 
discussion of the third preexistent social network question. In that 
discussion I mentioned how, at times, the range of tactics a movement 
can use is often determined by the network the movement grows out of and 
how, at other times, the choice of tactics can determine which network 
individuals seek to use as a base for their movement. Which direction 
the relationships between tactics and networks take may be explained in 
terms of structure. Individuals in more powerful societal positions 
because of their access to resources may not only have a wider range of 
tactics to choose from but may also be better able to choose their tac-
tics even before they have the necessary resources and networks for 
implementing them. They can simply "trade" other resources or simply 
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lean on their social prominence to gain access to other networks and 
these resources. On the other hand, social movements arising out of 
inferior structural positions do not have such an extensive repertory of 
resources (although sometimes, as with the YAF, what they do have 
becomes valuable) and so must make do with those they have. This puts 
them in the position of being limited to only those tactics which their 
resources will allow. 
There are various structural-historical factors which can deter-
mine the relative position of social networks and so the relative degree 
of choice a movement has over the tactics it wishes to use. I have dis-
cussed in chapters 5 and 6 how a group's relative proximity to the 
political "mainstream" affects their tactical choices. Garner and Zald 
(1982), in the quote above, show how the state of the economy can affect 
the ability of movements to choose their tactics. There are possible 
other factors as well. First, as is obvious, the social class base of a 
movement will affect its choices. Those of lower classes will have 
fewer resources by definition and, therefore, will have less choice in 
the tactics they can use. The racial and/or ethnic character of the 
movement can, in the same way, affect a movement. Because of their 
smaller resources, minority movements may also be constrained. Another 
factor may be the social movement's position relative to the segmented' 
economy (Averitt, 1968; Becket al., 1978). Those movements made up of 
individuals from core industries, irrespective of the positions the 
individuals hold, may have more resources to trade-off than movements 
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attached to periphery industries. 3 These hypotheses, while being quite 
plausible, still need empirical testing. 
QUESTIONS FOR MEDIA/MOVEMENT RESEARCH 
The results of Chapter 7, which discussed the relationship between 
the NCR and the news media, lead us to ask a number of research ques-
tions as well. First, if the media do present a distorted view of 
social movements, what effect, if any, does this have on member recruit-
ment to the movement? Does the distortion effectively thwart the abil-
ity of the movement to recruit because the movement has received an 
unattractive image?; or does the distortion attract members of a differ-
ent social background or psychological disposition than the original 
members? In the case of the NCR, has the image of the NCR as anti-se-
mitics discouraged potential political supporters from joining?; or has 
this image actually attracted more anti-semites into the movement? 
These questions imply still further questions. If the media are a 
source of social control, what social control purpose does the distor-
tion of a social movement serve? Is the image-creating ability an 
effective means of destroying a movement? Is the image presented meant 
to affect the legitimacy of a movement in the eyes of the public?; or is 
the image-creating ability simply a means by which the media gain higher 
ratings and not a social control mechanism at all? If this ability 
3. It is obvious that many of these structural factors are related 
to each other as well: class position, position in political system, 
minority status and relation to dual economy all vary together to some 
degree. 
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helps a movement attract certain types of members, does this new 
"cohort" of members hamper the overall effectiveness of the movement to 
mobilize and gain legitimacy? 
The design necessary for answering some of the above questions may 
meet large methodological problems. Unfortunately, sociologists often 
take their cue as to what is an important social trend from the media. 
This is the case with most of the studies of the NCR and religious 
cults. Instead of studying mainstream religion, the religion of the 
majority of Americans, a segment of researchers have instead become stu-
dents of these exotic religious groups most of which have gained promi-
nence because of exposure in the media. This means, of course, that 
sociologists only begin to study the actors in such movements after the 
trend has gained media exposure. Unless a past researcher happened to 
survey the pre-media exposure actors of this movement or group, asking 
questions necessary to judge the effects of media coverage on, let's 
say, anti-semitism, the researcher has extreme difficulty in judging 
media effect. Of course, the researcher might compare the attitudes of 
pre- and post-media members by comparing new members to old members in 
the group. However, the present old members are also affected by the 
media and may have remained in the group because of their affinity with 
the attitudes of the new members. The researcher may also survey in a 
very general sense the attitudes of members of many obscure pre-media 
social movements in hopes that some day a few of these movements may 
gain media access. Of course, such a course may be time-consuming and 
expensive with no assurance that any of the movements chosen will ever 
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gain media attention. Also, the longer a movement takes before it gains 
sufficient attention, the more historical factors must also be cont-
rolled in order to determine what effect media exposure had on changing 
member attitudes and recruitment. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, then, this dissertation has been concerned with under-
standing the NCR and the bearing this movement has on the current social 
movement theory debate. My data do not support the social psychologi-
cally oriented theory but it does fall in line with much of the work of 
the resource mobilization approach. Resource mobilization cannot answer 
every question, however; and so I suggest that a possible avenue for 
future research may lie in exploring the connections between resource 
mobilization and more structural theories. Thus, as I have discussed in 
this chapter, every time some questions are answered more questions 
appear. 
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TABLE 16 
Inter-Leader Links in Matrix Form 
Leader 
Leader 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
-------1.Bakker 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.Beckett 1 - 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
3.Be1cher 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
4.Billing 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
5.Billing 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6.Bonney 0 0 0 0 0 
-
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
7.Bright 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
B.Brown 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 - 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
9.Bundy 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
10.Crouch 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11.DeMoss 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
12.DeVos 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
-
0 0 0 0 
13.Dixon 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14.Dornan 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15.Dugan 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16.Evans 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 .Falwell 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
18.Fowler 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
19.Gimenez 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20.Graham 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21.Grant 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
22.Grimsted0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23.Hargis 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
24.Hatch 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
25 .Hill 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26.Huns. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
27.Hunter 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
28.Jackson 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
29.Jarmin 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
30. Jarrill 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
31. Jepsen 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
32.LaHaye 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
33.Lund. 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
34.Lyons 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
35.Manion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36.McAteer 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
37 .McColl. 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
38.McDon. 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
39.Mooney. 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40.Morris 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Table 16 continued next page. 
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Table 16 continued 
Leaders 
Leader 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
-------
41. Phillips a 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
42.Priest 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
43.Robert. 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
44.Robison 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
45.Rogers 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
46.Schafly 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
47.Shaka. 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
48.Talcott 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
49.Towns. 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
50.Trox. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
51. Van And. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
52.Viguerie0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
53.Walton 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
54.Weyrich 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
55.Zone 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
continued on next page· 
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continued from last page 
Leaders 
Leaders 
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
1. 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2. 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
3. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
4. 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
5. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6. 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7. 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
8. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
9. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
10. 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
11. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
12. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
13. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
14. 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
15. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
16. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
17. - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
18. 0 - 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
19. 0 0 - 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
20. 0 0 1 - 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
21. 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
22. 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23. 0 1 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
24. 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 - 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
25. 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
26. 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 - 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
27. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 1 0 0 0 0 
29. 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 - 0 1 1 0 0 
30. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 - 0 0 0 0 
31. 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 - 0 0 0 
32. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 - 0 0 
33. 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
34. 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
35. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
37. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
38. 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
39. 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
40. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
continued on next page. 
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Leaders 
Leaders 
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
41. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
42. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
43. 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
44. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
45. 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
46. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
47. 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
48. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
49. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
50. 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
51. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
52. 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
53. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
54. 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
55. 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
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Continued from last page 
Leaders 
Leaders 
35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 
1. 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2. 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
3. 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
4. 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
5. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
7. 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
8. 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
9. 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
10. 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
11. 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
12. 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
13. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
14. 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
15. 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
16. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
17. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
18. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
19. 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
20. 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
21. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
22. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
23. 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
24. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25. 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
26. 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
27. 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
28. 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
29. 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
30. 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
31. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
32. 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
33. 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
34. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
35. - 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36. 0 - 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
37. 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
38. 1 0 0 - 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
39. 0 0 1 0 - 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
40. 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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Leaders 
Leaders 
35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 
41. 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
42. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
43. 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
44. 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
45. 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 ·o 
46. 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
47. 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
48. 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
49. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
50. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
51. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
52. 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
53. 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
54. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
55. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Leaders 
Centrality 
53 54 55 Score 
1. 0 0 0 .03 
2. 1 1 0 .06 
3. 0 0 0 .02 
4. 1 1 1 .07 
5. 0 0 0 .002 
6. 0 0 0 .01 
7. 1 0 0 .06 
8. 1 0 0 .06 
9. 1 1 0 .04 
10. 1 0 0 .03 
11. 1 0 0 .04 
12. 1 0 0 .04 
13. 0 1 0 .02 
14. 0 0 1 .04 
15. 1 1 0 .04 
16. 1 0 0 .01 
17. 0 0 0 .02 
18. 1 0 0 .03 
19. 0 0 0 .03 
20. 0 0 0 .03 
21. 0 1 1 .03 
22. 0 1 0 .06 
23. 0 0 0 .02 
24. 0 0 0 .02 
25. 0 0 0 .03 
26. 0 0 1 .04 
27. 0 0 0 .03 
28. 1 0 0 .04 
29. 1 1 1 .06 
30. 1 0 0 .04 
31. 0 0 1 .03 
32. 1 1 0 .05 
33. 0 0 0 .03 
34. 0 0 0 .02 
35. 0 0 0 .02 
36. 1 1 0 .05 
37. 1 0 0 .04 
38. 0 0 0 .06 
39. 0 0 0 .04 
40. 1 0 0 .02 
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Leaders 
Leaders 
Centrality 
53 54 55 Score 
41. 0 0 0 .02 
42. 1 0 0 .03 
43. 0 0 0 .05 
44. 1 1 0 .04 
45. 1 1 0 .05 
46. 1 1 0 .04 
47. 0 0 0 .03 
48. 1 0 0 .03 
49. 1 1 0 .03 
50. 0 0 1 .02 
51. 0 0 0 .002 
52. 1 1 1 .09 
53. - 1 0 .07 
54. 1 0 .04 
55. 0 0 .02 
Density of Network= .24 
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TABLE 17 
Distance Scores Matrix 
Leaders 
Leaders 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
l.Bakker 
2.Beckett 4.90 
3.Belcher 6.40 8.12 
4 .Billings 7.87 6.48 8.48 
5 .Billings 4.90 6.48 5.09 7.21 
6.Bonney 5.66 7.48 5.65 7.34 3.46 
7.Bright 5.47 7.07 4.89 8.83 6.93 7.21 
8.Brown 6.16 5.19 3.16 7.93 5.10 5.48 4.90 
9.Bundy 6.63 5.09 7.21 5.48 5.29 6.32 8.00 
10.Crouch 2.82 5.29 6.32 7.75 5.47 5.29 4.90 
ll.DeMoss 6.63 7.87 2.44 8.37 5.29 5.66 4.69 
12.DeVos 6.63 8.06 2.45 8.49 5.29 5.48 4.90 
13.Dixon 6.92 6.48 6.00 6.16 3.74 4.69 7.35 
14.Dornan 7.21 8.12 7.21 6.78 5.48 4.90 8.49 
15.Dugan 6.00 6.16 5.29 5.48 5.10 7.62 7.61 
16.Evans 5.47 6.78 5.29 6.40 2.82 3.74 6.78 
17 .Falwell 5.83 6.48 5.83 6.16 3.46 4.47 7.35 
18.Fowler 6.63 7.87 4.69 7.75 4.90 3. 74 6.32 
19.Gimenez 1.41 5.10 6.78 7.62 4.90 5.48 5.48 
20.Graham 1.41 5.19 6.32 7.62 5.10 5.66 5.29 
21. Grant 6.40 7.07 6.48 5.66 4.47 4.90 7.87 
22.Grimsted 5.29 6.78 5.83 6.93 2.00 3.46 6.93 
23.Hargis 6.00 7.48 5.48 7.48 4.24 3.46 5.83 
24.Hatch 6.16 5.48 6.32 6.63 4.24 4.24 7.87 
25 .Hill 2.45 5.29 6.48 7.35 4.90 5.65 5.10 
26.Hunsinger 7.07 6.56 7.21 4.90 5.48 5.83 8.25 
27.Hunter 6.16 7.75 4.35 8.37 4.90 4.90 6.16 
28.Jackson 7.21 7.62 3.74 8.25 5.48 5.48 4.90 
29.Jarmin 7.48 6.00 7.87 3. 74 6.32 6.63 8.49 
30.Jarrill 6.48 7.87 3.16 8.49 5.29 5.48 4.90 
31. Jepsen 6.48 7.07 6.32 5.66 4.24 4.69 7.87 
32.La Haye 6.78 5.47 7.47 4.47 5.83 6.48 7.87 
33.Lundquist 2.00 4.69 6.32 7.75 5.10 6.48 5.66 
34.Lyons 5.83 7.75 5.66 7.21 3.74 2.00 7.35 
35.Manion 5.83 7.07 5.29 7.62 3.74 4.24 7.07 
36.McAteer 6.78 5.66 7.21 4.69 5.83 6.48 7.62 
37.McCollist.6.32 7.21 4.47 8.00 5.48 5.83 5.10 
38.McDonald 7.21 6.93 7.35 5.48 6.16 6.16 8.37 
39.Mooneyham 2.45 5.29 6.63 8.00 5.48 6.00 5.19 
40.Morris 6.32 7.48 3.46 8.25 4.90 5.29 6.00 
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Leaders 
Leaders 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
41.Phillips 5.83 8.37 5.10 7.21 5.10 4.24 7.07 
42.Priest 6.63 7.74 3.16 8.12 5.10 5.48 5.29 
43.Robertson 5.48 5.48 7.07 7.21 6.00 6.63 6.24 
44.Robison 6.16 4.69 6.78 5.10 5.10 6.16 7.48 
45.Rogers 5.10 2.83 7.87 6.93 6.32 6.93 7.07 
46. Schlafly 6.48 4.90 7.21 5.48 5.48 6.16 7.35 
47.Shakarian 2.24 5.10 6.16 8.00 4.69 5.48 5.66 
48.Talcott 6.00 7.35 3.46 8. 72 5.10 5.48 5.29 
SO.Troxler 6.32 6.93 6.16 6.63 4.00 4.47 7.48 
51. Van Andel 4.90 6.48 5.10 7.07 2.00 2.83 6.93 
52.Viguerie 8.94 7.21 7.35 7.07 8.00 7.75 7.75 
53.Walton 7.48 6.63 5.83 6.93 7.35 7.35 7.21 
54.Weyrich 6.93 5.29 7.21 5.29 5.83 6.16 7.87 
55.Zone 6.32 7.35 6.00 6.48 3.74 4.24 2.62 
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Leaders 
Leaders 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
9.Bundy 7.07 
lO.Crouch 5.47 6.78 
ll.DeMoss 3.16 7.35 6.32 
12.DeVos 3.16 7.35 6.32 1.41 
13.Dixon 5.83 5.48 6.32 6.32 6.32 
14.Dornan 6.93 6.63 7.75 7.21 7.21 6.16 
15.Dugan 6.78 3.16 6.48 7.21 7.21 5.29 6.93 
16.Evans 4.90 4.69 5.66 5.29 5.29 4.47 5.29 
17 .Falwell 5.83 5.29 6.32 6.24 6.32 2.45 6.00 
18.Fowler 4.69 6.63 5.83 5.10 5.10 5.65 5.83 
19.Gimenez 6.16 6.63 2.82 6.78 6.78 5.83 7.35 
20.Graham 6.48 6.48 3.16 6.56 6.63 6.00 7.48 
21.Grant 6.32 6.00 6.63 6.78 6.78 4.69 4.00 
22.Grimsted 5.29 6.16 5.83 5.48 5.48 3.16 5.48 
23.Hargis 6.00 6.16 6.63 5.66 5.66 5.29 5.10 
24.Hatch 6.16 5.83 6.48 6.63 6.63 5.29 4.69 
25 .Hill 6.48 6.63 3.61 7.07 7.07 5.48 7.07 
26.Hunsinger 7.21 6.32 7.48 7.48 7.48 4.69 5.10 
27.Hunter 4.00 6.40 6.78 4.47 4.36 6.16 6. 78 
28.Jackson 3.16 7.21 6.63 2.45 6.32 7.21 7.21 
29.Jarmin 2.62 5.10 6.16 7.48 5.83 6.16 4.90 
30.Jarrill 2.83 7.35 6.48 2.45 2.45 6.32 7.21 
31.Jepsen 6.32 4.69 6.93 6.63 6.63 4.90 3.61 
32.La Haye 7.07 4.00 6.93 7.48 7.48 4.69 5.10 
33.Lundquist 6.32 5.83 3.46 6.93 6.93 6.00 8.49 
34.Lyons 5.66 6.48 6.32 6.00 6.00 4.90 4.69 
35.Manion 5.66 5.10 6.32 5.66 5.66 5.29 5.66 
36.McAteer 6.93 4.47 6.93 7.35 7.35 4.69 7.21 
37 .McCollis. 4.47 5.47 6.00 4.24 4.24 5.66 7.21 
38.McDonald 7.87 5.29 7.87 7.75 7.75 6.32 5.48 
39.Mooneyham 6.32 6.63 3.74 6.63 6.63 6.63 7.75 
40.Morris 3.46 6.48 5.83 3.46 3.46 5.29 6.78 
41. Phillips 5.29 5.66 6.32 5.66 5.66 5.10 6.16 
42.Priest 3.74 6.48 6.00 3.16 3.16 6.00 7.21 
43.Robertson 6.78 6.63 5.66 7.35 7.35 5.29 7.48 
44.Robison 6.78 2.82 6.32 7.21 7.21 4.90 6.78 
45.Rogers 7.21 4.90 5.66 7.87 7.87 6.32 7.75 
46.Schafly 6.93 3.74 6.63 7.21 7.21 4.47 6.93 
47.Shakarian 5.83 6.48 3.46 6.48 6.48 6.16 7.21 
48.Talcott 2.83 7.07 5.66 3.74 3. 74 6.32 7.21 
49.Townsend 5.66 3.16 5.66 6.78 6.78 5.10 7.07 
50.Troxler 5.83 5.48 6.78 6.48 6.48 4.69 3.87 
51. Van Andel 5.10 5.66 5.48 5.48 5.48 4.00 5.66 
52.Viguerie 6.78 7.75 7.35 6.78 6.78 7.21 6.93 
53.Walton 6.16 5.66 7.48 5.92 5.92 6.93 8.25 
54.Weyrich 6.93 4.00 6.93 7.21 7.21 5.48 6.93 
55.Zone 6.00 6.16 6.63 6.16 6.16 4.47 4.24 
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Leaders 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
15.Dugan 
16.Evans 5.29 
17 .Falwell 5.10 4.47 
18.Fowler 6.78 4.69 5.83 
19.Gimenez 6.16 5.48 6.00 6.63 
20.Graham 6.00 5.66 6.00 6.78 2.00 
21.Grant 5.83 4.00 4.69 6.00 6.48 6.78 
22.Grimsted 5.10 2.83 3.74 4.90 5.29 5.48 4.00 
23.Hargis 6.32 4.47 5.29 4.58 6.16 6.32 5.10 
24.Hatch 5.66 4.24 5.29 5.48 6.16 6.32 4.00 
25 .Hill 6.16 5.29 5.48 6.63 2.00 2.45 6.00 
26.Hunsinger 6.32 5.79 4.69 6.63 7.07 7.07 4.00 
27.Hunter 6.78 5.48 6.16 5.10 6.23 6.48 6.32 
28.Jackson 7.21 5.83 6.32 4.90 6.48 6.32 6.78 
29.Jarmin 4.90 6.00 6.16 7.21 7.62 7.62 4.69 
30. Jarrill 7.21 5.10 6.32 4.90 6.48 6.32 6.78 
31. Jepesen 6.00 4.00 4.69 5.83 6.48 6.48 2.00 
32.LaHaye 3.74 5.66 4.69 7.07 6.78 6.78 5.83 
33.Lundquist 6.48 5.66 6.00 6.78 2.00 2.45 6.78 
34.Lyons 6.32 3.46 4.90 4.00 5.83 6.00 4.69 
35.Manion 5.66 4.47 5.29 5.48 5.83 6.00 5.48 
36.McAteer 4.24 5.29 4.47 7.07 6.78 6.93 6.16 
37.McCollist.6.93 5.29 5.66 4.90 6.32 6.00 6.93 
38.McDonald 5.66 5.83 6.00 7.07 7.21 7.48 5.66 
39.Mooneyha. 6.32 5.83 6.00 6.78 2.83 3.16 7.07 
40.Morris 6.48 4.69 5.83 4.47 6.16 6.32 6.32 
41. Phillips 5.48 4.47 5.29 5.48 5.83 6.16 5.10 
42.Priest 6.93 4.90 5.83 4.24 6.48 6.32 6.48 
43.Robertson 6.16 6.48 4.47 7.48 5.10 5.48 6.93 
44.Robison 2.45 5.29 4.90 6.78 6.16 5.83 5.83 
45.Rogers 4.47 6.48 6. 78 7.75 4.90 5.29 6.93 
46.Schafly 3.74 5.29 5.10 6.78 6.48 5.32 5.83 
47.Shakarian 6.00 5.29 6.00 6.48 2.00 2.45 6.48 
48.Talcott 6.93 5.29 6.16 4.90 6.16 6.32 6.78 
49.Townsend 2.83 5.10 4.69 6.32 6.00 6.00 6.00 
50.Troxler 5.83 4.24 4.69 6.00 6.16 6.32 2.45 
51. Van Andel 5.29 3.16 4.24 4.47 4.90 5.10 4.69 
52.Viguerie 7.75 8.00 7.21 7.07 9.06 8.83 6.93 
53.Walton 5.83 7.07 7.07 6.63 7.62 6.78 7.75 
54.Weyrich 3.74 5.29 4.69 6.78 6.78 6.78 6.32 
55.Zone 6.00 4.00 4.47 5.48 6.16 6.32 2.83 
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Leaders 
Leaders 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
23.Hargis 4.24 
24.Hatch 4.24 4.24 
25 .Hill 5.29 6.16 6.16 
26.Hunsinger 5.48 6.00 6.56 6.93 
27.Hunter 5.29 5.10 5.83 6.32 7.07 
28.Jackson 5.48 6.00 6.63 6.63 7.48 4.24 
29.Jarmin 6.00 6.63 5.48 7.35 5.19 7.75 7.87 
30. Jarrill 5.48 6.00 6.78 6.63 7.48 4.24 1.41 
31.Jepsen 4.24 4.69 3.46 6.32 3.74 6.16 6.63 
32.LaHaye 5.48 6.63 6.00 6.63 5.66 7.48 7.48 
33.Lundquist 5.48 6.32 6.48 2.45 7.21 6.48 6.63 
34.Lyons 3.74 3.16 4.90 5.66 7.07 5.48 5.66 
35.Manion 4.00 4.24 5.10 5.66 6.32 4.36 6.00 
36.McAteer 5.48 6.93 6.48 6.63 6.16 7.35 7.21 
37.McCollist.5.48 6.00 6.78 6.32 6.93 5.29 4.47 
38.McDonald 6.16 6.16 5.66 7.21 5.83 7.21 8.00 
39.Mooneyham 5.83 6.63 6.78 3.16 7.48 6.16 6.32 
40.Morris 4.90 5.29 6.32 6.48 7.07 5.10 4.00 
41. Phillips 4.24 5.48 4.69 5.66 6.00 4.24 5.66 
42.Priest 5.10 5.10 6.48 6.63 7.21 4.47 3.74 
43.Robertson 6.00 7.07 6.93 5.29 6.48 7.21 7.07 
44.Robison 5.10 6.32 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.78 7.21 
45.Rogers 6.16 7.35 6.93 5.29 7.21 7.48 7.62 
46.Schlafly 5.10 6.32 5.83 6.32 5.66 6.78 7.21 
47.Shakarian 5.10 6.00 6.16 2.45 7.21 6.16 6.32 
48.Talcott 5.48 5.66 6.48 6.32 7.35 4.47 3.74 
49.Townsend 4.47 6.16 6.00 5.48 6.48 6.63 6.78 
50.Troxler 4.00 4.69 2.82 6.16 4.00 6.00 6.32 
51. Van Andel 2.83 4.24 4.00 4.69 5.29 4.90 5.48 
52.Viguerie 7.87 7.62 6.93 8.94 6.78 7.21 6.93 
53.Walton 6.78 7.75 7.62 7.62 8.00 6.78 5.48 
54.Weyrich 5.29 6.63 6.16 6.63 6.00 7.35 7.21 
55.Zone 3.74 4.90 3.16 6.00 4.24 6.16 6.32 
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Leaders 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 
30.Jarrill 7.87 
31.Jepsen 4.90 6.63 
32.LaHaye 4.69 7.48 6.00 
33.Lundquist 7.35 6.63 6.63 6.63 
34.Lyons 6.48 5.83 4.47 6.63 5.83 
35.Manion 6.78 6.00 5.29 6.32 6.00 4.47 
36.McAteer 5.39 7.21 6.32 2.45 6.63 6.63 6.63 
37.McCollist.7.62 4.24 6.63 7.07 6.32 6.00 5.66 
38.McDonald 4.47 7.87 5.10 5.83 7.21 6.00 6.00 
39.Mooneyham 7.62 6.32 6. 78 6.93 3.16 6.32 6.16 
40.Morris 7.48 4.00 6.16 7.07 6.48 5.29 5.09 
41.Phillips 6.48 5.66 4.90 6.32 6.00 4.47 3.74 
42.Priest 7.62 3.74 6.32 7.21 6.63 5.66 5.48 
43.Robertson 6.93 7.07 6.93 6.00 5.29 6.78 7.07 
44.Robison 4.90 7.21 6.00 3.16 6.00 6.32 5.66 
45.Rogers 6.63 7.62 7.07 5.66 4.90 7.34 6.78 
46. Schafly 5.20 7.21 6.00 3.16 6.32 6.00 3.74 
47.Shakarian 7.35 6.32 6.32 6.93 2.45 5.66 5.66 
48.Talcott 7.75 3.74 6.63 7.48 6.32 5.66 5.29 
49.Townsend 4.69 6.78 6.16 4.00 5.83 5.66 5.48 
50.Troxler 5.10 6.32 2.00 5.48 6.32 4.69 5.10 
51.Van Andel 6.32 5.48 4.24 6.16 5.10 3.16 3.74 
52.Viguerie 7.07 6.93 7.21 7.48 9.06 7.75 7.48 
53.Walton 6.63 5.48 7.75 6.16 7.62 7.48 7.48 
54.Weyrich 4.90 6.78 6.00 3.74 6.63 6.32 6.16 
55.Zone 5.10 6.32 2.45 6.00 6.32 4.47 5.29 
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Leaders 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 
37 .McCollis. 7.07 
38.McDonald 5.66 7.48 
39.Mooneyham 6.63 6.78 7.48 
40.Morris 7.07 2.83 7.07 6.78 
41. Phillips 6.32 6.16 6.16 6.00 5.83 
42.Priest 7.21 3.16 7.21 6.48 2.45 5.66 
43.Robertson 5.65 7.07 7.07 4.90 7.07 6.63 7.35 
44.Robison 3.74 6.32 5.83 6.33 6.93 5.66 7.48 
45.Rogers 6.00 7.35 7.21 5.66 7.48 6.93 7.62 
46.Schafly 3.74 6.32 6.16 7.07 6.78 6.00 6.93 
47.Shakarian 6.93 6.32 7.21 3.16 6.16 5.66 6.32 
48.Talcott 7.21 4.00 5.48 6.48 3.74 5.66 3.74 
49.Townsend 4.00 6.48 5.48 6.16 6.32 5.48 6.48 
SO.Troxler 6.16 6.48 5.29 6.78 6.00 4.69 6.16 
51. Van Andel 6.16 5.48 6.16 5.48 4.90 3.16 5.10 
52.Viguerie 7.55 7.48 8.00 8.83 7.35 7.61 7.35 
53.Walton 5.83 6.63 7.21 7.21 6.63 7.21 6.48 
54.Weyrich 3.74 6.78 5.29 6.93 6.32 6.32 6.93 
55.Zone 6.00 6.32 4.90 6.63 5.83 4.90 6.00 
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Leaders 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 
44.Robison 6.63 
45.Rogers 5.29 4.69 
46.Shafly 6.00 3.16 4.69 
47.Shakarian 4.69 6.32 4.90 6.63 
48.Talcott 7.07 6.93 7.35 6.93 6.00 
49.Townsend 6.00 5.83 5.10 4.00 5.83 6.48 
SO.Trox1er 6.63 5.83 6.93 5.83 6.16 6.48 6.00 
51. Van Andel 6.32 5.48 6.63 5.83 4.69 5.10 4.90 
52.Viguerie 8.00 7.62 8. 72 7.75 6.48 7.07 8.00 
53.Wa1ton 7.07 5.83 6.63 6.16 7.48 6.48 5.66 
54.Weyrich 6.16 3.74 5.66 4.24 6.63 7.21 3.46 
SS.Zone 6.48 6.00 7.07 6.00 6.00 6.32 5.83 
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Leaders 50 51 52 53 54 55 
51. Van Andel 4.00 
52.Viguerie 7.07 8.00 
53.Walton 7.61 7.35 6.93 
54.Weyrich 5.83 5.66 7.75 5.83 
55.Zone 2.00 3.74 7.21 7.48 5.66 
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